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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.C. A/K/A E.J.S., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.S., FATHER
No. 2155 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree June 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000427-2016
CP-51-DP-0002711-2014
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2017
J.S. (“Father”) appeals from the June 13, 2016 decree entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas terminating his parental rights
to E.C. (“Child”), born in November 2014. We affirm.
The trial court made the following factual findings:
[I]n November . . . 2014, [the Department of Human
Services (“DHS”)] received a substantiated General
Protective Services (GPS) report alleging that the mother
had given birth to the child, E.C. and the mother tested
positive for drugs. The mother had a long history of drug
abuse. The mother was not participating in a drug/alcohol
treatment program. Furthermore, the report alleged that
the mother did not have appropriate baby supplies for the
child. The mother and the father, J.S. resided together.
On November 18, 2014, DHS obtained an Order for
Protective Custody [(“OPC”)] for E.C.
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On November 19, 2014, the child was released from the
hospital and placed in foster care.
A shelter care hearing was held on November 20, 2014
before Master Alexis [Ciccone]. Master Ciccone lifted the
OPC and ordered the temporary commitment of E.C. to the
care and custody of DHS.
On November 26, 2014, an adjudicatory hearing was held
before Master Lynne M. Summers. Master Summers
adjudicated E.C. dependent and committed him to the care
and custody of DHS.
The matter was listed on a regular basis before Judges of
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas – Family Court
Division – Juvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the
Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §6351, and evaluated for the
purpose of determining or reviewing the permanency plan
of the child.
In subsequent hearings, the [Permanency Review Orders]
reflect the Court’s review and disposition as a result of
evidence presented, addressing, and primarily with, the
goal of finalizing the permanency plan.
On January 28, 2016, a Permanency Review hearing was
held before the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. The father
did not attend the hearing. The father’s attorney was
present. A Termination of Parental Rights hearing was
scheduled for June 13, 2016.
On May 16, 2016, DHS attempted to serve a subpoena to
the father for the termination hearing scheduled on June
13, 2016. DHS obtained the service address from a Parent
Locator Service Report (PLS) dated February 3, 2016. The
return of service indicated that the father no longer lived
at the address where the subpoena was served.
On May 16, 2016, DHS attempted to serve a second
subpoena to the father for the hearing on June 13, 2016.
DHS obtained the service address from a PLS dated May 9,
2016. The return service indicated that the service
address did not exist. It was a vacant lot.
On May 26, 2016, DHS made service to the father for the
hearing on June 13, 2016. The subpoena indicated that
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the hearing was scheduled to be heard at ONE o’clock P.M.
Service of the subpoena was made by way of UPS
overnight shipping. The package containing the subpoena
was left at the front door on May 27, 2016. DHS obtained
the father’s current address from a PLS dated May 23,
2016.
On June 13, 2016, a Termination of Parental Rights
hearing for the father, J.S., was held in this matter. The
Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the
father’s parental rights of E.C. should be terminated
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act. Furthermore,
the Court held that it was in the best interest of the child
that the goal be changed to adoption.
1925(a) Opinion, 8/30/16, at 1-2 (“1925(a) Op.”) (unpaginated) (emphasis
in original).
On July 12, 2016, Father timely filed a notice of appeal. Father argues
on appeal that DHS failed to meet its burden because Father had completed
almost all of his permanency goals.
We review a trial court’s order terminating parental rights for an abuse
of discretion. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). An
abuse of discretion “does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the reason for
applying a particularly deferential standard to termination decisions:
[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to
make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record,
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where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even
where the facts could support an opposite result, as is
often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the
trial court and impose its own credibility determinations
and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so
long as the factual findings are supported by the record
and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 826-27 (internal citations omitted). “The burden of proof is on the
party seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of grounds for doing so.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1116
(Pa.Super. 2010).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
The trial court found two grounds for termination of Father’s parental
rights, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (2). However, we need only agree
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with the trial court’s determination as to one subsection of section 2511(a)
in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc). Thus, we will analyze the trial court’s decision to terminate under
section 2511(a)(2), which provides:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). To terminate parental rights pursuant to section
2511(a)(2),
the following three elements must be met: (1) repeated
and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
Father claims that DHS failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the requirements of section 2511(a)(2) because he was close to
achieving his single case plan (“SCP”) objectives.
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Here, the trial court found that DHS met its burden under section
2511(a)(2). In particular, it found:
[The Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)] social worker
testified that she informed the father of his SCP objectives
in person, through phone calls and through text messages.
The father was also invited to all of the SCP meetings. The
father failed to attend any of the SCP meetings. The
father did not complete anger management. Anger
management was an objective because the father was
threatening the kinship parents at his visits with the child.
Additionally, when visits were moved to the agency, the
father had an altercation with the social worker.
Furthermore, as a result of the father’s behavior, the visits
were changed from supervised at the CUA to supervised at
DHS. The visits were changed to DHS so that proper
security could be provided. Moreover, the father did not
visit the child after March, 2016. The social [sic] CUA
social worker testified that the father indicated that he did
not attend visits was [sic] because he had a new job.
Additionally, the CUA worker testified that the father would
“let him know” about visits. Moreover, the father failed to
respond to telephonic text messages sent to the father
regarding visits. The social worker testified that during
visits when the child cried for the kinship parent – the
father would end the visit. The social worker testified that
the father would say “I want to cut the visit short because
the baby is crying.” Lastly, the father did not have
appropriate housing. The social worker testified that the
father was evicted from his home. The father would not
provide a new address to the social worker.
1925(a) Op. at 4 (internal citations omitted).
The trial court’s findings are supported by the record. The evidence at
the hearing showed that Father failed to complete his SCP objectives. N.T.,
6/13/16, at 20-21, 23. The August 3, 2015 permanency review order
indicates that Father was ordered to complete anger management and
parenting classes. Although Father completed parenting classes, he did not
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complete anger management classes.1 N.T., 6/13/16, at 16-17.
Furthermore, he ceased visits with Child for two months because he had a
new job, but never followed up to reschedule lost visits or schedule future
visits at a time that would not conflict with his work schedule. Additionally,
after being evicted from his housing, he refused to provide a new address.
During Child’s 18 months of life, he has never been in Father’s care or
control. N.T., 6/13/16, at 23. Child has been in placement for his entire
life, and Father has only had limited contact with him. Father has
continuously failed to demonstrate a willingness or ability to parent Child.
“The courts of this Commonwealth have long held that a child’s life simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to
handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732
(Pa.Super. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). Based upon Father’s poor
visitation history and seeming lack of interest in Child, the trial court
reasonably concluded that Father will not remedy the causes of his failure to
provide parental care to Child, and that DHS met its burden under section
2511(a)(2).
We next turn to section 2511(b), which we have described as follows:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
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1
Father began attending anger management classes, but never
completed them. N.T., 6/13/16, at 17.
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physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As
this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) does not
explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is
not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however,
provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with
his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many
factors to be considered by the court when determining
what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103
(Pa.Super. 2011)) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
In his brief, Father does not argue that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the requirements of section 2511(b) have been
met. He, therefore, has waived any claim related to section 2511(b). See
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 662 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2009)
(claim waived where appellant fails to include argument to support issue).
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Even if Father had not waived this claim, we agree with the trial court
that it was in Child’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights.2
The trial court found that:
the child, E.C., has been in placement for his entire life,
eighteen months. The testimony established that
termination of the father’s parental rights would not cause
permanent emotional harm to the child. Furthermore, it is
in the best interest of the child to terminate the father’s
parental rights.
1925(a) Op. at 4. The trial court further found that:
the child, [E.C.], is in a pre-adoptive kinship home with his
maternal grandparents. The child does not have a
significant or necessary parental bond with the father. The
child has a parent-child relationship with the kinship
parents. The interactions between the child and the
kinship parents are loving, caring and bonding. The child
is safe in the home with his needs being met.
Furthermore, the child would not suffer permanent
emotional harm if the father’s rights were terminated.
Moreover, it is in the best interest of the child to terminate
the father’s parental rights and free the child for adoption.
Id. at 5.
We conclude that the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion
in terminating Father’s parental rights.
Decree affirmed.
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2
See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1010 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc)
(considering section 2511(b) despite appellant’s failure to challenge trial
court’s analysis).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/22/2017
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