UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4715
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CURTIS R. MARTIN, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:15-cr-00111-RDB-1)
Submitted: December 30, 2016 Decided: February 21, 2017
Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Francis A. Pommett, III, NATHANSON & POMMETT, P.C., Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Jefferson M. Gray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Tony K. Cheng, Student Law Clerk, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Curtis R. Martin, Jr., appeals his 96-month prison sentence
after pleading guilty to wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2(b), 1343 (2012). The district court sentenced him above
his advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. On appeal,
Martin questions whether his sentence is reasonable. We affirm.
We review “the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of
‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v.
Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). We “must first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error, such
as failing to . . . adequately explain the chosen sentence —
including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines
range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we consider its substantive reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.”
Id. If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, we “may
consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id.
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The district court “must make an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented when imposing a sentence,
apply[ing] the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific
circumstances of the case and the defendant, and must state in
open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen
sentence.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 113 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “In imposing a variance sentence, the
district court must consider the extent of the deviation and
ensure that the justification is significantly compelling to
support the degree of the variance.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation of
its sentence need not be lengthy, but the court must offer some
individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and
rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on
§ 3553.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The “court’s stated rationale must be tailored to the particular
case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate
review.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that Martin’s
sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. First,
we conclude that the district court did not procedurally err in
its finding as to when his fraud scheme began or in comparing
his fraud crime to drug crimes. Moreover, the district court
made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented,
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applied relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific circumstances
of the case and the defendant, and adequately explained the
particular reasons supporting its sentence. We therefore give
due deference to the district court’s reasoned and reasonable
decision that the § 3553(a) factors justified the sentence. See
United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 357 (4th Cir.
2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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