United States v. Curtis Martin, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4715

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CURTIS R. MARTIN, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:15-cr-00111-RDB-1)

Submitted: December 30, 2016 Decided: February 21, 2017

Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Francis A. Pommett, III, NATHANSON & POMMETT, P.C., Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Jefferson M. Gray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Tony K. Cheng, Student Law Clerk, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Curtis R. Martin, Jr., appeals his 96-month prison sentence

after pleading guilty to wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2(b), 1343 (2012). The district court sentenced him above

his advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. On appeal,

Martin questions whether his sentence is reasonable. We affirm.

We review “the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of

‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside, or

significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v.

Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). We “must first ensure that the

district court committed no significant procedural error, such

as failing to . . . adequately explain the chosen sentence —

including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines

range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is procedurally

reasonable, we consider its substantive reasonableness,

“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances,

including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.”

Id. If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, we “may

consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)

factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id.

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 The district court “must make an individualized assessment

based on the facts presented when imposing a sentence,

apply[ing] the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific

circumstances of the case and the defendant, and must state in

open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen

sentence.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 113 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “In imposing a variance sentence, the

district court must consider the extent of the deviation and

ensure that the justification is significantly compelling to

support the degree of the variance.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation of

its sentence need not be lengthy, but the court must offer some

individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and

rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on

§ 3553.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The “court’s stated rationale must be tailored to the particular

case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate

review.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that Martin’s

sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. First,

we conclude that the district court did not procedurally err in

its finding as to when his fraud scheme began or in comparing

his fraud crime to drug crimes. Moreover, the district court

made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented,

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applied relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific circumstances

of the case and the defendant, and adequately explained the

particular reasons supporting its sentence. We therefore give

due deference to the district court’s reasoned and reasonable

decision that the § 3553(a) factors justified the sentence. See

United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 357 (4th Cir.

2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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