J-S03044-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.T., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: N.T., NATURAL MOTHER : No. 1466 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order entered September 14, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-082-2016
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2017
N.T. (Mother) appeals from the order entered September 14, 2016, in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which terminated
involuntarily her parental rights to her minor son, J.T. (Child), born in
August 2010.1 We affirm.
The orphans’ court summarized the relevant factual and procedural
history of this matter as follows.
Although dependency proceedings regarding Child have
only been before the [orphans’ c]ourt since 2014, the Allegheny
County Office Children, Youth and Families [(CYF)] has been
involved with Mother and Child since Child’s birth in 2010. CYF
became involved with Mother and Child due to concerns about
Mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues. CYF first
removed Child from Mother’s care by Emergency Care
Authorization (ECA) on December 19, 2014, when Child was four
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The order also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, R.A. R.A.
has not filed a brief in connection with this appeal, nor has he filed his own
separate appeal.
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years old. The [orphans’ c]ourt returned Child to Mother’s care
in a residential drug and alcohol treatment facility on January
13, 2015. The [orphans’ c]ourt adjudicated Child dependent on
January 28, 2015. On February 2, 2015, CYF again removed
Child from Mother’s care pursuant to a second ECA. The
[orphans’ c]ourt again returned Child to Mother on March 27,
2015. CYF removed Child for a third and final time on April 17,
2015. CYF placed Child in a kinship foster placement. CYF
moved Child to his current foster care placement on July 13,
2015. Child has remained in that placement since then. CYF
filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on May 2,
2016.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/2/2016, at 1-2.
The orphans’ court conducted a termination hearing on September 2,
2016. Following the hearing, on September 14, 2016, the court entered an
order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely filed a notice of
appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Mother now raises the following issue for our review. “Did the
[orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in
concluding that termination of [Mother’s] parental rights would serve the
needs and welfare of the Child pursuant 23 Pa.C.S. §[]2511(b)?” Mother’s
Brief at 5.
We consider Mother’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
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court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b), which provides as follows.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
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to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b).
On appeal, Mother concedes that CYF presented clear and convincing
evidence that her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to
subsection 2511(a). Mother’s Brief at 9 (“CYF, the petitioner, did clearly and
convincingly establish threshold grounds for termination pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. §[]2511(a)(2).”). Thus, we need only consider whether the orphans’
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court abused its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant
to subsection 2511(b). The requisite analysis is as follows.
[Subs]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
explained, [subs]ection 2511(b) does not explicitly require a
bonding analysis and the term bond is not defined in the
Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the
emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to
be considered as part of our analysis. While a parent’s
emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the
subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only
one of many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Here, the orphans’ court found that Child has a bond with Mother, but
that this bond is detrimental to Child’s needs and welfare. Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 11/2/2016, at 4. The court further concluded that “any potential
damage that may result from prolonging this relationship substantially
outweighs the pain that may be caused by severing any remaining bond.”
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Id. at 4-5. The court emphasized the testimony of psychologist, Patricia
Pepe, Ph.D., who opined that Child’s contact with Mother should be
significantly decreased. Id. at 4.
Mother argues that the conclusion of the orphans’ court that Child does
not share an appropriate bond with her was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Mother’s Brief at 12-13. Mother contends that Child
loves her, and that terminating her parental rights will have a negative
impact on him. Id. at 12.
After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that
the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s
parental rights to Child involuntarily. During the termination hearing, Dr.
Pepe testified that she conducted an individual evaluation of Mother on April
30, 2015, as well as an individual evaluation of Child on November 10, 2015.
N.T., 9/2/2016, at 6-7. Dr. Pepe also conducted an interactional evaluation
of Child and Mother on September 2, 2015, and interactional evaluations of
Child and his foster mother on December 29, 2015, and June 16, 2016. Id.
at 7-8.
Concerning Child’s relationship with Mother, Dr. Pepe testified that
Child clearly loves Mother and exhibited bonding toward her during their
interactional evaluation. Id. at 14, 17. However, Dr. Pepe expressed
concern that maintaining Child’s relationship with Mother appears to be
causing him significant confusion and distress. Dr. Pepe recalled that Child
was “having considerable conflict” around the time of the June 16, 2016
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interactional evaluation of Child and his foster mother, and was exhibiting
severe behavioral issues. Id. at 23. Dr. Pepe received collateral information
indicating that Mother was offered two visits with Child per week, but was
only exercising about one visit per month. Id. While Mother had the ability
to call Child on the phone, she had only made one phone call since January
or February 2016. Id. Mother also was making numerous “negative
comments” to Child around this time, which included telling Child that “he
was coming home and he had many new toys and new clothing[.]” Id.
When Dr. Pepe met with Child, Child reported that he “feels very sad
because he misses [Mother] and he worries about her, about whether she’s
going to show up for visits. And he said that he has to take care of
[Mother].” Id. Child further stated “that [Mother] tells him things on visits
that make him feel sad and confused and that, in his words he said he feels
sad and, quote, upside down.” Id. at 24.
Concerning the impact that terminating Mother’s parental rights would
have on Child, Dr. Pepe expressed concern that Child’s foster mother is not
currently a pre-adoptive resource, and that ending Child’s relationship with
Mother may not result in Child being placed in a permanent home. Id. at
31. Dr. Pepe also acknowledged that terminating Mother’s parental rights
would likely make Child “very sad.” Id. at 32. Nonetheless, Dr. Pepe
emphasized that Child is already very sad as a result of his continuing
relationship with Mother, and that Child “can’t continue like this because he’s
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acting out behaviorally, and psychologically, he’s having a difficult time.”
Id. at 30-32. Dr. Pepe explained,
You know, I have difficulty with children becoming legal
orphans, but at the same time, [Child] has been too
disappointed. He is so reactionary to what [Mother] says and
does and doesn’t do and, ... it’s too overwhelming for him. I
mean, as he said, he just blanked out and he doesn’t know what
end is up, and that’s not fair to him because as long as there is
that confusing -- you know, that stance of anxiety and not
knowing what’s going to occur, that’s going to take away his
ability to develop stability and develop positive functioning.
So, you know, on one hand, it’s difficult, but I think at this
point, [Mother] having such a negative influence on him by not
coming to visit, by saying things to him, by confusing him, …
that’s also a concern.
Id. at 28.
Thus, the record supports the finding of the orphans’ court that
terminating Mother’s parental rights will best serve Child’s needs and
welfare. While Child loves Mother, it is clear that Child’s relationship with
Mother is not healthy, and causes him considerable emotional distress. It
was well within the court’s discretion to accept the testimony of Dr. Pepe,
and to conclude that Child simply “can’t continue like this,” and that the
benefits of ending Child’s relationship with Mother will outweigh any harm
that Child may experience. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251 at 271 (finding the
trial court erred in denying termination when, although there was a strong
parent-child bond, the trial court “failed to recognize the substantial,
possibly permanent, damage done to th[e] children by the prolonged,
unhealthy, pathological bond” they had with their mother.).
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Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans’ court did not
abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child
involuntarily, we affirm the court’s September 14, 2016 order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/22/2017
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