FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FEB 21 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEANETTE M. WALLIS, No. 14-35448
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00040-TSZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE
RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2017
Seattle, Washington
Before: FISHER, PAEZ and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) appeals the district
court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs after a jury found in
favor of the plaintiff, Jeanette Wallis, on her claim under the Federal Railroad
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Safety Act. BNSF also appeals the clerk’s taxation of costs. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we review for an abuse of discretion, see Webb v. Ada
Cty., 285 F.3d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
1. BNSF waived appellate review of taxable costs by failing to appeal
the clerk’s award to the district court. See Walker v. California, 200 F.3d 624,
625-26 (9th Cir. 1999). Our decision in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964), is distinguishable because the plaintiff
there appealed the clerk’s order to the district judge. See id. at 222-23.
2. BNSF’s argument that the district court erred by failing to consider
the amount of damages awarded compared to the amount Wallis sought is
unpersuasive. The district court expressly recognized Wallis’ limited success on
her claims and gave sound reasons for declining to reduce the lodestar again on the
basis of limited success, explaining that “the substantive basis of Plaintiff’s claim
centered on the record suspension she received and the imposition of 40 PPI
points, the two unfavorable personnel actions that were presented to the jury and
upon which Plaintiff prevailed.” The court also cited McCown v. City of Fontana,
565 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2009), where we recognized that “a comparison of
damages awarded to damages sought is required,” while also emphasizing that “the
district court must consider the excellence of the overall result, not merely the
2
amount of damages won.” Id. at 1103-04. Although it would have been preferable
for the district court to have provided a clearer statement regarding the relationship
between the relief sought to the relief obtained, the explanation offered here was
adequate under the circumstances. The district court made clear that it “considered
the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.”
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Nothing more was required.
See Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 225 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
there was no abuse of discretion where, although the district court did not “discuss
the relationship that the damages awarded . . . had to the damages . . . sought,” the
district court’s opinion made “clear that it was well aware of this relationship”).
3. BNSF’s argument that the district court failed to properly account for
Wallis’ lack of success on her claim for punitive damages is unpersuasive as well.
In calculating reasonable hours, the district court declined to subtract 55 hours
devoted to Wallis’ unsuccessful punitive damages claim, saying “there was
sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue.” We agree with BNSF that the
inquiry under Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, focuses on the results obtained in the
litigation, not whether a claim was strong enough to survive summary judgment.
But, as noted, the district court elsewhere adequately explained its reasons for
declining to reduce the lodestar further based on limited success. BNSF’s reliance
3
on McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, 51 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1994),
is misplaced. There, the district court “expressly refus[ed] to relate the extent of
success to the amount of the fee award.” Id. at 810. That did not occur here.
4. BNSF argues Wallis was unsuccessful on central issues. The district
court, however, was in the best position to assess whether the claims upon which
Wallis prevailed were central to her case. The district court did not abuse its broad
discretion in finding Wallis’ “claim centered on the record suspension she received
and the imposition of 40 PPI points, the two unfavorable personnel actions that
were presented to the jury and upon which [she] prevailed.”
5. BNSF argues Wallis’ “success was limited according to any
measure,” such that a further reduction in the lodestar for limited success was
essentially mandatory here. We disagree. The district court reasonably concluded
Wallis was successful on the central claim in her case. “Where a lawsuit consists
of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have [her]
attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each
contention raised.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. Adjustments to the lodestar for
limited success are committed to the district court’s broad discretion. See id. at
436-37. The district court also may have concluded that this lawsuit achieved a
4
significant “public benefit” in deterring future violations of the Federal Railroad
Safety Act. See McCown, 565 F.3d at 1105.1
6. BNSF’s argument that non-taxable costs should be reduced based on
limited success fail for the same reasons as those discussed above.
***
The experienced district judge who decided this fee motion was intimately
familiar with this case, having presided over summary judgment proceedings and
an eight-day trial. The court was well positioned to assess the relationship between
Wallis’ success and her request for fees and costs. We agree with BNSF that in
some instances the court’s explanation could have been clearer. But the court’s
explanations were adequate, and the court neither relied on an incorrect legal rule
nor applied the governing law in a manner that was illogical, implausible or
without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record. See
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The
court therefore did not abuse its discretion.
AFFIRMED.
1
Generally, however, a court’s conclusions regarding a suit’s public benefit
should be stated on the record, so as to facilitate appellate review.
5