THEATTORNEYGENERAL
OF-TEXAS
AUSTIN. TZMAS 76711
JOaN L EIXL
A-- o-A&
August 23, 1974
The Honorable Jim Clark, Chairman Opinion No. H- 379
House Committee on Labor
House of Representatives Re: Qualifications of signers
P. 0. Box 2910 of a petition under the
Austin, Texas 78767 Fire and Police Employee
Relations Act, Article
Dear Representative Clark: 5154c-1, Sec. 5(b), V. T.C.S.
You have requested the opinion of this office on the following question:
Is a person who is a qualified voter of the city, town
or other political subdivision in which a local option
petition under Article 5154c-1 is circulated eligible to
sign the petition, without regard to whether the per son
voted in the last preceding general election in that
political subdivision?
Article 5154c-1, Sec. 5(b), V. T. C.S. (Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 81.
p. 151) reads in relevant part:
Upon receiving a petition signed by the lesser of five
percent or 20,000 of the gualified voters voting in
the last preceding general election in such city, town,
or political subdivision, the,gq.verning body of such
city, town or political subdivision shall hold an elec-
tion within 60 days after said petition has been filed
with such governing body. (Emphasis added)
The underlined language is ambiguous in that it is subject to two possible
interpretations: (1) that a qualified voter must have voted in the last pre-
ceding general election in order to be eligible to sign such petition; or (2) that
the petition must be signed by a number of qualified voters equal to the lesser
of 20,000 or five percent of the number of votes cast in the past preceding
general election.
p. 1777
The Honorable Jim Clark, page 2 (H-379)
Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, construction becomes
necessary. Koy v. Schneider, 221 S. W. 880 (Tex. 1920).
The fundamental rule controlling the construction
of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legis-
lature expressed therein. That intention should be
ascertained from the entire act, and not from isolated
portions thereof.
City of Mason v. West Texas Utilities Co., 237 S. W. 2d 273. 278
(Tex. 1951).
Thus, in order to determine the correct.interpretation of Sec. 5(b) of
Article 5154c-1, the entire statute must be considered and discussed
in light of the aims and purposes of the Legislature with respect to
collective bargaining rights for firefighters and policemen in Texas.
Section Z(b)(l) of Article 5154c-1 states:
(1) It is also the policy of the State of Texas that
firefighters and policemen, like employees in the
private sector, should have the right to organize
for purposes of collective bargaining, for collec-
tive bargaining is deemed to be a fair and practical
method for determining wages and other conditions
of employment for the employees who comprise the
paid fire and police departments of the cities, towns,
and other political subdivisions within this state. A
denial to such employees of the right to organize
and bargain collectively would lead to strife and un-
rest, with consequent injury to the health, safety
and welfare of the public. The protection of the
health, safety, and welfare of the public, however
demands that strikes, lockouts, work stoppages
and sl.owdowns of firefi.ghters and policemen be pro-
hibited; therefore, it ins the obligation of the state
to make available reasonable alternatives to strikes
by employees in these protective services.
p- 1778
,
The Honorable Jim Clark, page,3 ~(H-379)
. . .
(3) With the right to strike prohibited, it is requisite
to the high morale of firefighters and policemen, and
to the efficient operation of the departments which they
serve, that alternative procedures be expeditious,
effective, and binding. To that end, the provisions of
this Act should be liberally construed.
In construing the statute, .the court must look to the object to be
accomplished and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction which
will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it. 82 C. J, S.
593, Statutes, Sec. 323. An act should be given a practical and reason-
able rather than a literal construction so as to accomplish as nearly as
possible the intent of the Legislature. Brown & Root-v. Durland, 84 S. W. 2d
1073 (Tex. 1935).
It is clear from the language of Article 5154c-1 that the Legislature
intended to provide reasonable collective bargaining rights for police-
men and firefighters on a local option basis. It is also clear that the
Legislature sought to prescribe the method by which such local option
election could be called by providing for submission of a petition to the
local governing body. To interpret the language in question to mean that
a person signing such peti,tion must have actually voted in the last pre-
ceding general election would only serve to fnntmte the clear public
policy established by the Legislature. One seeking to comply with the
requirements set forth to call an election would be faced with an undue
burden of determining not only a potential signee’s present qualification
to vote but whether or not such person actually voted in the last pre-
ceding general electi.on. Such a result would lead to harsh consequences
not intended by the Legi,slature.
Furthermore, were we to construe the statute that persons who did
not vote in the last gen,eral election were ineligible to sign a petition,
serious constituti.onal questions would be presented.
It is therefore our opinion that
the lesser of five percent or 20,000 of the qualified
voters voting in the last preceding general election
. . .
p. 1779
. .
The Honorable Jim Clark, page 4 (H-379)
states a formula for determining the requisite number of qualified voters
who must sign a petition calling a local option election under this statute.
SUMMARY
Section 5(b) of Article 5451c-1, V. T. C. S., The
Fire and Police Employee Relations Act, requires
that a petition for an election be signed by 5% of
the number of qualified voters who voted in the last
preceding general election or 20.000. whichever is
less, and not that those signing must have themselves
voted in that previous election.
Very truly yours,
Attorney General of Texas
APP’R$j ED:
.,P
DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman
Opinion Committee
p. 1780
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Combined Opinion