The Attorney General of Texas
July 27, 1979
lARK WHITE
ittorney General
Honorable W. B. Anderson Opinion No. MW-34
Lamar County Auditor
Lamar County Courthouse Re: Authority of a county to pay
Paris, Texas a former county judge for services
rendered in acquiring right-of-way
for the ‘county.
Dear Mr. Anderson:
You have requested our opinion regarding the authority of a county to
pay a former county judge for services rendered in acquiring right-of-ways
for the county. The county attorney has issued an opinion in thii matter
with which you disagree. We have asked that you provide us with the dates
of the various transactions, and our opinion is based on the narrative you
have provided.
You state that, on December 28, 1978, prior to the expiration of his
term, the county~judge of Lamar. County made an informal agreement with
each other member of the commissioners court. Under the terms of the
contract, the county judge would act as the agent for the county in squiring
parcels of land for a highway project. On January 8,1979, after the county
judge had left office, the commissioners court officially considered the
matter, but left it unresolved. On January 22,1979, the commissioners court
assigned all further duties in regard to obtaining rxht-of-way to the county
attorney’s office. Subsequently, the former county judge submitted his
claim for $l,SllO.OO for services rendered from January l-26. On April 9,
1979, the commissioners court, on the basis of the December 28 contract,
authorized a payment of $800.00 to the former judge. You ask a number of
questions regarding the validity of these actions.
Article 2340, V.T.C.S., requires that, upon entering the duties of
office, a county judge and each member of the commissioners court
take a written oath that he will not be directly or
indirectly interested in any contract with, q claim
against, the county in which he resides. . . .
It has long been firmly established in this state that a contract between a
public official and the public body of which he is a member is contrary to
P- 101
* Honorable W. E. Anderson - Page Two (NN-341
public policy and therefore void, if the official has any personal pecuniary interest in the
contract. Bexar County v. Wentworth, 378 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio
1964, writ refed n.r.e.); Starr County v. Guerra, 297 S.W.%d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. - San
Antonio 1956, no writ); Meyers v. Walker, 276 S.W. 305 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1925,
no writ). This office has said that the purpose of article 2340 is “to eliminate any conflicts
of interest between the county and those who manage its fiscal affairs.” Attorney
General Opinion No. II*24 (19751. See Attorney General Opinions M-R40 (1972); WW-1406
(1962). Even compelling circumstances are not sufficient to render such a contract lawful.
Attorney General Opinions H-734, H-695 (1975). Since, under the circumstances you have
described, the contract was entered into while the individual still occupied the office of
county judge, we must conclude that it was void ab. initio. Such a contract may not be
subsequently ratified, Limestone County v. Knox, 234 S.W. 131 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas
1921, no writ), and thus,’ the $800.00 payment by the commissioners court on April 9,1979,
on the basis of that contract, was invalid.
SUMMARY
Under the circumstances described, a commissioners court may not
authorize payment to a former county judge for services rendered
under a contract with the county entered into while the judge still
occupied his office.
MARK WHITE
Attorney General of Texas
JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
First Assistant Attorney General
TED L. HARTLEY
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
C. Robert Heath, Chairman
David B. Brocks
Walter Davis
Susan Garrison
Rick Gilpin
William G Reid
Bruce Youngblood
p. 102
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Combined Opinion