.
The Attorney General of Texas
August 31, 1982
MARK WHITE
Attorney General
Honorable Henry Wade Opinion No.MW-509
Supreme Court Building
Criminal District Attorney
P. 0. BOX 12546
Austin. TX. 76711. 2546
601 Elm Street Re: Longevity pay for deputy
5121475.2501 Dallas, Texas 75202 sheriffs
Telex 91Ol674.1367
Telecopier 51214750266 Dear Mr. Wade:
1607 Main St., Suite 1400
Your question concerns article 3912f-7, V.T.C.S., which provides
Dallas, TX. 75201.4709 in pertinent part as follows:
2141742.8944
(a) The commissioners court of each county in
this state with a population of not less than
4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160
El Paso, TX, 799052793
150,000... shall provide longevity pay for each
915/533-3464 commissioned deputy of the sheriff's department in
accordance with this Act.
1220 Dallas Ave., Suite 202
(b) Each commissioned deputy shall receive, in
Houston, TX. 77002.6966
7131650.0666
addition to his regular compensation, longevity
pay of not less than $5 per month for each year of
service in the department. Years of service in
606 Broadway. Suite 312 excess of 25 do not count for the purposes of this
Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479
subsection.
6061747-5236
You inform us that the policy of the Dallas County Commissioners Court
4309 N. Tenth, Suite B is to calculate a deputy sheriff's "longevity pay" on the basis of his
McAlten, TX. 76501-1665 latest period of continuous employment in the department. You ask
5121662.4547
whether this policy is permissible, or whether article 3912f-7
requires pay to be computed on the basis of the total number of years
200 Main Plaza. Suite 400 in which a deputy is employed in the department.
San Antonio. TX. 76205.2797
5121225.4191 Article 3912f-7 states that "longevity pay" shall be provided "in
accordance with this Act." "[Tlhis Act" provides that the amount of
An Equal Opportunity/ such pay shall be "not less than $5 per month for each year of service
Affirmative Action Employer in the department." (Emphasis added). This language is quite
straightforward. Applied literally, it would preclude the policy in
effect in Dallas County.
You in effect contend, however, that the phrase "for each year of
service in the department" should not be construed literally, but
should be treated as if it reads as follows: "for each year of
[continuous] service [during the most recent period of employment] in
p. 1838
.
Honorable Henry Wade - Page 2 cm- 509
the department." Essentially, you argue that: (1) the purpose of
article 3912f-7 is not merely to provide deputies with additional
compensation, but is to reward continuous employment and thereby
create an incentive for deputies to remain in the same sheriff's
department; and (2) the legislature's choice of the word "longevity,"
which is defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as "long
continuance; esp. seniority," indicates that it had continuous, and
not total service in mind when it enacted the statute. Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary 678 (5th ed. 1977).
For the following reasons, we conclude that there is in this
instance no legitimate basis for departing from the literal language
of the statute.
As the Texas Supreme Court stated in Sweeny Hospital District v.
w, 378 S.W.Zd 40 (Tex. 1964), courts will rewrite statutes only
"when necessary to give effect to legislative intent, provided the
intent... is clearly disclosed by the remainder of the statute."
(Emphasis added). See State v. Shoppers World, Inc., 380 S.W.Zd 107
(Tex. 1964). In this instance, we are not persuaded that the
legislature's intent in enacting article 3912f-7 must have been to
reward only continuous employment. It could just as plausibly have
been to reward deputies for their total experience in a department,
whether acquired on a piecemeal basis or not, in order to encourage
experienced officers to return to service. Since the statute does not
"clearly disclose" that the legislature's intent was to reward only
continuous employment, we decline to add to the statute the words
which would be "necessary to give effect to that intent." Sweeny
Hospital District v. Carr, a.
Your second argument places too much emphasis upon the word
"longevity" and not enough upon the other words in the statute. Even
if we assume arguendo that "longevity pay" usually suggests pay based
upon uninterrupted seniority or length of continuous service, it does
not follow that the term has this meaning in all contexts. When
construing statutes, one must look not just to isolated words, but to
the entire act. Ex parte Pruitt, 551 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977); Ex parte
Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1974). When article 3912f-7 is
considered in its entirety, it becomes clear that in the context of
this statute the term "longevity" has been defined by the legislature
toean a prescribed amount of money "for each year of service in the
department" without modification.
It has been suggested that Attorney General Opinion MW-100 (1979)
requires a different result. However, that opinion merely addressed
the question of whether a period of military service which comes
between two periods of service with the state is to be counted for
longevity purposes under article 6813d, V.T.C.S. Neither it nor other
opinions of this office, see, e.g., Attorney General Opinions M-250
p. 1839
I I
Honorable Henry Wade - Page 3 (MW- 509
(1968); M-886 (1971). even touch upon the question of whether two
interrupted periods of employment are to be combined for longevity
purposes under either article 6813d or article 3912f-7.
You also ask whether article 3912k, V.T.C.S., which provides that
county commissioners shall fix the amount of compensation for deputies
paid wholly from county fund, controls over article 3912f-7. Article
3912k was adopted at the Sixty-second Legislative Session, while
article 3912f-7 was adopted at the Sixty-third Legislative Session.
Since article 3912f-7 is the more recent and more specific statute, it
controls article 3912k where the two conflict.
In summary, we conclude that article 3912f-7, V.T.C.S., requires
that deputy sheriffs be given "not less than $5 per month for each
year of service in the department," whether or not such service is
continuous. See Taylor v. Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service
Commission, 616.W.Zd 187 (Tex. 1981).
SUMMARY
Article 3912f-7, V.T.C.S., requires that deputy
sheriffs be given "not less than $5 per month for
each year of service in the department," whether
or not such service is continuous.
Very truly yours,
MARK WHITE
Attorney General of Texas
JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
First Assistant Attorney General
RICHARD E. GRAY III
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Jon Bible
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Susan L. Garrison, Chairman
Jon Bible
Rick Gilpin
Patricia Hinojosa
Bruce Youngblood
p. 1840