In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.S., Mother, J.D.W., Father, and J.W., Minor Child, T.S. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Feb 21 2017, 8:48 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marianne Woolbert Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Majorie Newell
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination February 21, 2017
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of T.S., Mother, J.D.W., Father,1 48A02-1606-JT-1496
and J.W., Minor Child, Appeal from the
T.S., Madison Circuit Court
The Honorable
Appellant-Respondent,
G. George Pancol, Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
48C02-1508-JT-61
Indiana Department of Child
Services,

1
Father does not participate in this appeal; however, according to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), a party of
record in the trial court shall be a party on appeal.

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 Appellee-Petitioner.

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] T.S. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental

rights to her child, J.W. (“Child”). On appeal, Mother raises the following

restated issue: whether the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights was

clearly erroneous because it was based on insufficient evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History2
[3] Mother and J.D.W (“Father”) are the biological parents of Child, born June 6,

2004. Mother placed Child in the care of Father and Father’s girlfriend

sometime after December 25, 2013. A few days later, on New Year’s Eve,

Father checked himself into a rehabilitation center for alcoholism, leaving Child

in the girlfriend’s care. On January 4, 2014, the girlfriend kicked Child out of

2
The juvenile court also terminated Child’s father’s parental rights; however, the father does not appeal.
Here, we set forth only the facts pertinent to the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

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 the home, saying that she no longer wanted to care for Child. DCS Ex. N at 2.

The police became involved and contacted Mother, who said that she could not

at that time care for Child. Accordingly, DCS took Child into its custody.

[4] On January 8, 2014, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need

of services (“CHINS”). When Mother did not appear at the initial hearing, the

CHINS court continued the hearing to January 22, 2014. At that time, Mother

again failed to appear, and the CHINS court entered a default order finding

Child to be a CHINS. At the February 2014 dispositional hearing, the CHINS

court set aside the default judgment and, over DCS’s objection, allowed Mother

to enter a general admission. The CHINS court then ordered Mother to

participate in and follow the recommended services, including, individual

counseling, parent evaluation, and substance abuse evaluation. The CHINS

court also ordered Mother to have supervised visitation with Child. At the July

2014 review hearing, the CHINS court found that Mother had not complied

with Child’s case plan, had continued to test positive for illegal substances, and

had failed to enhance her ability to fulfill parental obligations.

[5] About a year later, on July 23, 2015, the CHINS court ordered Child’s

permanency plan changed from reunification to adoption. By August 2015, the

CHINS court had suspended Mother’s visitation and most of her services. That

same month, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to

Child. At a review hearing, the juvenile court set the matter for a December

2015 fact-finding hearing, which was rescheduled to February 2016 on

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 Mother’s motion. Ultimately, the fact-finding hearing was held on February

23, 2016 and continued on May 16, 2016.

[6] During the course of the proceedings, Child was placed in her first foster home

in February 2014, where she remained until June 2014, at which time her foster

parents reported that they could no longer care for Child because she was

physically and verbally aggressive, and she could not get along with another

child in the home. In June 2014, Child was placed in a second foster home,

where she remained until December 2015. In December 2015, Child’s

behavior, again, resulted in Child being removed from the home, and when

Child threatened she was going to harm herself, she was admitted to the

hospital. After Child left the hospital, she was placed in a third foster home.

Child lived in the third foster home for only a few days until her behavior

caused her to be placed in a treatment facility; Child still lived in the treatment

facility at the time of the February 23, 2016 evidentiary hearing. On February

29, 2016, Child left the treatment facility and was placed in the fourth foster

home, where she resided at the time of the May, 16, 2016 hearing.

[7] A total of seven witnesses testified at the two-day evidentiary hearing.3 On the

first day of the hearing, Michelline Gaddis (“Gaddis”), a home-based therapist

with Youth Service Bureau, testified that she began working with Child around

December 2014, when Child was approximately ten years old. Gaddis met

3
We note that Mother arrived late at first day of the hearing held, on February 23, 2016, and did not appear
at the second day of the hearing, held on May 16, 2016.

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 with Child on a weekly basis, but she never met Mother. Tr. at 15, 33. Tests

revealed that Child suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 18.

Accordingly, Gaddis determined that Child would benefit from “a trauma focus

CBT approach,” which was a twelve-week program, “working through a

workbook, . . . identifying emotions and those emotional triggers that go along

with trauma.” Id. at 16. Child had a “broken relationship” with Mother,

which manifested itself in Child’s aggression and feelings of abandonment. Id.

at 17-18. Gaddis testified that Child completed the program and made great

strides toward identifying emotions and their impact on her behavior, thereby,

allowing her to manage her behavior. Id. at 17. Right after completing the

program, Child “was in a really good place” and had “a toolbox . . . of coping

skills.” Id. at 19. However, Child was still visiting with Mother, which made

Child uncertain about her future and “frustrated about the whole situation of

not knowing what comes next for her.” Id. at 22-23. The visits also made

Child susceptible to emotional triggers, which in turn resulted in Child being

physically and verbally aggressive at school and at home. One evening, Child

was in “a high state of agitation” and was pacing and ripping up paper. Id. at

23. That night, Child’s behavior escalated to the point where she threatened

and choked her second foster mother. Id. at 22, 23.

[8] Gaddis testified that Child had been through complex trauma, having witnessed

violence while living with Mother. Id. at 24, 25. Additionally, individuals

came in and out of her life, which created “a lot of fear of the unknown[,] of

unknown people.” Id. at 26. Based on Child’s escalating bad behavior, and

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 because that behavior was affecting Child’s “daily functioning,” Gaddis

recommended that visitation with Mother be suspended. Id. at 28. Gaddis

stated that Child was “a bit calmer” after visitation with Mother was

suspended; however, Child was still aware of timelines and “where things were

in the Court setting.” Id. at 29. Gaddis testified that Child needed “security

and consistency,” and it was in Child’s best interest to “move on[,] . . . she

needs somebody to care for her.” Id. at 32.

[9] At the second day of the fact-finding hearing, Paula Scott (“FCM Scott”), a

DCS permanency family case manager, testified that Child was in her fourth,

and current, foster home, she was “doing very well” in her new placement, and

she was coming “out of her shell.” Id. at 49. During FCM Scott’s visits, Child,

initially, had been shy and would not speak for herself; now Child was “more

than willing to have a conversation.” Id. FCM Scott testified that Child now

carries on like a typical eleven-year-old girl, playing softball and doing well in

school. Id. As part of the CHINS dispositional order, Mother was ordered to

participate in individual and family counseling, complete parenting and

substance abuse evaluations, and take part in supervised visitation with Child.

Id. at 56. FCM Scott stated that Mother’s visitation with Child had been at the

home, but was moved after incidents where neighbors came to the house

“highly intoxicated” and others were present during visitation without

authorization. Id. at 65. When told that these interruptions were inappropriate,

Mother always responded, that she “couldn’t keep people away.” Id. FCM

Scott testified that, “it was always one excuse after another” as to why Mother

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 could not make her visits. Id. at 66. Mother’s visitation was suspended in July

2015 because she was not compliant with the visitation rules, she cancelled or

“no-showed” some of the visits, and Child asked to no longer visit with Mother.

Id. at 63-64. Mother had not seen Child since visitations were suspended. Id. at

69. Although Mother called a few times to say she wanted to reestablish visits

or phone calls with Child, FCM Scott testified that, “as with most things with

[Mother,] it’s always discussion and it’s never put into action.” Id. at 67. FCM

Scott testified that during the CHINS and termination proceedings, Mother had

been unable to keep consistent housing for herself. Id. at 68.

[10] FCM Scott testified that Mother had taken about twenty-five random drug

screens since January 2014, nineteen of which were positive, showing the

presence of substances such as amphetamine, methamphetamine, ephedrine,

THC, and cocaine. Id. FCM Scott testified that Mother complied with none of

the service recommendations, and communication with Mother was sporadic

because providers “always [had] to leave voice mails.” Id. at 78-79. FCM Scott

stated that the permanency plan for Child was adoption, and Child had made

progress toward that goal by “making herself responsible for her own actions

and her own behaviors” and the consequences therefrom. Id. at 80. FCM

Scott, who had last seen Child in late April 2016, stated, “[F]rom everything

that I’m hearing and seeing so far she is doing very well.” Id. at 81.

[11] Barbara Baumgartner (“Baumgartner”), a therapist with Meridian Health

Services, had worked with Child since March 2016. She testified that Child had

experienced significant trauma while living with Mother and, as a result, was

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 closed off and had trust issues. Tr. at 91. Baumgartner indicated that therapy

was going well and that Child “knows she needs to deal with the issues she is

facing.” Id. at 93. One aspect of the therapy encourages Child to build her self-

esteem so that she can talk about the emotional issues of her past. Id. at 94.

Baumgartner described that in the prior two months Child had improved in

matters of trust and emotional openness. Id. at 95. Baumgartner opined that

Child needs to be involved and given support, especially since further delving

into Child’s past will “trigger” challenging behavior. Id. at 96, 98. The current

foster mother is supportive and comes to most of the therapy sessions. Id. at 98.

Baumgartner stated that Child was progressing well in her current foster home,

and the family, who has one other child (“E.”), includes Child in family

activities and vacations. Id. at 96. Child is learning and adjusting to a “sibling

type of competitive experience.” Id. Baumgartner stated that predictability is

“monumental” for any child that has suffered the kind of trauma suffered by

Child, and it is also important for Child to have consistency, continuation, and

structure. Id. at 99-100. It was Baumgartner’s belief that the foster family

provides those things for Child. Id. at 98-100. Further, Baumgartner stated that

Child has only spoken of Mother once, and that was to say that she did not

want to see Mother. It was Baumgartner’s opinion that it would be detrimental

for Child to resume visitation or have contact with Mother, concluding that it is

in Child’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 102.

[12] Karen Royer (“Royer”), a therapist with Villages of Indiana, had been involved

in the therapeutic visitation between Mother and Child since around August

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 2014. As such, she helped mediate the visits and trained Mother on parenting

skills. Royer stated that she was scheduled to meet with Mother once a week,

but Mother missed about one meeting a month. Royer testified that the

locations of the meetings changed from homes to libraries to motels because

Mother was “moving around from one place to another.” Tr. at 110-11. Royer

helped Mother focus on positive things in her life, such as maintaining sobriety

and developing judgment concerning who she could trust.4 Id. at 112. Main

goals for Mother were to establish stability in her life, get a job, get a home, and

try to reestablish positive relationships with family members. Id. Royer

testified that, to date, Mother had made limited progress, and she lacked

stability in both her housing and finances. Id. at 113-14. Royer stated that

Mother was usually late for her visits with Child and that Child asked that the

visits stop, knowing that Mother’s parental rights might be terminated. Id. at

116-17. When asked whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated,

Royer stated that it is in Child’s best interest to stay in foster placement, mostly

because of Mother’s lack of stability in her life and her history of not being able

to parent a child that has severe behavioral problems. Id. at 119-20.

[13] Cory McCoy (“FCM McCoy”), a permanency family case manager for DCS,

had worked with Mother, since January 2016, in a CHINS case involving

Mother and her sixteen-year-old child (“C.”). The allegations against Mother,

4
In the past, one of Mother’s friends stole her clothes, and another stole her dog. Tr. at 113.

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 which were later substantiated, indicated that Mother and C. were homeless,

and Mother was abusing substances. A follow-up report stated that Mother and

C. had gotten into a fight, and Mother had broken C.’s hand. Id. at 124. C.

was removed from Mother’s care and placed in “kinship placement,” a home

where Mother and C. had previously lived. Id. at 128. There, C. sustained

third degree burns caused by sulfuric acid that she had been using to make

methamphetamine. Id. at 127. As part of services, Mother was ordered to take

drug screens. The most recent drug screen was conducted on April 8, 2016,

about one month before the termination hearing, and indicated a positive result

for the presence of methamphetamine and marijuana. Id. at 126.

[14] Delisa Strange (“Strange”), the current foster mother, testified that Child was

placed in her home in February 2016 and that Child lived with Strange, her

husband, and their son, E., who the parents had adopted after he was their

foster child. The family lives in a four-bedroom house with three dogs, and

Child has her own room. Strange, who testified that she did not work outside

the home, stated that Child was doing extremely well at the home, completes

required chores, and complies with house rules. Id. at 131. Child also does

well in school and plays softball two times a week, and Strange had not

received any negative reports from school. Child is easy to get along with,

friendly, respectful, and well-mannered in public. Strange stated that Child is

“just a sweet kid[],” and although “we still have our quirks,” “we all seem to be

getting along pretty well.” Id. at 131. Strange indicated that Child was going to

accompany the family on vacations to Virginia Beach and outings to French

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 Lick and the Daytona Air Museum. Id. at 132. Strange reported that, with the

help of Baumgartner’s therapy, Child and E. have learned that they both have a

spot in the home and that no one is being pushed out. Id. at 33. Strange has

helped Child with her reading, takes Child and E. to the library, and is

encouraging Child to meet her parenting goals. Id. at 134. Child has expressed

to Strange that she loves the family and wants to stay in the home, but she

understands that, since she has lived in the home for only a few months, things

will be taken day to day, and adoption will be discussed when it is time. Id. at

137.

[15] Nellie Elsten, Child’s court appointed special advocate (“the CASA”), was

appointed in September 2015. The CASA, who visited with Child once a

month, testified that she last had contact with Child in April 2016. Id. at 141.

Prior to placement with the Strange family, Child was shy, and her voice was

very soft for the first half hour of the CASA’s visit. In the current foster home,

Child is “a very different child”; she is outgoing and talkative, speaks for

herself, and is cheerful. Id. at 142. The CASA testified that it is in Child’s best

interests that Mother’s parental rights be terminated to allow Child to be placed

for adoption. Id.

[16] At the close of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found that DCS had

met its burden of proof, and it granted DCS’s request to terminate Mother’s

parental rights. Id. at 143. On June 8, 2016, the juvenile court entered its order

terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother now appeals.

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 Discussion and Decision
[17] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In

re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

“However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of

the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination.” Id. at

1188. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child’s

emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. “Although the right to

raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better

home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is

unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities.” Id.

[18] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS is

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree[;]

....

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

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 (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS’s burden of proof for establishing these

allegations in termination cases is one of clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K.

v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). If the court finds

that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true,

the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[19] When reviewing a termination of parental rights issue, our court will not

reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 56

N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider “only the evidence and any

reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment,” and give “‘due

regard’ to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses

firsthand.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. Here, in terminating Mother’s

parental rights to Child, the juvenile court entered specific findings and

conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment contains specific findings of fact

and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re R.S.,

56 N.E.3d at 628. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the
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 findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.

Id. We will set aside the trial court’s judgment terminating a parent-child

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous

if the findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do

not support the judgment. Id. If the evidence and inferences support the trial

court’s decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d

1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[20] In its May 26, 2016 order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, the

juvenile court entered the following pertinent findings of fact, which we

paraphrase as follows:

8. Throughout the underlying CHINS proceeding, Mother
was inconsistent and had no meaningful participation in
services. Mother did not comply with either services or
dispositional orders, and she has continued to test positive for
illegal substances including methamphetamine, amphetamine,
marijuana (THC), cocaine, hydrocodone, and ephedrine or
some combination thereof. Although Mother had
intermittent and inconsistent supervised visitation with Child,
Mother had no meaningful or consistent visitation or
interaction with Child from June 2015 through May 16, 2016.

10. The Family Case Manager, Child’s therapist, Mother’s
therapist, and the CASA believe it would be in the best
interest of Child for the court to grant the Petition and to
terminate the parent-child relationship. This is due to
Mother’s inconsistency and lack of participation in any
services or efforts toward reunification with Child, her
inconsistency in visitation services, the detrimental and
harmful impacts to Child from contact and interaction with

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 Mother, and Mother’s ongoing substance use. Adoption is a
satisfactory plan for permanency for Child.

Appellant’s App. at 24-25.

[21] The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights, concluding: (1) Child

had been removed from the care and custody of Mother and under the terms of

a dispositional decree for more than six months; (2) there is a reasonable

probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship between

Mother and Child poses a threat to the well-being of Child; (3) there is a

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal from

and continued placement outside the care and custody of Mother will not be

remedied; (4) termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of

Child; and (5) DCS’s plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being

adoption, is satisfactory. Id. at 26.

[22] Mother challenges none of the juvenile court’s findings. As a result, Mother

has waived any argument relating to whether these unchallenged findings are

clearly erroneous. See McMaster v. McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1997) (unchallenged trial court findings were accepted as true). Mother

also does not dispute that DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the

following elements: (1) Child has been removed from parent for at least six

months under a dispositional decree pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(A)(i); and (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of

Child, i.e., adoption, under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). Instead,

Mother argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
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 conditions that resulted in the removal of Child will not be remedied, that the

continuation of the parent-child relationship with Mother poses a threat to

Child, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best

interest.

Remediation of Conditions

[23] Mother first argues that DCS did not meet its burden of proving two of the

elements under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). It is well-settled that

because Indiana Code section 31-5-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the

juvenile court need find only one of the following: (1) the conditions resulting in

removal from or continued placement outside the parent’s home will not be

remedied; (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to

the child; or (3) the child has been adjudicated CHINS on two separate

occasions. See In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans.

denied. Therefore, where the juvenile court determines one of the above-

mentioned factors has been proven, and there is sufficient evidence in the

record supporting the juvenile court’s determination, it is not necessary for DCS

to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, any of the other factors listed in

Indiana Code section 31-5-2-4(b)(2)(B). In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 882 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2004). Accordingly, we focus only on the element of whether the

conditions that led to removal and placement outside Mother’s care will not be

remedied.

[24] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal from or

continued placement outside Mother’s home will not be remedied, we engage
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 in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). First, we

identify the conditions that led to removal or continued placement of Child

outside Mother’s care, and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable

probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. “In the

second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the

termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed

conditions,” that is, balance a parent’s recent improvements against “habitual

pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of

future neglect or deprivation.” Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial

court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than

efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to

give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that

parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[25] The conditions resulting in Child’s removal from or continued placement

outside Mother’s home included Mother’s lack of stable housing, her drug use,

and her inability to care for Child. From January 2014 through May 2016,

Mother “moved around from place to place,” living in various homes, with

friends, and occasionally at a local motel. Id. at 110-11. During that same time

frame, Child was never returned to Mother’s care, but lived in four separate

foster homes and one treatment facility. Child had a “broken relationship”

with Mother, which manifested itself in aggressive behavior. Id. at 17-18.

Child was transferred from one place to another due to her physical and verbal

aggression and her inability to get along with the foster parents or other children

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in the home. Child suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder due to violent

events that occurred while she was in Mother’s care. Tr. at 25. Mother’s initial

visitation with Child was in Mother’s home, but that changed because Mother

did not have consistent or stable housing. Further, Child’s visits in Mother’s

home were interrupted by intoxicated neighbors and persons unauthorized to be

in the home; Mother claimed she could not keep people away. Id. at 65. Visits

with Mother made Child more susceptible to emotional triggers. Id. at 21, 116-

17. Initially, Child was shy and would not speak for herself, she had low self-

esteem, and her aggressive behavior got her into trouble both at home and at

school. Drug use was one of the reasons that Mother was unable to care for

Child. However, Mother did not change her behavior. Of the twenty-five

random drug screen that Mother participated in, Mother tested positive for

illegal drugs in nineteen of them. Id. at 73. Mother’s most recent positive drug

screen was April 8, 2016, one month before the final fact-finding hearing. Id. at

126. In January 2016, one month before the first fact-finding hearing, Mother

was involved in another CHINS pertaining to her older child, C. The

allegations, later substantiated, were that Mother and C. were homeless,

Mother was abusing drugs, Mother broke C.’s hand during a fight, and, while

in a “kinship placement,” C. was seriously burned while making

methamphetamine. Id. at 124, 127. Royer testified that Mother had made

limited positive progress during the CHINS and termination proceedings. Id. at

114.

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[26] Mother argues that termination of her parental rights is not appropriate because

she “has demonstrated that she is not unwilling to cooperate with [DCS].”

Appellant’s Br. at 15. Mother’s cooperation, however, is not the question.

Instead, this court must determine where the conditions that resulted in Child’s

removal from or continued placement outside Mother’s care will not be

remedied. The juvenile court determined that these conditions will not be

remedied. From the evidence before us, it was reasonable for the juvenile court

to reach that conclusion. Having found that conditions will not be remedied,

we need not reach Mother’s claim that the continuation of the parent-child

relationship poses a threat to Child. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882

(unnecessary to prove continuation of parental relationship poses threat where

evidence is sufficient that conditions will not be remedied).

Best Interests of Child

[27] Mother next challenges the juvenile court’s finding that termination of her

parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Citing to Rowlett v. Vanderburgh

County Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),

trans. denied, Mother argues that stability and permanency cannot be the sole

basis for the termination. Appellant’s Br. at 16. We agree. As our court recently

reiterated, “a need for permanency, alone, is not a sufficient basis for

terminating parental rights.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App.

2014), trans. denied. Here, however, stability and permanency are far from being

the sole reasons that the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights.

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[28] In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court must look

beyond the factors identified by DCS to the totality of the evidence. A.D.S., 987

N.E.2d at 1158. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the

parents to those of the child. Id. The court need not wait until the child is

irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

“Moreover, we have previously held that the recommendation by both the case

manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to

evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is

sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the

child’s best interests.” Id. at 1158-59.

[29] Here, DCS proved that there is a reasonable probability that the circumstances

leading to Child’s removal from or continued placement outside Mother’s care

will not be remedied. In its order terminating Mother’s parental rights, the

juvenile court cited to Mother’s lack of participation in reunification services,

her inconsistency in visiting Child, her noncompliance with services, the

harmful impact that visits with Mother had on Child, and Mother’s ongoing use

of illegal drugs. Appellant’s App. at 25. While these factors, alone, could be

sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights, the evidence

also reveals that Mother made only limited progress toward positive change,

she did not have a stable home, she was financially unstable, and Child, who at

the time of the hearing was almost twelve years old, asked that visits with

Mother be stopped. Tr. at 113-14, 116. Moreover, at the time of the fact-

finding hearing, Mother was unable to parent Child’s older sister, C.

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[30] Gaddis reported that Child has a broken relationship with Mother and is

suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of time spent with

Mother. Id. at 16-18. FCM Scott and Strange testified that Child had been

living in her current placement for three months, and she was doing extremely

well. Id. at 49, 131. Child is friendly, respectful, easy to get along with, and is

well mannered in public. Id. at 131. Child does well in school and plays

softball two times a week. Id. at 132. Child is included in family trips and loves

the Strange family, they love her, and she hopes they can adopt her. Id. at 132,

138, 139. Therapist Baumgartner testified that Child is doing well in her foster

home and gets the support that she will need as she continues in therapy to

delve deeper into her memories. Id. at 95-98. The CASA testified that Child is

a “very different person” in her current home; she is outgoing, talkative, and

cheerful. Id. at 142. Further, Gaddis, Baumgartner, Royer, and the CASA all

testified that it would be in Child’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to

be terminated. Id. at 32, 102, 119-20, 142. The trial court did not err in its

determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best

interests.

[31] We will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of “clear

error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Based

on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of

Mother’s parental rights to Child was clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm

the juvenile court’s judgment.

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[32] Affirmed.

[33] Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

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