The Attorney General of Texas
JIM MATTOX
July 10. 1986
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building Honorable Mark W. S~:iles Opinion No. JM-514
P. 0. Box 12548
Austin. TX. 78711. 2548
Chairman
512,4752501 State Affairs Commi:tee Ret Whether a city may require a
Telex 91018761367 Texas House of Representatives school district to apply for a
Telecopier 5121475.0268 P. 0. Box 2910 special building use permit in
Austin, Texas 787159 order to convert a school facility
714 Jackson, Suite 700
to an administrative facility
Dallas, TX. 752024506
2141742.8944 Dear Representative Stiles:
You inform us that the Beaumont Independent School District has
4824 Alberta Ave., Suite 160
El Paso, TX. 79905-2793
operated an element:aryschool in a residential area of the city of
91515333484 Beaumont. In June, 1985, however, the board of trustees voted to
convert that facility to a central administrative office building for
the school distric,t. In order to obtain the requisite building
-1 Texas, Suite 700 permits for the conrersion, the city required that the school district
,uston, TX. 77002-3111
comply with city z,,ning ordinances requiring it to make application
713,223-W
for a specific use ,?ermit.
808 Broadway, Suite 312 Although the school board complied with all city fire and
Lubbock. TX. 79401-3479 building codes, it a,bjectedto the city's requirements on the ground
8061747-5238
that the city has no authority to require the school district to
follow the specific use application process. The city has, in fact,
4309 N. Tenth, Suite B granted the required permit, but asserts that it has the authority to
McAllen, TX. 78501-1885 require the school district to comply with the permit procedures and
512/582-4547
conditions. In that regard you ask whether a municipality may require
a school district to comply with city zoning ordinances requiring the
200 Main Plaza, Suite 400 school district to apply for a specific use permit in order to convert
San Antonio. TX. 78205-2797 a school facility t) an administrative facility.
51212254191
The issue as presented is governed by the principles of Port
An Equal Opportunityi
Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.Zd?%
Affirmative Action Employer (Tex. 19641, and Austin Independent School District v. City of Sunset
Valley, 502 S.W.2rg70 (Tex. 1973); see also Attorney General Opinion
JM-180 (1984). In Groves, supra, the issue was whether a school
district had to c:omply with the city's building regulations in
constructing a school facility on school property located within the
boundaries of a t,ome rule city. The school district in Groves
contended that the city could not exercise its police power against
the school district because a school district is an independent
political subdivision of the state. State property is exempt from
p. 2358
Honorable Mark W. Stiles - Page 2 (JM-514)
municipal zoning. Attorne:rGeneral~Opinion JM-117 (1983). The Texas
Supreme Court rejected the school district's contention because a
school district.'sproperty should not be classified as state property.
376 S.W.2d at 333. The court held that school buildings of an
independent schooi district are subject to reasonable ordinances of
the city. 376 S.W.2d at 334. The Texas Supreme Court in Sunset
Valley consideied whether t'hecity could, through its zoning regula-
tions, wholly_ prohibit the location of school facilities within its
boundaries. 502 S.W.2d at 671. The court emphasized that the
reasonableness of the scIioc1district's action was not before.it. 502
S.W.2d at 672. Relying on well-established principles of zoning law,
the court held that the c:.ty could not totally exclude schools from
areas zoned residential.~ Id. In both Groves and Sunset Valley, the
proposed buildings were sdool facilities, not administrative offices.
School facilities traditicnally receive special treatment in zoning
law. -See 502 S.W.2d at 67i.
At issue here is the t:ransformationof a school facility into an
administrative office bulLding. The court of appeals in City of
Addison v. Dallas Indepen(.entSchool District, 632 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.
Civ..App~.- Dallas 1982, w;it ref'd n.r.e.), held that a city cannot
declare a legitimate school district action to be a nuisance per ;e
and thereby prohibit the action. At issue was the school district s
use of its property for a b,us:parkingfacility. The court left open
the possibility that the activity could become a nuisance by reason of
its locality, surroundings, or manner of operation. 632 S.W.2d at
774. In essence, the cm.rt held that the city could not totally
foreclose this use of the property simply by declaring the use to be
a nuisance per se. Although the case is not directly applicable
because it turned on nuisance law rather than on zoning law, we
believe that. when it is read with Groves and Sunset Valley, it stands
for the proposition that the city cannot exclude the school district's
administrative offices.
As indicated, however,, the city has not totally excluded the
school district's administrative facility. The city has, in fact,
granted the specific use permit. The city's permit procedure and
conditions are designed to :providea reasonable means to assure that
the health, safety, property and welfare of the people affected by the
proposed land use are prote,cted. The Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Groves makes it clear that a school district's facilities are
subject to reasonable tit], ordinances. 376 S.W.2d at 334. As the
court stated: "To hold smherwise would be to leave a hiatus in
regulation necessary to th6:health and safety of the community." Id.
Accordingly, so long as a city's specific use permit procedures and
conditions do not attempt to totally exclude a school district's
facilities and are reasonably related to the protection of the health,
safety, and welfare of the cmmunity. the school district must comply
with those procedures and conditions.
p. 2359
Honorable Mark W. Stiles - P.sge3 (JM-514)
S U.MM.ARY
The Beaumont Independent School District must
comply with reasonable city of Beaumont's zoning
ordinances in order to convert a classroom
facility to an administrative facility. The city
may not, howe.rer, use its zoning powers
s /ka%
unreasonably to prohibit the conversion.
Very ruly your
A;,
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
JACK HIGHTOWER
First Assistant Attorney General
MARY KELLER
Executive Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Tony Guillory and
Jennifer Riggs
Assistant Attorneys General
p. 2360