Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC15-1486
____________
SHARON MYERS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[February 23, 2017]
PARIENTE, J.
The issue before the Court is whether the Fifth District Court of Appeal
misapplied our precedent from Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 2010), and
Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999), when it reversed the trial court’s
determination that the defendant, Sharon Myers, was in custody for the purpose of
administering Miranda1 warnings based on the totality of the circumstances. State
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
v. Myers, 169 So. 3d 1227, 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). We have jurisdiction. See
art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.2
At the heart of this issue is the constitutional right against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
9, of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, we review the constitutionally required
“procedural safeguards” first set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that “assure that [a criminal defendant]
is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be
compelled to incriminate himself.” Id. at 444, 439. As this Court recently stated in
State v. Horwitz, 191 So. 3d 429 (Fla. 2016), in Florida, the right “against self-
incrimination, as one of our Constitution’s fundamental rights, must be—and has
long been—broadly construed.” Id. at 439 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957,
965 (Fla. 1992)).
In this case, police interrogated Myers on two occasions—both times at the
police station—first within hours and then just days after her husband was
murdered and after her son and his friend had already confessed to the murder and
implicated Myers in planning and facilitating the murder. The entire tenor of the
2. See Dorsey v. Reider, 139 So. 3d 860, 862 n.1 (Fla. 2014); Van v.
Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 246 (Fla. 2013) (citing State v. McMahon, 94 So. 3d 468,
471 n.2 (Fla. 2012)).
-2-
interrogations, which were conducted by a team of multiple officers, was
accusatorial, aggressive, and confrontational. As the trial court found, during both
interrogations, Myers was “immediately and aggressively confronted by multiple
officers about her involvement in the murder. The tone of their questioning
indicated that law enforcement believed [Myers] was a suspect.”
For the reasons more fully explained below, we conclude that Myers was in
custody for purposes of Miranda warnings during both interrogations, and the Fifth
District did not afford proper deference to the trial court’s findings, nor did it
adequately consider the factors this Court set forth in Ramirez and explained in
Ross guiding police on when Miranda warnings are necessary. We agree with the
trial court and with Judge Cohen’s dissent in the Fifth District’s decision that “a
reasonable person would have felt constrained” in the circumstances in which
Myers was interrogated. Myers, 169 So. 3d at 1232 (Cohen, J., dissenting). As
Judge Cohen explained, “courts should view attempts by law enforcement to
circumvent [Miranda] safeguards warily.” Id. Thus, Myers’ constitutional right
against self-incrimination under both the United States Constitution and the Florida
Constitution was violated by the failure of police to safeguard her constitutional
right through the administration of Miranda warnings before proceeding with
Myers’ custodial interrogations. Accordingly, we quash the Fifth District’s
decision below.
-3-
I. BACKGROUND
On June 16, 2008, Gary Kenney, Myers’ husband,3 was found murdered in
his family’s home in Merritt Island, Florida. He had been shot several times and
had several lacerations to his wrist and neck. Shortly after the victim’s body was
found, Myers’ son, Darryl Kenney, and his friend, Rubin Nero, were apprehended
near the scene and confessed to the murder. Both Darryl and Rubin implicated
Myers in planning and facilitating the murder. As a result, law enforcement
officers believed that Myers was an integral part of the conspiracy to murder Gary
and brought her to the police station for questioning on June 16, 2008, and June 20,
2008.
The first questioning on June 16, 2008, occurred sometime after 2:00 a.m.
At that time, Myers was staying with her in-laws while her home was being
processed as a crime scene. Deputy Sheriff Kent of Brevard County (“Agent
Kent”) testified at the suppression hearing that it was after midnight when he and
Brevard County Sheriff’s Agent Martin (“Agent Martin”) arrived at the in-laws’
home.
Upon their arrival to Myers’ in-laws’ home, Agent Kent explained to Myers
that he needed more information from her about her husband’s murder, and,
3. Sharon Myers (defendant) was known as Sharon Kenney at the time of
the murder.
-4-
according to him, Myers “volunteered to come down to [the] Merritt Island
precinct” for questioning. Agent Kent testified that he advised Myers that she was
free to leave before they departed the in-laws’ house. Myers rode to the precinct in
the front seat of Agent Kent’s agency-issued, unmarked vehicle without handcuffs.
Upon arrival at the precinct, Myers was placed in a room, which, due to
ongoing building renovations, was not originally designed for questioning and was,
therefore, smaller than a typical interview room. Myers was seated in the corner so
that she would be seen on the camera inside the room. The door was closed for
privacy, but it was not locked. Myers was questioned for approximately ninety
minutes about her involvement in the murder. A four-man team consisting of
Agents Kent, Martin, Vitaliano, and Reyes took turns questioning Myers. After
questioning Myers, Agent Kent returned Myers to her in-laws’ home around 4:00
a.m. She again rode in the front passenger seat of his unmarked car without
handcuffs.
The next day, investigators executed a search warrant on the hotel room in
which Darryl stayed in the days leading up to the murder. During the search,
Agent Kent found letters that Darryl received from Myers while incarcerated;
Darryl had been released just days before the murder. Agent Kent testified that his
review of those letters over the next few days revealed more evidence, which led
him to believe that Myers was complicit in Gary’s murder. Based on this
-5-
information, Agent Kent decided to question Myers further about the contents of
the letters.
On June 20, 2008, Agent Kent and another agent arrived at Myers’ home
during the daytime. Agent Kent explained to Myers that he “needed her to speak
with [him] again regarding some new evidence that had come up.” He “asked if
she would be willing to come down to the [Criminal Investigations Division
(“CID”)] building in Rockledge.” Again, Myers was told she was free to leave
before the questioning commenced. And, according to Agent Kent, Myers “again,
as the first time, volunteered to do so.” Similar to the first time Myers was
questioned, Myers rode in the front passenger seat of Agent Kent’s agency-issued,
unmarked vehicle without handcuffs.
Upon arrival at the CID, Agents Kent and Vitaliano escorted Myers into a
standard interview room. Myers was again seated in the corner, although not for
any particular reason, according to Agent Kent. The same four-man team from the
first interview, plus a fifth agent, Agent Spadafora, questioned Myers for
approximately one hour and forty-five minutes. Thereafter, Agent Kent
transported Myers home.
After being charged with the murder, Myers filed a motion to suppress the
statements she made to police on June 16 and June 20, alleging that her statements
were illegally obtained because the interviews constituted custodial interrogations.
-6-
After a hearing, during which the lead investigator testified and video recordings of
both interviews were played in open court, the trial court granted the motion to
suppress. In the trial court’s order granting Myers’ motion to suppress, the trial
court further explained:
Although [Myers] was told at the start of each interrogation that she
was not in custody, a reasonable person would not have felt free to
leave. During both interrogations, she was seated in the corner of a
small room with law enforcement blocking her access to the door.
The door remained closed throughout her interrogations. Officers
were seated in close proximity to [Myers], invading her personal
space. [Myers] was never offered a break and was given water on
only one occasion. [Myers’] daughter was allowed to see [Myers]
only briefly, until Agent Kent told her to leave. [Myers] was never
reminded during either interrogation that she was not in custody. At
the end of the second interrogation, Agent Kent told [Myers] “you’ve
always been free to go,” but that alone does not vitiate the need for the
Defendant to be advised of her Miranda rights. Further, [Myers] was
dependent upon law enforcement for transportation back to her
residence.
. . . On both occasions, [Myers] was immediately and
aggressively confronted by multiple officers about her involvement in
the murder. The tone of their questioning indicated that law
enforcement believed [Myers] was a suspect. Officers indicated they
had information from [Myers’] “conspirators” that she had acquired
the weapons used in the murder and that she had arranged for Mr.
Kenney to come home at the time of the murder. Agent Kent told
[Myers] he had spent hours reviewing the letters [Myers] had written
to Darryl and that based on those letters, he knew [she] was involved.
He had copies of the letters, and quoted from them to [Myers].
. . . Multiple officers questioned [Myers] in a tag-team style
designed to elicit information from [her]. One officer used a
sympathetic approach to gain [Myers’] trust, another officer accused
[Myers] of being “full of unadulterated sh[]t”, and another officer
graphically described the wounds on the victim’s body. Yet another
officer posed as a friend, based on prior acquaintance with [Myers],
-7-
and then sought incriminating testimony from her. At least five
separate officers questioned [Myers] during her two interrogations.
. . . Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court
finds [Myers] was in custody at the time of her interrogations and
because she was not advised of her Miranda rights, her statements to
law enforcement must be suppressed. However, the Court also finds
that those statements were voluntary and therefore can be used for
impeachment purposes at trial. Carlisi v. State, 831 So. 2d 813 (Fla.
4th DCA 2002).
Trial Court Order (emphasis added).
The State appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting Myers’
motion to suppress because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
established that Myers was not in custody during the interviews. Myers, 169 So.
3d at 1229-30. After reviewing the evidence and the trial court’s findings of fact,
the Fifth District reversed the trial court, concluding that “a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position would have felt free to terminate the interviews,” after
emphasizing that the officers told her that she was free to leave at any time. Id. at
1231.
II. ANALYSIS
Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 9, of the Florida Constitution provide a constitutional right against self-
incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; see Horwitz, 191 So.
3d at 439. In Miranda, the seminal case on the right against self-incrimination, the
United States Supreme Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements,
-8-
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444. As we explained
in Ross:
“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a
fundamental [sic] with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and
not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of
interrogation.” [Miranda, 384 U.S.] at 476. The Supreme Court has
also recognized that the prophylactic Miranda warnings are “not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
[is] protected.” [Oregon v. ]Elstad, 470 U.S. [298,] 305 [(1985)]
(quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)). As
recognized in Elstad, the Miranda exclusionary rule sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself: “A Miranda violation does
not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal
presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned
statements.” Id. at 307 n.1 (emphasis omitted). This presumption is
irrebuttable for the purposes of the State’s case in chief. Id. at 307.
These protections are equally applicable under the Florida
Constitution. As this Court has recognized, “[t]he protections
enunciated in Miranda have been part of this State’s jurisprudence for
over a century pursuant to the Florida Constitution.” Ramirez, 739
So. 2d at 573; see also Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 964-66. Traylor[, 596
So. 2d at 964,] explains the contours of our state constitutional law:
The basic contours of Florida confession law were
defined by this Court long ago under our common law.
We recognized the important role that confessions play in
the crime-solving process and the great benefit they
provide; however, because of the tremendous weight
accorded confessions by our courts and the significant
potential for compulsion—both psychological and
physical—in obtaining such statements, a main focus of
Florida confession law has always been on guarding
against one thing—coercion. . . . The test thus is one of
-9-
voluntariness, or free will, which is to be determined by
an examination of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the confession. This determination is to be
made by the judge, in the absence of the jury, based on a
multiplicity of factors, including the nature of the
questioning itself.
Ross, 45 So. 3d at 413-14 (footnote omitted).
The Fifth District concluded that Myers was not in custody on either
occasion for the purpose of requiring the administration of Miranda warnings,
emphasizing that the agents told Myers that she was free to leave prior to both
interrogations. Myers, 169 So. 3d at 1231-32. On the other hand, the trial court
and Judge Cohen’s dissent in the Fifth District highlighted other factors within the
Ramirez framework that indicated that Myers was in custody during both
interrogations, including the agents’ aggressive and accusatorial tone. Id. at 1232
(Cohen, J., dissenting).
We proceed by explaining the federal and Florida constitutional rights
against self-incrimination and case law surrounding those rights. We then analyze
the totality of the circumstances surrounding Myers’ interrogations within this
framework. Ultimately, we conclude, consistent with the trial court and Judge
Cohen’s dissent in the Fifth District, that Myers’ constitutional right against self-
incrimination under the United States and Florida Constitutions was violated by the
failure of police to administer Miranda warnings because her interactions with
police on both June 16 and June 20, 2008, were custodial interrogations.
- 10 -
A. The Federal and State Constitutional Right Against Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “No
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. V. Article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution provides, “No
person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against
oneself.” Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court
“required that any individual held for [custodial] interrogation must be clearly
informed as to his or her rights, including the ‘right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and . . . [the] right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.’ ” Ross, 45 So. 3d at 413
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). Informing persons of their constitutional
rights, referred to comprehensively as Miranda warnings, is likewise required
under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at
965-66.
Florida’s right against self-incrimination is part of the Florida Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights, “a series of rights so basic that the framers of our
Constitution accorded them a place of special privilege,” and is, therefore,
fundamental. Id. at 963; State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1109 (Fla. 2004) (“It is
settled law that each of the personal liberties enumerated in the Declaration of
- 11 -
Rights of the Florida Constitution is a fundamental right.”). In Traylor, this Court
emphasized the significance of Florida’s fundamental rights, specifically the right
against self-incrimination:
Special vigilance is required where the fundamental rights of
Florida citizens suspected of wrongdoing are concerned, for here
society has a strong natural inclination to relinquish incrementally the
hard-won and stoutly defended freedoms enumerated in our
Declaration in its effort to preserve public order. Each law-abiding
member of society is inclined to strike out at crime reflexively by
constricting the constitutional rights of all citizens in order to limit
those of the suspect—each is inclined to give up a degree of his or her
own protection from government intrusion in order to permit greater
intrusion into the life of the suspect. The framers of our Constitution,
however, deliberately rejected the short-term solution in favor of a
fairer, more structured system of criminal justice:
These rights [enumerated in the Declaration of
Rights] curtail and restrain the power of the State. It is
more important to preserve them, even though at times a
guilty man may go free, than it is to obtain a conviction
by ignoring or violating them. The end does not justify
the means. Might is not always right. Under our system
of constitutional government, the State should not set the
example of violating fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to all citizens in order to obtain a
conviction.
Bizzell v. State, 71 So. 2d 735, 738 (Fla. 1954). Thus, even here—
especially here—where the rights of those suspected of wrongdoing
are concerned, the framers drew a bright line and said to government,
“Thus far shalt thou come, but no farther.”
Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 963-64.
It is also important to reemphasize the purpose of Miranda warnings. As the
United States Supreme Court explained in Miranda:
- 12 -
[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that
without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and
to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added). In other words, the purpose of
Miranda warnings is to ensure that the person is aware of his or her constitutional
right against self-incrimination. See id. As this Court articulated in Ramirez:
This constitutional guarantee [against self-incrimination] “is fully
applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.” Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966). Thus, to be admissible in a
criminal trial, the State must prove that the confession was not
compelled, but was voluntarily made. . . .
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a
bright-line rule to guard against compulsion and the coercive nature
and atmosphere of custodial interrogation, and “assure that the
individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains
unfettered throughout the interrogation process.” [Id.] at 469. . . .
“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is . . .
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not
simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” [Id.]
at 476. . . . Therefore, “unless and until [the Miranda] warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the
defendant].” [Id.] at 479. The protections enunciated in Miranda
have been part of this State’s jurisprudence for over a century
pursuant to the Florida Constitution.
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 572-73 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Essentially, a
suspect must be informed of his or her rights via Miranda warnings when subjected
- 13 -
to custodial interrogation by police. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68; Ramirez,
739 So. 2d at 572-73.
Recently in Horwitz, we explained that the right “against self-incrimination
provided in the Florida Constitution offers more protection than the right provided
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 191 So. 3d at 439
(citing Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866, 888 (Fla. 2011)). Although this Court has
previously construed the procedural safeguards of Miranda in accordance with
United States Supreme Court precedent and relied on United States Supreme Court
precedent for guidance in determining when custodial interrogation occurs,
consistent with federalist principles, this Court has also developed its own
framework, as set forth in Ramirez and Ross, to guide police and courts in
determining when Miranda warnings are necessary. As we explained in Traylor:
[W]hen called upon to construe their bills of rights, state courts should
focus primarily on factors that inhere in their own unique state
experience, such as the express language of the constitutional
provision, its formative history, both preexisting and developing state
law, evolving customs, traditions and attitudes within the state, the
state’s own general history, and finally any external influences that
may have shaped state law.
596 So. 2d at 962; accord id. at 965-66; see Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 56
(2010) (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
Therefore, our analysis under Florida’s constitutional right against self-
- 14 -
incrimination provides the basis for our determination of custodial interrogation in
this case.
B. Defining “Custodial Interrogation”
In State v. McAdams, 193 So. 3d 824 (Fla. 2016), we defined
“interrogation” as “when a state agent asks questions or engages in actions that a
reasonable person would conclude are intended to lead to an incriminating
response.” Id. at 833; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (defining “interrogation” as
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers”). Pursuant to this definition of
interrogation, both times that police questioned Myers in this case were
interrogations for Miranda purposes. See McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 833. Thus, the
specific issue in this case is whether the police interrogations of Myers on June 16
and June 20 were custodial for purposes of requiring the administration of Miranda
warnings.
As to determining whether an interrogation is custodial, we explained in
Ramirez that “[c]ustody for purposes of Miranda encompasses not only formal
arrest, but any restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with
formal arrest.” 739 So. 2d at 573. As we stated in Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188
(Fla. 2010), “[t]he standard for ‘custody’ is whether, based on the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would feel that his freedom of movement has
- 15 -
been restricted to a degree associated with an actual arrest.” Id. at 197 (citing
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573).
In Ramirez, we adopted a “four-factor test . . . [for determining] whether a
reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider himself in custody”:
(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning;
(2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent
to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt;
[and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave
the place of questioning.
739 So. 2d at 574. This Court explained these factors in Ross:
[I]t must be evident that, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable person in the suspect’s position would feel a restraint of
his or her freedom of movement, fairly characterized, so that the
suspect would not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter with
police.
45 So. 3d at 415.
Likewise, in McAdams, we reiterated what establishes “custody” for
Miranda purposes:
“Custody for purposes of Miranda encompasses not only
formal arrest, but any restraint on freedom of movement
of the degree associated with formal arrest. A person is
in custody if a reasonable person placed in the same
position would believe that his or her freedom of action
was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest.
“The proper inquiry is not the unarticulated plan of the
police, but rather how a reasonable person in the
suspect’s position would have perceived the situation.”
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573. Although we approved in Ramirez a
four-factor test to provide courts with guidance in determining
- 16 -
whether an individual in is custody . . . . [C]ourts are to consider the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether a reasonable
person would believe that his or her freedom of action has been
curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest.
McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 833 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We further
explained in McAdams that no “single specific comment, question, or
circumstance . . . converts an encounter from noncustodial to custodial.” Id. at
839. Rather, “[a] situation can commence as a voluntary interaction with police,
but slowly intensify and become more pressured, pointed, and accusatory until it
evolves into custodial status.” Id.
Although the four Ramirez factors frame our analysis, “the ultimate inquiry
is twofold: (1) the ‘circumstances surrounding the interrogation;’ and (2) ‘given
those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” Ross, 45 So. 3d at 415 (quoting
Yarborough v. Alvorado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004)).
C. Standard of Review for Determining “Custody”
“Determining whether the defendant was ‘in custody’ so as to require the
administration of Miranda warnings involves a mixed question of law and fact
subject to independent review.” Ross, 45 So. 3d at 414. In Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99 (1995), the United States Supreme Court explained why such
independent review is necessary:
- 17 -
[C]lassifying “in custody” as a determination qualifying
for independent review should serve legitimate law
enforcement interests as effectively as it serves to ensure
protection of the right against self-incrimination. As our
decisions bear out, the law declaration aspect of
independent review potentially may guide police, unify
precedent, and stabilize the law.
Id. at 115. Because determining whether an interrogation was custodial is
somewhat fact-dependent, the object of our jurisprudence is not to set forth a
bright-line rule but to ensure that in situations when a reasonable person would not
feel free to leave, police properly administer Miranda warnings. See id. Although
the determination of whether a person is in custody is a mixed question of law and
fact, we nevertheless endeavor to provide clear guidance to police as to when
Miranda warnings should be given.
This Court has explained:
[A]ppellate courts should continue to accord a presumption of
correctness to the trial court’s rulings on motions to suppress with
regard to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, but
appellate courts must independently review mixed questions of law
and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the
context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article
I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.
Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 668-69 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Nelson v. State, 850
So. 2d 514, 521 (Fla. 2003)). Further:
Suppression issues are extraordinarily rich in diversity and run the
gamut from (1) pure questions of fact, to (2) mixed questions of law
and fact, to (3) pure questions of law. . . . Appellate courts cannot use
their review powers in such cases as a mechanism for reevaluating
- 18 -
conflicting testimony and exerting covert control over the factual
findings. As with all trial court rulings, a suppression ruling comes to
the reviewing court clad in a presumption of correctness as to all fact-
based issues, and the proper standard of review depends on the nature
of the ruling in each case.
State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
Also, as in this case, where a defendant is recorded either by audiotape or
videotape, appellate review of the facts is aided in determining whether the trial
court’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id. at 160.
Keeping that standard of review in mind, we turn now to review the circumstances
surrounding Myers’ interrogations within the framework of the Ramirez factors.
The trial court also considered the facts of this case in the context of the Ramirez
factors before concluding that Myers was, in fact, subjected to custodial
interrogation for Miranda purposes.
D. Application of the Ramirez Factors to This Case
As we stated above, the four factors relevant to the custody inquiry are:
(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning;
(2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent
to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt;
[and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave
the place of questioning.
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574. This is a conjunctive test, so no factor is solely
determinative of whether Myers was in custody for Miranda purposes. See, e.g.,
Ross, 45 So. 3d at 416.
- 19 -
1. The Manner in Which Myers Was Summoned For Questioning
The first factor from Ramirez is “the manner in which police summon the
suspect for questioning.” 739 So. 2d at 574. Myers’ first interrogation took place
in the early morning hours after her husband’s body was found. Agents Kent and
Martin went to Myers’ in-laws’ house and explained that they “needed to interview
her” regarding the ongoing investigation of her husband’s murder. Myers agreed
to accompany the agents to a local precinct for the interview. According to Agent
Kent, prior to leaving her in-laws’ house, the agents told Myers that she was free to
leave. However, Myers was dependent upon Agent Kent for transportation back to
her home. Nevertheless, Myers rode, without handcuffs, to the precinct in the front
passenger seat of Agent Kent’s unmarked car.
The second interrogation occurred days later. This time, Agent Kent and
another agent arrived at Myers’ home during the daytime and requested that she
come to the CID to speak with them about letters they had found in the hotel room,
where her son had stayed in the days leading up to the murder. Again, agents
indicated that Myers would be free to leave, and, according to Agent Kent, Myers
again went voluntarily. Agent Kent drove Myers without handcuffs in the front
passenger seat of his agency-issued, unmarked vehicle.
Although the manner in which Myers was summoned for questioning both
times was not particularly coercive or forceful, Agent Kent indicated on both
- 20 -
occasions that he “needed” to question Myers. Neither time was Myers given the
option to transport herself to the place of questioning, and Myers only learned of
the agents’ need to question her when both officers physically arrived to see her.
The fact that Myers was not handcuffed is certainly not, in isolation, indicative of
the interrogations being noncustodial.
Further, the timing of these interrogations is significant. Myers was first
summoned to the police station sometime after 2:00 a.m., just hours after her
husband’s murder. Prior to the second interrogation, Agent Kent told Myers that
the questioning would be related to letters she had written to her son while he was
in prison, which would have conveyed to a reasonable person that the purpose of
the interrogation was accusatorial, not investigative or neutral. Under these
circumstances, a reasonable person in Myers’ position would not have felt free to
decline the interrogation or leave. Thus, this factor favors a finding that Myers
was in custody, and we proceed to review the other factors.
2. The Purpose, Place, and Manner of the Interrogation
The second factor we consider is “the purpose, place, and manner of the
interrogation,” which has always been an important consideration in the custody
inquiry. Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574. In this case, this factor weighs heavily in
favor of a finding that Myers was in custody. As borne out by the evidence, the
purpose of these interrogations, especially the second, was not just to gain
- 21 -
information about the circumstances surrounding Myers’ husband’s murder but
also to gain incriminating information about Myers. See McAdams, 193 So. 3d at
833.
From the commencement of the first interrogation, it would be clear to a
reasonable person that the interrogations were not being conducted for routine
information-gathering purposes. Within seconds of beginning the interrogation,
Agent Kent told Myers that her son, Darryl, confessed to killing his father and
implicated her in facilitating the murder. Agent Kent told Myers that they could
track the phone calls between her and Darryl while Darryl was in prison and on the
day of the murder. He told her that all of the letters she sent Darryl in prison were
read by corrections officers, and suspicious contents were photographed.4
Law enforcement already knew that Myers’ son and his friend had confessed
and implicated Myers as being involved in orchestrating her husband’s murder,
and agents made Myers aware of this knowledge. Thus, the interrogation was
clearly intended to elicit a confession from Myers to further support the case that
agents were building against her. See McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 833. As we stated
4. Although Agent Kent testified at the suppression hearing that he did not
discover the letters until after the first interrogation, his reference to the letters
during the first interrogation indicates that he was at least aware at that time of the
existence and incriminating nature of the letters, which further indicates that law
enforcement already knew Myers was involved in the murder and considered her a
suspect at the time of the first interrogation.
- 22 -
in Ross, “a deliberate attempt to elicit incriminating statements in a coercive
manner, undermin[es] the very purpose of Miranda. Miranda itself addressed
‘interrogation practices . . . likely . . . to disable [an individual] from making a free
and rational choice’ about speaking . . . .” 45 So. 3d at 427 (quoting Miranda, 384
U.S. at 464-65). Indeed, Agent Vitaliano told Myers that he was “accusing [her] of
being a coconspirator to [Gary’s] murder.” Thus, this factor weighs in favor of
finding that the first interview was custodial.
It is even clearer that the purpose of the second interrogation was obtaining a
confession. Upon arrival at the CID, Agents Kent and Vitaliano escorted Myers
into an interrogation room and began the second interrogation as follows:
KENT: Okay. So let’s—let’s—Sharon, let’s you and I move along as
if we haven’t had a conversation, although you and I spoke Monday
night at length.
I think some of the things that you told us Monday night just
isn’t true. I think that there’s some things that you need to clear up for
us. And I am going to give you the opportunity today, right now, to
tell the truth.
And all of these details, as painful as they’re going to be, I need
to know why you felt the necessity to plot and plan to have your
husband being murdered at your son’s hands.
Whether your son did it or this hitman that you were trying to
hire did it, why did you feel pushed to that level? What did he -- what
had Gary done?
(Emphasis added.) Before Myers could even say a word, she was told that officers
knew she was lying and she needed to tell the truth to explain why she planned her
husband’s murder.
- 23 -
As to the place of the interrogations, Myers was seated in the corner of a
small room in a sheriff’s office, while under video surveillance, with several agents
surrounding her during both interrogations —four agents during the first interview
and five agents during the second interview. In such small quarters surrounded by
authorities, it is likely, as the trial court concluded, that “a reasonable person would
not have felt free to leave.” Accord Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663.
Also, the agents sat so close to Myers at times during the second
interrogation that their knees touched her. At other times, the agents held Myers’
hands. This intimidation, coupled with intermittent sympathy and physical contact
by the agents, further supports the conclusion that a reasonable person would not
have felt free to leave—for fear of either emotional retaliation or physical restraint
by the agents, who had not shown any boundaries.
Turning to the manner of the interrogations, the second interrogation was
extremely accusatorial. In the words of the interrogators:
KENT: You and Darryl Kenn[e]y conspired, planned, you gave
financial support. You facilitated vehicle support. You put him up in
a place. You told him where to get the gun. You helped your son kill
Gary Kenn[e]y.
Why did you do it? What drives a mother to write letters like
that to her son? What drives a woman to try to get phone numbers of
hitmen to kill her husband? . . . It’s all in black and white right here,
Sharon (indicating). You can’t deny it. You can’t say it didn’t
happen.
What you’re saying about: Well, I never wanted that to happen.
I didn’t plan for that, is lies. You are lying when you say that because
- 24 -
you did plan for it. You did prepare for it. You wrote it down. That’s
where you f[*****] up.
It went from thought to action, and you detail it all out in these
letter.
Sharon, this is the time for you to tell us why it happened.
Okay, this is the time to tell us, right here and right now. You wanted
him dead didn’t you?
MYERS: I really don’t.
KENT: You wanted him dead, didn’t you?
MYERS: I really don’t.
KENT: Time and time again, Sharon, you said you wanted him dead.
You wanted him to disappear. You thought about pushing him over
the edge at the gator farm. You thought about poisoning his potatoes.
You wish he would have a wreck and die on his way to work. You
wished the door would’ve fell on him and crushed his bones.
Ain’t that what you wanted, you wanted him dead? You
wanted him dead for a reason, what’s the reason? You obviously
wanted him dead for a reason. You helped plan to get him murdered.
You tried to help your son get away with the murder. You told your
son to go move the body out of the house. . . .
Don’t get it twisted. We’ve got eye witnesses. There’s
neighbors and friends of yours that were coming out of the movie
theater that seen you in the mall parking lot talking to your son and
Rubin Nero after Gary was dead. You can’t hide no more, Sharon.
You’re not getting away with it. You might have thought you were.
You might have thought you were scot-free, but you’re not.
The only option you have left, the only option you have left is
to help yourself and tell me why you wanted Gary Kenn[e]y dead.
MYERS: I didn’t really want him dead.
KENT: Do you want me to read the letters again?
MYERS: No.
KENT: You wanted him dead.
MYERS: I wanted him to go away.
- 25 -
KENT: Forever?
MYERS: No.
KENT: You wrote that. Do you want me to read it?
MYERS: No, it’s not --
KENT: You wanted him dead, why can’t you admit it? Don’t be
scared now. When you were having these evil thoughts, you were
strong enough to write them.
....
MYERS: I didn’t really want him dead.
KENT: Well, you shouldn’t have conspired with your son to kill him.
When your son came to you when he got out of prison, and laid out
his plan to you.
MYERS: I didn’t know he was going to kill him.
KENT: Bulls--t. Don’t forget, Sharon, Darryl is talking. He don’t
want to get the needle in his arm.
VITALIANO: You know, when a person is backed into a corner they
are willing to tell all. Okay? And when a person is facing their life,
they are going to talk to us. It don’t matter if it’s mom, dad, brother,
sister, all of that is out the window. It’s out the door. Okay?
And that’s why we are here talking to you right now. All right,
this is your opportunity. Not a lot of people get opportunities like
this, this is to help your side of the story. All right, this is it. This is
the time. This is where you need to start telling the truth. Because all
of this other stuff that you have been talking about is not the truth.
It’s not going to cut it. Okay? You tell me, you put, you know,
six people, five people, and you read these letters and we present this
evidence, what do you think a person is going to think? Put yourself
in our shoes, what would you think?
(Emphasis added.)
- 26 -
Further, officers threatened Myers that if she did not confess, she would not
be able to raise her youngest child, her teenage daughter would be charged with
accessory to murder, and her oldest son could “get the needle in his arm.” Agent
Reyes told Myers that her son, Darryl, would never get out of prison, get married,
have children, grow old, or “enjoy the joys of life” if she did not take responsibility
for the murder. He told her that by not taking responsibility for the murder she was
going to let Darryl “rot” in prison and be “portrayed like a monster.” Specifically,
Agent Reyes said:
[Darryl] is your martyr, your own flesh and blood. Your son
you gave birth to, the son you raised and you loved, turns out to be
your martyr. He gave up his life to kill your husband so you could be
happy. . . .
....
You weren’t responsible when you poisoned your son to do this
act. Be responsible now and maybe people could say: You know
what, maybe Darryl—maybe Darryl was manipulated in a certain
way. He definitely was vulnerable. And his mama is the one that
helped him get to that point.
Rather you don’t want to own up to what really happened and
Darryl is taking the whole brunt of this. He is your martyr. He [is]
going to give the rest of his life for your cause. And you did nothing
to stop it, Sharon. I’m sorry, but you did nothing to stop it.
Here’s your chance to show your love for Darryl and to speak
and tell us the truth of what really happened; to show the world . . .
(Emphasis added.)
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), the United States Supreme
Court explained:
- 27 -
“[A]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual
susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might
be an important factor in determining” what the police reasonably
should have known. [Rhode Island v.] Innis, 446 U.S. [291], 302, n. 8
[(1980)]. Thus, custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda
includes both express questioning and words or actions that, given the
officer’s knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the suspect, the
officer knows or reasonably should know are likely to “have . . . the
force of a question on the accused,” Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d
870, 874 [(5th Cir. 1980)], and therefore be reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response.
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601. Indeed, while interrogating Myers, the agents knew,
especially due to the letters they read, that Myers had a “special susceptibility” to
coercion under pressure regarding her children, which would be “reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response” in order to save her son from the officers’
threats and have the opportunity to raise her other children. Id. Thus, the agents’
statements regarding Myers’ son further indicate coercion.
Further, the place and manner of these interrogations would be especially
intimidating to a reasonable person. In considering this factor in Ross, we wrote:
However, at the point when Detective Waldron informed Ross about
the bloody pants, the detective’s focus shifted from merely
questioning a witness to attempting to obtain a confession and
pressuring Ross to admit his involvement in the crime. The detective
repeatedly told Ross that he knew Ross committed the crime and the
only question remaining was why. This type of questioning, which
was highly confrontational and accusatorial, lasted for hours and took
place in a very small room at the station with at least two officers in
the room. Moreover, at this point, when Ross asked for a smoke
break, the detective told him to smoke in the room, while the
questioning continued. This factor clearly supports a conclusion that
the defendant was in custody.
- 28 -
45 So. 3d at 415-16 (emphasis added).
Similar to Ross, in this case, both times Myers was questioned four or five
officers alternated in questioning her for between ninety minutes and two hours,
often employing a good-cop/bad-cop strategy or, as the trial court characterized it,
a “tag-team style designed to elicit information.” Both times, the officers
intermittently raised their voices, cursed at Myers, called her a liar, and told her
that they could prove she was guilty so she had no choice but to confess.
Specifically, Agent Kent yelled at, belittled, and mocked Myers, as he aggressively
and continuously repeated, “You wanted him dead, didn’t you?”
Agent Vitaliano told Myers that if she confessed, he would talk to his boss,
the State Attorney’s Office, and “everybody” and tell them that he believed that
she was a battered woman who felt she had no choice. Agent Spadafora—who
was not otherwise involved in the investigation—was sent into the interrogation
room to pose as a friend and “familiar face” to Myers, but he also attempted to
extract a confession from Myers.
In conclusion, the purpose, place, and manner of both Myers’ interrogations
was similar to the aggressive and accusatory manner of the interrogation in Ross,
which this Court determined was custodial for purposes of Miranda. See Ross, 45
So. 3d at 415-16. The agents were clearly searching for a confession, rather than
merely gathering information. They repeatedly told Myers that they knew she
- 29 -
directed her son to murder her husband, and the only remaining question was why.
She was questioned for hours in small rooms by multiple agents in a
confrontational and accusatorial manner. And, although Myers was told she was
free to leave before reaching the place of questioning, she was also told to “stay
right here” and relied on the officers for transportation. As in Ross, this factor
strongly supports a conclusion that Myers was in custody during the interrogations
and that Miranda warnings should have been administered. See id.
3. The Extent to Which Myers Was
Confronted With Evidence of Her Guilt
The third factor is “the extent to which the suspect is confronted with
evidence of his or her guilt.” Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574. In this case, this factor
is intertwined with the second factor. Myers was extensively confronted with
evidence of her guilt throughout both interrogations. As described above, the first
interrogation began with Agent Kent telling Myers (1) that Darryl confessed and
implicated her in facilitating the murder, (2) that her phone calls with Darryl were
tracked and recorded, and (3) that letters she wrote to Darryl in prison had been
photographed. She was told that both Darryl and Rubin informed the agents that
Myers instructed Darryl to remove her husband’s body from the house after the
murder.
Like the first interrogation, the second interrogation began with officers
confronting Myers with strong evidence of her guilt. She was immediately told
- 30 -
that the police had evidence to prove that she intended for Darryl to kill her
husband. Agent Kent then read excerpts from some of the many, extremely
incriminating letters found in Darryl’s hotel room, which Myers acknowledged she
had written. In the letters, Myers wrote about devising a plan with Darryl to kill
Gary. She discussed “feelings of homicide” as well as providing Darryl with a
gun, a truck, and money to facilitate the murder, or hiring a hitman, whom she
planned to pay with Gary’s motorcycle. In her letters, Myers also provided Darryl
with information about the victim’s daily routine, including the time he would
leave for work in the morning and that he would often step outside alone in the
middle of the night. She wrote to Darryl that she hated her husband, wished he
would die in an accident, and that she kept hoping to get a phone call saying that
he was dead. She repeatedly discussed her or Darryl getting her “problem to go
away” and “get[ting] the job done” without her “get[ting] into any trouble” or him
“spend[ing] anymore time in jail.” Agent Kent also read Myers a letter written to
her by Darryl, which the agents found in Myers’ home:
Mom, we will play dirty. We need to get Amanda to play along if she
really wants Gary gone. You, under no circumstances, are to do
anything to Gary just (indiscernible). I am going to feed the gators
when I get out. Let me handle the situation when I get out. Because
if he so much as touches any[one] again, I will torture him. Make
sure you have the keys and $500 ready for me when I get out. Okay?
When I get out, we will go through everything, the works. Does Nana
still have all the guns? Gary will pull a disappearing act in 86 days. I
am going to show him. PS, Let me handle Gary. Get it all planned
out. Keep the motorcycle for me. Let me do this. Don’t worry.
- 31 -
Myers was also told that agents had information that she recently asked her
husband to renew his life insurance policy. At one point, one of the agents
described the evidence against Myers as a “mountain of evidence” to “which any
reasonable person would say: ‘Oh my God.’ ”
Myers was also told that her daughter had given a sworn statement
indicating that she and Myers were both aware of Darryl’s plan to murder Myers’
husband. Agents also told Myers that her daughter had been “running her mouth”
about the murder plot. Agent Kent said that even though Myers was not present at
the time of the murder and did not pull the trigger, he knew that she facilitated the
murder, helped Darryl get the gun that he used in the murder, provided him with
transportation, and helped him try to cover up the murder.
Myers was confronted with very strong, indisputable evidence of her guilt,
including the letters, phone records, and statements of coconspirators and
witnesses. Many of the letters were read aloud to her during the interrogation, and
boxes filled with even more letters were brought into the interrogation room for her
to see. She was repeatedly told that the police could prove that she was behind her
son killing her husband. She was told that a jury would find her guilty in ten
minutes. Thus, similar to our conclusion in Ross, this factor weighs in favor of
finding that Myers was in custody for Miranda purposes.
- 32 -
4. Whether Myers Was Told That She
Was Free to Leave the Place of Questioning
The final Ramirez factor for considering whether a defendant was in custody
is “whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of
questioning.” 739 So. 2d at 574. The Fifth District improperly emphasized this
factor in concluding that Myers was not in custody. See Myers, 169 So. 3d at
1229-30.
Contrary to the emphasis the Fifth District placed on this factor, police
merely stating that a suspect is free to leave or terminate the interrogation does not
automatically render the interrogation noncustodial. U.S. v. Craighead, 539 F.3d
1073, 1088 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he delivery of these statements [must be
considered] within the context of the scene as a whole.” (citing United States v.
Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that interrogation was custodial
even though suspect was told that he was free to leave or terminate the interview at
any time where questioning lasted over an hour in closed FBI car while
investigators searched house)); McIntosh v. State, 829 N.E.2d 531, 538 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005). Ultimately, “[t]he Miranda test for custody does not ask whether the
suspect was told that he was free to leave; the test asks whether ‘a reasonable
person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and leave.’ ” Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112).
- 33 -
In this case, Agent Kent testified that when he and Agent Martin went to
Myers’ in-laws’ home to pick Myers up for the first interrogation on June 16,
2008, he told Myers that she was free to leave while they were still at the in-laws’
house. And Myers was not told again that she was free to leave until the
interrogation at the Merritt Island Precinct had concluded. Therefore, the officers’
statement at her in-laws’ house could have been understood to mean that she had
an option whether to go with the agents to the precinct. Thus, the record does not
support the Fifth District’s conclusion that Myers was told she was free to leave
the place of questioning—the Merritt Island Precinct.
As to the second time police questioned Myers, the video reveals that once
Myers was seated in the interrogation room and before questioning began, Agent
Vitaliano informed Myers that she was free to leave at any time and asked her if
she understood. Myers nodded to indicate her understanding. However,
immediately after she nodded, Agent Kent told Myers that he thought she lied
during the first interrogation and that he needed her to tell him why she planned
her husband’s murder.
The police statement that Myers was free to leave during the second
interrogation must not be viewed in isolation but, rather, in context of the entire set
of circumstances. See, e.g., Ross, 45 So. 3d at 415. After being told she was free
to leave at any time before questioning, Myers was immediately confronted with
- 34 -
and accused of her guilt by police upon the start of the interrogation. Agents told
Myers that they did not believe the statements she made previously and that they
knew she was guilty of planning Gary’s murder. She was then confronted with
extensive evidence of her guilt, including statements of coconspirators and letters
between her and her son, in which they discussed plans of the murder. The fact
Myers was free to leave was never repeated after the nearly two-hour interrogation
began. Cf. Monroe v. State, 148 So. 3d 850, 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (finding that
the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes where, among other
reasons, “[i]n stark contrast [to Ramirez],” the defendant was “repeatedly informed
. . . that he was free not to talk and to get up and leave the room anytime”).
Moreover, even if Myers had wanted to leave, she was dependent upon
officers for transportation to and from both interrogations. In other words, police
were in control of Myers the entire time after she agreed to be questioned. Thus,
this factor also weighs in favor of finding that Myers was in custody for purposes
of Miranda.
E. The Totality of the Circumstances
Under a Ramirez analysis, no single prong should be considered in isolation.
See, e.g., Ross, 45 So. 3d at 415. However, the Fifth District improperly elevated
the fact that police advised Myers, before she agreed to be questioned, that she was
free to leave, to determine that the interrogations were noncustodial. See Myers,
- 35 -
169 So. 3d at 1231. This conclusion ignores that every other aspect of both
interrogations would have led reasonable persons to believe they were not free to
leave and, therefore, directs a conclusion that Myers was in custody during both
interrogations.
Moreover, although the Fifth District acknowledged that prongs two and
three favored the defendant, it improperly weighed these against factors one and
four by failing to give the appropriate emphasis to the evidence regarding the
interrogation, including placement in a small room, confronting Myers with “a
mountain of evidence,” accusations that she was lying, and use of the good-
cop/bad-cop technique. Absent the agents’ one statement on each occasion that
Myers was free to leave, every other fact surrounding the interviews indicated
police coercion and custody. Thus, the Fifth District placed undue weight on the
fourth factor at the expense of factors two and three, which is evidenced by its
footnote explaining that the defendant did not cite any case where a defendant was
found to be in custody where they were told they were free to leave at any time.
Id. at 1231 n.3. We therefore conclude that both interviews were custodial and
Myers was entitled to Miranda warnings prior to the commencement of each
interview.
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the purpose of
the confrontational and accusatory interrogations in this case was to solicit a
- 36 -
confession from Myers. After Darryl and Rubin implicated Myers in her
husband’s murder, she was not only considered a suspect, but was treated by police
during the interrogations in a manner that would lead Myers—or any reasonable
person—to conclude that she was suspected in her husband’s murder and,
therefore, compelled to answer the agents’ questions and not free to leave the place
of questioning. We emphasize the words of Judge Cohen’s dissent as to how the
agents obstructed the purpose of Miranda in this case by failing to give Myers
Miranda warnings:
The requirement of Miranda warnings is ingrained in the
constitutional analysis of the voluntariness of confessions. . . . As the
trial judge recognized, courts should view attempts by law
enforcement to circumvent these safeguards warily. We should do the
same.
Id. at 1232 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
Reviewing a mixed question of law and fact governed by the totality of the
circumstances, the Fifth District failed to defer to the trial court’s factual findings
and to properly consider “the purpose, place and manner of interrogation” and the
“the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of guilt,” as set forth
in Ramirez and Ross. By concluding that a reasonable person in Myers’ situation
would have felt free to terminate the interrogations, the Fifth District placed undue
weight on the fact that Myers was told she was free to leave before being taken to
the place of questioning. After considering the totality of the circumstances
- 37 -
surrounding the questioning of Myers on June 16 and June 20, 2008, we conclude
that a reasonable person in Myers’ position would have felt constrained, would
have felt compelled to answer the officers’ accusatory questions, and would not
have felt free to terminate the questioning or leave the place of questioning on
either occasion.
III. CONCLUSION
In attempting to provide guidance to law enforcement as to when to
administer Miranda warnings, we emphasize that no single Ramirez factor
determines whether a defendant is in custody. However, when the interrogation is
predominately accusatorial and confrontational in nature, taking place in the
confines of a police interrogation room so as to lead a reasonable person to believe
that he or she is suspected of a crime, all Ramirez factors are likely implicated. As
the trial court explained in this case, the questioning of Myers clearly would have
led her to believe she was a suspect in her husband’s murder and was not free to
terminate the interrogation:
Although [Myers] was told at the start of each interrogation that she
was not in custody, a reasonable person would not have felt free to
leave. During both interrogations, she was seated in the corner of a
small room with law enforcement blocking her access to the door.
The door remained closed throughout her interrogations. Officers
were seated in close proximity to [Myers], invading her personal
space. [Myers] was never offered a break and was given water on
only one occasion. [Myers’] daughter was allowed to see [Myers]
only briefly, until Agent Kent told her to leave. [Myers] was never
reminded during either interrogation that she was not in custody. At
- 38 -
the end of the second interrogation, Agent Kent told [Myers] “you’ve
always been free to go,” but that alone does not vitiate the need for the
Defendant to be advised of her Miranda rights. Further, [Myers] was
dependent upon law enforcement for transportation back to her
residence.
. . . On both occasions, [Myers] was immediately and
aggressively confronted by multiple officers about her involvement in
the murder. The tone of their questioning indicated that law
enforcement believed [Myers] was a suspect. Officers indicated they
had information from [Myers’] “conspirators” that she had acquired
the weapons used in the murder and that she had arranged for Mr.
Kenney to come home at the time of the murder. Agent Kent told
[Myers] he had spent hours reviewing the letters [Myers] had written
to Darryl and that based on those letters, he knew [she] was involved.
He had copies of the letters, and quoted from them to [Myers].
. . . Multiple officers questioned [Myers] in a tag-team style
designed to elicit information from [her]. One officer used a
sympathetic approach to gain [Myers’] trust, another officer accused
[Myers] of being “full of unadulterated sh[]t”, and another officer
graphically described the wounds on the victim’s body. Yet another
officer posed as a friend, based on prior acquaintance with [Myers],
and then sought incriminating testimony from her. At least five
separate officers questioned [Myers] during her two interrogations.
. . . Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court
finds [Myers] was in custody at the time of her interrogations and
because she was not advised of her Miranda rights, her statements to
law enforcement must be suppressed.
All four factors of the Ramirez test compel the conclusion that the totality of
the circumstances created a situation in which a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave. Therefore, we conclude that Myers was in custody for Miranda
purposes, and because Myers was not provided Miranda warnings prior to the
questioning on those dates, the statements she made during those interrogations
were obtained in violation of Miranda and must be suppressed from the State’s
- 39 -
case-in-chief at trial. Accordingly, we quash the Fifth District’s decision and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.
LAWSON, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANADY, J., dissenting.
Because I conclude that there is no express and direct conflict of decisions
underpinning our review, I would dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction under
article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Contrary to the view adopted
by the majority, the Fifth District’s decision in State v. Myers, 169 So. 3d 1227
(Fla. 5th DCA 2015), does not expressly and directly conflict with Ross v. State,
45 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 2010), or Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999).
The majority’s view is that Myers conflicts with Ross and Ramirez because
“[u]nder a Ramirez analysis, no single prong should be considered in isolation,”
but “the Fifth District placed undue weight on the [free-to-leave] factor at the
expense of factors two and three, which is evidenced by” footnote three of the
opinion below. See majority op. at 35-36. But the Fifth District did not consider
the fact that Myers was told she was free to leave either in isolation or at the
- 40 -
expense of the other Ramirez factors. Rather, the Fifth District expressly analyzed
each of the four factors as follows:
Thus, as for prongs one and four, the manner in which law
enforcement summoned the defendant for questioning did not suggest
that she was in custody, and the defendant was told, prior to both
interviews, that she was not under arrest and she was free to leave at
any time.[N.3]
[N.3] Notably, the defendant has not cited to any case
where a defendant was found to be in custody where the
defendant was told, prior to being interviewed, that
he/she was free to leave at any time.
As for prongs two and three, although one purpose of the
interview was to get the defendant to tell the officers her motive for
participating in her husband’s murder, and the officers spent most of
the time during both interviews confronting the defendant with
evidence they said they had against her, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
have felt free to terminate the interviews.
Myers, 169 So. 3d at 1231 (emphasis added).
When determining whether a defendant is in custody during questioning, a
court properly considers whether the police informed the defendant that he or she
was free to leave the place of questioning, Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574, and the
district court’s mention in a footnote that Myers failed to cite any case in which a
defendant was determined to have been in custody during questioning despite
being told that he or she was free to leave does not provide any indication, let alone
express indication, that the court misapplied Ross or Ramirez by placing “undue
weight” on the free-to-leave factor “at the expense of factors two and three.” In
- 41 -
considering each of the four Ramirez factors, the Fifth District employed the legal
standard our precedents have set forth. Even if we disagree with the result reached
by the district court, “this Court is without power to simply assume jurisdiction in a
case to correct what we perceive as error.” State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 523
(Fla. 2005); see also Am. Wall Sys., Inc. v. Madison Intern. Group, Inc., 944 So.
2d 172, 176 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., dissenting) (“Like it or not, we must permit
some district court decisions to become final even though we disagree with
them.”).
The majority also asserts that the Fifth District misapplied our precedents by
failing to properly weigh the Ramirez factors and “give the appropriate emphasis
to the evidence regarding the interrogation, including placement in a small room,
confronting Myers with ‘a mountain of evidence,’ accusations that she was lying,
and use of the good-cop/bad-cop technique,” majority op. at 36, but neither Ross
nor Ramirez establishes a precedent regarding the “appropriate emphasis” to be
given to such case-specific facts. And the majority’s disagreement with how the
district court weighed the Ramirez factors does not establish express and direct
conflict. Cf. Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085, 1098 (Fla. 2013)
(Canady, J., dissenting) (“But the fact that a majority of this Court disagrees with
how a lower court has weighed the Kinney[ System, Inc. v. Continental Insurance
- 42 -
Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996),] factors does not establish express and direct
conflict.”).
I therefore conclude that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the Fifth
District’s decision based on express and direct conflict. Accordingly, I dissent.
POLSTON, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct
Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District - Case No. 5D14-3037
(Brevard County)
Kevin John Mawn of Onek and Mawn, P.A., Titusville, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Wesley Harold
Heidt, Bureau Chief, and Kristen Lynn Davenport, Assistant Attorney General,
Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
- 43 -