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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JACOB M. SPINNEY, :
:
Appellant : No. 1048 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 13, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-62-CR-0000005-2016,
CP-62-CR-0000012-2015, CP-62-CR-0000533-2015,
CP-62-CR-0000534-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER, JJ.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 01, 2017
Jacob M. Spinney (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after he pled guilty to simple assault. We affirm.
Because of the issue raised herein, a full recitation of the factual and
procedural history is not necessary. Pertinent to this appeal, in January
2015, Appellant was charged at docket number CP-62-CR-0000012-2015
with burglary, conspiracy, and simple assault. On March 31, 2016, after
spending time in an inpatient drug rehabilitation facility, Appellant pled
guilty to simple assault, and the Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining
charges. On May 13, 2016, Appellant was sentenced to six to twelve
months’ incarceration, to run consecutive to sentences he received at other
docket numbers. At sentencing, despite his request, the sentencing court
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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declined to give Appellant credit on his sentence for the time he spent in the
rehabilitation facility.
On the day he was sentenced, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion,
requesting the trial court modify his sentence, which the court denied on
June 17, 2016. This appeal followed, wherein Appellant’s sole issue is
“[whether] the failure to provide credit for Appellant’s drug addiction
treatment at sentencing result[ed] in a sentence that was unreasonable,
manifestly excessive, and an abuse of discretion?” Appellant’s Brief at 3
(suggested answer and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
While a sentencing court’s failure to award credit time ordinarily
implicates the legality of a sentence, the determination of whether a
defendant is entitled to credit for time spent voluntarily 1 in a drug
rehabilitation facility is within the discretion of the sentencing court. See
Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242, 1250–51 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(“[W]hether a defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in an inpatient
drug or alcohol rehabilitation facility turns on the question of voluntariness.
If a defendant is ordered into inpatient treatment by the court, e.g., as an
express condition of pre-trial bail, then he is entitled to credit for that time
against his sentence. By contrast, if a defendant chooses to voluntarily
commit himself to inpatient rehabilitation, then whether to approve credit for
1
As set forth in more detail infra, Appellant concedes his time spent in the
drug rehabilitation facility was voluntary. See also Appellant’s Brief at 11
(“Appellant’s time spent in drug treatment rehabilitation was voluntary[.]”).
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such commitment is a matter within the sound discretion of the court.”)
(citation omitted).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his [or her] sentence
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part
test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some
citations omitted).
Appellant filed timely a post-sentence motion and a notice of appeal,
and included a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f) in his brief. On appeal,
Appellant alleges the reasons given by the sentencing court “for denying
credit were inappropriate and as a result of Appellant’s unique
circumstances[,] Appellant spent more time in confinement (in locked
treatment facilities), th[a]n he would have otherwise.” Appellant’s Brief at
8.
At the outset, we find Appellant has raised a substantial question for
our review. Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 847 (Pa. Super.
2016) (discussing the merits of Shull’s claim that the trial court erred in
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failing to award him credit for time spent in a rehabilitation center). Here
Appellant argues that his
time spent in drug rehabilitation was voluntary, but it was
substantially incentivized by the circumstances to the point of
almost making it involuntary. … [A]ppellant’s reasons for
entering treatment were clearly to avoid spending additional
time in jail. Initially, treatment was not a condition of
Appellant’s bail. However, Appellant realized his addiction had
caused him to commit other crimes and he would be facing other
theft related charges in the future. Appellant ran the risk, and
rightly so, that when presented with these new charges he would
not be released on unsecured bail. The District Attorney stated
he would allow Appellant to finish his inpatient rehab before
facing new charges. Appellant was therefore presented with the
options of [(1)] staying in treatment and possibly given credit for
time served or [(2)] facing new charges and going back to jail.
This created a substantial incentive for Appellant to remain in
treatment. The voluntary treatment was nearly involuntary at
this point!
***
Appellant argues that the facts present in this case do not
warrant the [sentencing] court’s imposition of a sentence which
denies him credit for time spent in drug rehabilitation. Appellant
was in a nearly custodial situation and not all factors were
adequately considered in crafting his sentence. Public policy
justifies incentivizing awarding credit for those in Appellant’s
situation, and the judge failed to award credit for time in
treatment in this case. Failure to do so created a sentence
which was unreasonable, manifestly excessive, and an abuse of
discretion.
Appellant’s Brief at 11-13.
The sentencing court offered the following response to Appellant’s
argument:
In the instant case, there was no bail condition of inpatient
treatment and Appellant was not subject to any condition that
was custodial in nature. When the inpatient rehabilitation
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treatment is voluntary, then the grant of credit for time served is
discretionary. … Although the treatment providers explained that
Appellant made progress, the [sentencing c]ourt gave detailed
reasons for not granting credit[.] Appellant engaged in criminal
activity after going through treatment by assaulting a fellow
inmate, which showed the ineffectualness of the treatment.
Appellant claimed to accept the consequences of his actions in
treatment but continued to perpetuate his lies to his own mother
regarding his theft of her firearms. Appellant also “cheeked”
medications to misuse or distribute the medication, which also
showed the ineffectiveness of the treatment. Appellant had
other misconducts during incarceration. During Appellant’s
incarceration, he attended zero out of nine self-help meetings.
Appellant has a history of revocations due to re-offending and
using. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the
[sentencing c]ourt found that granting credit for ineffectual
inpatient treatment to be inappropriate.
Sentencing Court Opinion, 8/18/2016, at 3-4.
A review of the sentencing transcript confirms that the sentencing
court did indeed consider Appellant’s request that he receive credit for time
spent in the drug rehabilitation center. However, for the reasons it set forth
in its 1925(a) opinion (as cited supra), and on the record at sentencing, the
sentencing court did not believe Appellant benefited from the time he
voluntarily spent in the rehabilitation facility, and therefore, awarding him
credit would be inappropriate. See N.T., 5/13/2016, at 18-27. Under these
facts, we discern no abuse of discretion in the sentencing court’s decision to
deny Appellant’s request.2
2
In finding Appellant is entitled to no relief from this Court, we are not
persuaded by his argument that his voluntary decision to enter the
rehabilitation facility was rendered “almost” involuntary due to his particular
circumstances. Appellant makes no argument that he was ordered by the
trial court to enter inpatient rehab. To the contrary, it is clear from
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/1/2017
Appellant’s own brief that his desire to enter rehab was, in large part, due to
the fear of facing additional charges and jail time. The fact that entering an
inpatient rehabilitation facility was the more desirable option does not make
his decision involuntary.
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