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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DRB, INC., D/B/A SUPERIOR HOMES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM S. KELLER :
:
Appellant : No. 1061 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered June 10, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-SU-003465-94
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2017
William S. Keller appeals from the trial court’s order entered on June
10, 2016, granting the motion to quash of DRB, Inc. and dismissing Keller’s
notice of appeal from an arbitration award entered in favor of DRB, Inc. We
affirm.
Keller and DRB entered into a contract on March 18, 2013, for the
delivery and installation of a pre-fabricated residential structure on Keller’s
property. See DRB’s Complaint, 09/27/2013, at 2. The total cost of the
project under the contract was $106,645.00. See id. at ¶ 6.
Paragraph 18 of the contract provided:
Any dispute arising under or related to this Contract shall be
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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resolved through binding arbitration. The parties agree to
mediation as a condition precedent to the arbitration.
See DRB’s Reply to New Matter, Exhibit A (“Contract”).
In September 2013, DRB initiated this action for breach of contract to
recover the remaining balance due under the contract of $96,645.00, plus
additional damages, costs, and fees totaling approximately $50,000. See
DRB’s Complaint, 09/27/2013, at ¶ 11.
Correspondence between the parties suggests that they agreed to
arbitration. Trial Ct. Op., 8/18/2016, at 2 (citing series of letters between
the parties). However, the parties could not agree to specific arbitrators.
Id. Thus, DRB filed a motion asking the court to compel Keller to execute
an Agreement for Reference for Arbitration. See Motion to Compel,
7/27/2015 (citing York County Civil Procedure Rule 1301(c) (“YCCiv. R.”),
which empowers a court to do so). At the hearing, the court noted that
“[Keller was] in agreement with the matter being referred to arbitration.”
Notes of Testimony, 8/7/2015, at 1-2. The court entered an order referring
the matter to arbitration pursuant to YCCiv. R. 1301(c). Order, 8/6/2015.
On October 19, 2015, DRB filed an Amended Praecipe for Reference to
Arbitrators. See Amended Praecipe, 10/19/2015. Thereafter, the court
administrator appointed members of the York County Bar to serve as
arbitrators. On February 5, 2015, the arbitrators awarded $126,538.18 in
favor of DRB on the contract claim, plus $9,334.00 in attorneys’ fees. The
arbitrators found against Keller on his counterclaim.
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Keller timely filed a notice of appeal to the York County Court of
Common Pleas, seeking a trial de novo. DRB filed a motion to quash the
appeal, arguing that Keller’s agreement to arbitrate pursuant to the parties’
underlying contract was voluntary and non-appealable. See Motion to
Quash, 6/1/2016.1 The court granted DRB’s motion to quash and confirmed
the arbitrator’s award. See Order, 6/10/2016.
Keller timely appealed to this Court and filed a court-ordered 1925(b)
statement. Keller’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement contained seven
paragraphs, in which he essentially averred the following: (1) the court
erred in dismissing his timely appeal from the award of arbitrators; (2) he
did not agree to “binding,” statutory arbitration; and (3) the court erred in
denying his right to a trial de novo, citing in support 42 Pa.C.S. § 7361(d).
See 1925(b) Statement, 7/13/2016. In its responsive opinion, the trial
court addressed a single issue, concluding the parties voluntarily agreed to
arbitrate and that the arbitrators’ award was binding and non-appealable.
See Trial Ct. Op., 8/18/2016, at 3.
Keller raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err by not concluding (or even
considering) that DRB waived its right to voluntary arbitration?
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1
DRB cited correspondence of the parties in which Keller indicated, through
counsel, willingness to submit the underlying dispute to arbitration pursuant
to paragraph 18 of the parties’ contract. See Motion to Quash, at ¶¶ 3-4.
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2. Did the trial court err by concluding that Keller agreed to
utilize the statutory arbitration process in lieu of a voluntary
arbitration process?
3. Did the trial court err by stripping Keller of his due process
rights by dismissing his timely filed statutory right of appeal?
Keller's Br. at 2.
Keller is seeking to reverse the dismissal of his appeal of an arbitration
award. As the determination of a right to appeal from arbitration presents a
question of law, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is
de novo. See Fastuca v. L.W. Molar & Assocs., 950 A.2d 980, 987 (Pa.
Super. 2008).
In reviewing the trial court’s decision …, we are limited to
determining whether the trial court’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the trial court abused its
discretion. As a matter of public policy, our courts favor the
settlement of disputes by arbitration. Nevertheless, the right to
enforce an arbitration clause can be waived. A waiver of the
right to proceed to arbitration may be expressly stated, or it may
be inferred from a party's undisputed acts or language so
inconsistent with a purpose to stand on the contract provisions
as to leave no opportunity for a reasonable inference to the
contrary.
Goral v. Fox Ridge, Inc., 683 A.2d 931, 933 (Pa. Super. 1996) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
In his first issue, Keller contends that DRB waived the right to enforce
the voluntary arbitration clause defined in their contract. He argues DRB
waived enforcement because DRB chose to use the judicial process instead
of arbitration. See Keller's Br. at 8-9.
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In order to preserve an issue for appellate review it must be
raised by the appellant in a Rule 1925(b) statement filed at the
lower court's direction. Any issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b)
statement are deemed waived. […] An issue not identified for
review in a Rule 1925(b) statement is waived whether or not the
lower court actually addresses the issue in an opinion.
In re Est. of Daubert, 757 A.2d 962, 963 (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal
citations omitted). As set forth above, Keller failed to raise this issue in his
1925(a) statement. Accordingly, we deem this issue waived. Id.
Second, Keller contends that he did not agree to the court-ordered
arbitration process as a substitute for voluntary arbitration. See Keller's Br.
at 9. Keller’s argument is comprised of three sentences, is extremely vague,
and lacks citation to legal authority or subsequent analysis. “[W]here an
appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to
relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” Umbelina v. Adams, 34
A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339
(Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). We
deem this claim waived for lack of development. Id.
Finally, Keller contends that the court erred in denying him the right to
appeal an award following compulsory arbitration. See Keller's Br. at 9-10
(citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 7361).
We reject Keller’s attempt to characterize this event as a compulsory
arbitration. Compulsory arbitration, under Section 7361(d), is unavailable in
actions involving title to real property or where the amount of controversy
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exceeds $50,000. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7361. As the trial court noted, it had
no authority to order compulsory arbitration because the amount of
controversy exceeded $50,000. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/18/2016, at 5; see 42
Pa.C.S. § 7361; YCCiv. R. 1301(c) (containing no amount in controversy
limitation). To the contrary, the court merely facilitated the arbitration
proceedings by ensuring that an arbitration panel was convened. See Trial
Ct. Op., 8/18/2016, at 5 (noting that Keller had decided it was a more cost-
effective for the court to select the arbitration panel); YCCiv. R. 1301(c).2
Here, the parties agreed to binding arbitration. See Contract at ¶ 18;
Trial Ct. Op., 8/18/2016, at 2 (recognizing the parties’ agreement).
Arbitration agreements are favored as a matter of public policy, as they
reduce litigation and provide an inexpensive method of resolving disputes.
Trombetta v. Raymond James Financial Servs., 907 A.2d 550, 570 (Pa.
Super. 2006). Moreover, these proceedings were governed in relevant part
by 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341, which provides:
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2
This finding is supported by the record. In August 2014, Keller expressed
that the “most efficient and economical procedure is to take advantage of
[the York County] court-sponsored Arbitration process….[which] should
satisfy the requirement in the agreement for arbitration.” See Letter from
Keller’s Counsel to DRB’s Counsel, 8/15/2014. On June 2, 2015, DRB asked
Keller to sign the Agreement for Reference for Arbitration. On July 20,
2015, DRB sent a second request asking Keller to execute the Agreement
before July 22, 2015. See Letter from DRB’s Counsel to Keller’ Counsel,
7/20/2015. Thereafter, DRB filed a motion in court to compel arbitration.
See Motion, 7/27/2015. Consequently, the court ordered Keller to execute
the Agreement within five days and submit to arbitration. See Order
Compelling [Keller] to Execute, 8/6/2015.
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The award of an arbitrator in a nonjudicial arbitration which is
not subject to Subchapter A (relating to statutory arbitration) or
a similar statute regulating nonjudicial arbitration proceedings is
binding and may not be vacated or modified unless it is clearly
shown that a party was denied a hearing or that fraud,
misconduct, corruption or other irregularity caused the rendition
of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable award.
42 Pa.C.S. § 7341(d). Notably, Keller does not assert fraud or some other
irregularity. Thus, there is no valid ground for appeal.
For these reasons, we discern no error in the court’s decision to quash
the Keller’s appeal for trial de novo.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/27/2017
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