_‘^ R-852
OFFICE OF
THE ATT RNEY GENERAL
AUSTIN,TEXAS
PRICE DANIEL
ATTORNEYGENERAL November 15, 1947
Eon. Ernest Guinn Opinion No. V-432
County Attorney
El Paso County Re: Constitutionality of H. B.
El Paso, Texas 796, Acts 50th Leg., 1947,
as it relate3 to juvenile
officers in El Paso County.
Dear HP. Quinn:
Your recent request for an opinion of this
office relates to the constitutionality of H. B. ,796,
Acts of the 50th Legislature, 1947. It is assumed that
your request pertains to El Paso County; and, therefore,
this opinion will be limited to that portion of the Act
relating to those counties with a population of eighty
thOUsend 80,000) and less than one hundred and fifty
thousand t150,000) inhabitants. H. B. 796 is an Act
amending Article 5142, V.C.S., and is in part as fol-
lows:
"Provided that in counties havin a
population of eighty thousand (80,0007 and
less than one hundred and fifty thousand
(150,000), the county judge may appoint a
juvenile officer subject to the approval of
the County Juvenile Board for a period not
to exceed two (2) years from date of appoint-
ment at a salary not to exceed Three Hundred
and Fifty Dollars ($350) per month and ex-
penses as recommended by the Board a;tc;p-
proved by the Commissioners Court.
juvenile officer may select such assistant
juvenile offlcers~,asare necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act, subject to
the approval of the county judge and the
County Juvenile Board; provided the number
may not exceed ten (10). The salaries and
expenses of suoh assistant juvenile officers
shall be in amounts recommended by the Board
subject to approval of the Court.
"Provided that in counties h8Vlng 8~
opulatlon of one hundred and fifty thousand
P150,000) or more, and containing a city of
’ .
‘.
I
Hon. Ernest Guinn - Page 2 (v-432)
one hundred thousand (100,903) or more, the
County judge may eppoint-8 juvenile officer,
subject to the approve1 of the County Juve-
nile Board, to serve for 8 period not to ex-
ceed two (2) years from the dete of appoint-
ment, and whose extre duties shall be to make
investigations for the Commissioners Court on
appllc8tlon3 for charity, or edmittance into
detention home3 or orphsn homes Cre8ted by
such counties. The salary of such juvenile
OfficeP shell not exceed Three Hundred Dol-
lars ($300) per month, his allowance for ex-
penses not to exceed Two Hundred Dollars ($200)
a yesr. Such juvenile officer mey select aa-
slatant juvenile officers, subject to the ap-
prove1 of the county judge and the County Juve-
nile Board, the number of such assistant juve-
nile officers not to exceed one (1) assistant
to each twenty-five thousand (25,300) popula-
tion. The selariea of such assistent juvenile
officers ah811 be the same as that fixed by
the General L8w in Article 3902 of the Revised
@vi1 Stati& af Texas, 1925, for assistants
to othez.eopqty orficials. Such assistant
juvenile officers msy be allowed ex enses not
to exceed Two Hundred Doll8rS ($200P per year
esch."
&ti,cle III, Section 56, constitution of Texas.'
provides in part as follows:
"The Legislature aball not, except as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass
any local or special lew, euthorising:. . .
"Regulating the affairs of counti.es,cit%es,
towns, election or sahool districts; . . .
"Creating offices, or prescribing the psw-
era and duties of officers, in counties. . .
The question for determination is whether this
Act purporting to fix the compensation of juvenile Offi-
cers of counties in certain population brackets ViOlate
the above constitutional provision relating to 10~81 or
SpeCi8.118W3, In 8n spproach to this question, the COUrt
In Oakley v. Kent, 181 S.W. (26) 919, steted as follows:
-.
Hon. Ernest Guinn - P8ge 3, (V-432)
"'A law which epplles only to 8 part of
8 nAtUral cl883 of persons or things must
predicate its inclusi,onof the p8rt end ex-
ClUSiOn of the balance upon ChRracteriatics
peculisr to the pert, which, considering the
objects 8~ndpurposes of the law, afford ree-
3On8ble ground for restricting the applica-
tion of the law to the pert, Gl83'3ifiC8tiOn
must be reaaoneble and netur8.1,not arbitrery
8nd C8priciOua. ArbitrRry designation is not
clasaificstion. The vice of locel or special
laws is that they rest on arbitrerg designe-
tiOn; th8t they do not embra~ce8nd sffect 811
of the class to which they sre naturally re-
lated. . . .
"'Because population 83 * basis for clas-
aificetion hea been SU3t8ined by the courts in
respect to legislation on ce.rtainsubjects, it
has been 88SUmed, erroneously, th8t population
brackets will aerve in all instances to avoid
the condemnation of the Constitution. This
misteken assumption proceeds from 8 feilure to
note th8t population h33 been austsined aa 8~
besis for claaaificetion only in those Instances
where it bore 8 reasoneble relation to the ob-
jects 8nd purposes of the law and ~8s founded
upon rational difference in the necessities or
conditions of the groups subjected to different
laws. Where it has been determined tkRt, con-
sidering the objects 8nd purposes of the lew,
differences in population afford no rational
basis for discriminating between groups of the
acme nstura1 Cl833, cl8saific8tion on the b8sia
of population has been termed a,rbitPe,ry
aelec-
tion, and the law has been held to be specie1
end lOC81. . . .'II
In the case of Clark v. Finley, 93 Tex. 171, 54
S.W. 343,the Supreme Court recognized the fact that the
Legisleture could resort to populetion br8ckets for the
purpose of fixing fees of officers in certain cases. But
there must be a subatential re8son for the classification.
It must not be 8 mere 8rbitrflrydevice resorted to for
the purpose of giving what is in f8Ct 8 lOC81 18W the 8p-
pear8nce of a gener81 18w. Miller v. El P8ao County, 136
Tex. 370, 150 S.W. (2d) 1000; Anderson v. Wood, 137 Tex.
f;;, 152 S.W. (2d) lOo4; Ex psrte Csrson, 159 S.W. (28)
Hon. Ernest Guinn - Page 4 (V-432)
In the case of Bexar County v. Tynan, 128 Tex.
223, 97 S.W. (26) 467, the Court stated:
'Conversely, we think it true that if
the Legislature ignores the obvious fact
that the work of county officers Is pro-
portionate to population and classifies
counties in such way that the compensation
Of OffiC8PS Of a COUIltyhaving a large pOpU-
lation is fixed far below the compensation
allOWed like officers In small counties,
such action amounts to fixing a classlfica-
tion which is arbitrary and which has no
true relevancy to the purpose of the legis-
lation. we think that it necessarily fol-
lows from all the circumstances that the
Legislature Intended to single out Bexar
County as being the only county intended to
be e,ffectedby the legislation, and the act
was undoubtedly a special lav."
H. B. 796 provides, among other things, that
the salary of juvenile officers in counties having a
population of 150,000 inhabitants OP more and oontain-
ing a city of 100,000 inhabitants or more shall not ex-
ceed $300 er month with an a.llowancefor expenses not
t0 eXCe8d 1200 a year. The juvenile officer In counties
in this population bracket may be allowed one assistant
for eaoh 25,000 population. In counties with a popula-
tion of eighty thousand (80,000) a,ndless than one hun-
dred fifty thousa.nd(150,000) Inhabitants, the maxisurs
salary of juvenile officers is $350.00 per month and ex-
penses 8,srecommended by the Board and approved by the
Commissioners' Court. The juvenile officer in COUIIti8S
in this population bracket may be allowed a leaXiISUm of
ten assistants. By way of comparison a juvenile officer
in a county with a population of 150,003 inhabitants
would b8 entitled to a salary of $300 per month and Six
assistants, whereas a juvenile officer in a county with
a population of 14g,OOO inhabitants would be entitled
to a salary of $350 per month and ten assistants. It is
Well Settled that an Act 8XC8pting Certain COtlnti8SOr
fixing salaries arbitrarily is a local or special law
within th8 meaning of the COnStitUtion. If, by the terms
of an Act, counties are Classifi8d in such a way that
the oompeneatlon of a juvenile officer of a oounty hav-
ing a large population is fixed far below the compensa-
tion allowed the jUV8nil8 Officer in Sl%&llel'
COUntiBS,
Hon. Ernest Guinn - Page 5 (V-432)
the same amounts to fixing a classification which is
arbitrary and has no relevancy to the purpose of the
Act. It therefore follows that the Act allows 'uve-
nil8 Officers in Counties with a population Of 4 0,000
to 150,000 inhabitants larger salaries than those juve-
nile officers in larger counties. Such classification
is an arbitrary one and is void as a special or local
law. Since the classification does not bear a reason-
able relation to the object and purposes of the law, it
is the opinion of this Department that the portion of
H. B. 796 relating to those counties with a population
of 80,000 to 150,000 inhabitants is a local or special
law and is in contravention of Article III, Section 56,
of the State Constitution.
SUMMARY
That portion of H. B. 796, R. S., 50th
Leg.9 1947, relating to the appointment of
juvenile officers in El Paso County and re-
lated counties In the same population bracket
is a looal or special law containing arbi-
trary classifications and is in contravention
of Art. III, Sec. 56, of the Texas Constitu-
tion. Bexar County v. Tynan, 97 S.W. (26)
467; Clark v. Finley, 54 S.W. 343;Oakley v.
Kent, 181 S.W. (26) 919; Anderson v. Wood,
152 S.W. (26) 1084, 137 Tex. 201; Miller v.
El Paso County, 150 S.W. (2d) 1000.
Very truly yours
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
BYBurn811 Waldrep
BW:djm Assistant
APPROVED:
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Combined Opinion