J-S07009-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CELESTE LOUISE COLES
Appellant No. 1329 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered July 29, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-66-MD-0000282-1994
BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS AND MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 01, 2017
Celeste Louise Coles appeals from the July 29, 2016 order dismissing
her PCRA petition as untimely filed. We affirm.
On June 23, 1995, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts each of
second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit homicide, and robbery, and
one count each of theft and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions
were based upon Appellant’s participation in the shooting deaths and
robberies of Raveielle Birdsong and Nichole Repsher. On July 19, 1995,
Appellant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, with
concurrent sentences imposed on the remaining charges. On October 21,
1996, we affirmed the judgment of sentence, but remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on the question of whether another participant in the
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crimes, whose attorney indicated that he would not testify based upon the
Fifth Amendment, intended to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination
himself. Commonwealth v. Coles, 688 A.2d 1225 (Pa.Super. 1996)
(unpublished memorandum). On remand, the trial court conducted a
hearing and concluded that the witness personally asserted his constitutional
right to remain silent. On May 10, 1999, we affirmed. Commonwealth v.
Coles, 739 A.2d 584 (Pa.Super. 1999) (unpublished memorandum).
On June 9, 2009, Appellant filed a PCRA petition, which was dismissed
as untimely without the appointment of counsel. We reversed and
remanded, ordering that counsel be provided before her petition was
addressed. Commonwealth v. Coles, 996 A.2d 538 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(unpublished memorandum). Counsel was appointed, but filed a no-merit
letter and a petition to withdraw. This pro se appeal followed the denial of
relief and grant of counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Appellant’s brief is woefully deficient. Most significantly, she fails to
cite a single legal authority or to set forth a statement of issues involved.
Our review of her brief reveals that her complaints relate to ineffective
assistance of counsel, which she avers renders her eligible for a new trial.
We first observe that this Court reviews the “denial of PCRA relief to
determine whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the
record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 86
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(Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444
(Pa. 2015)).
Next, it is axiomatic that all PCRA petitions must be filed within one
year of the date a defendant’s judgment becomes final unless an exception
to the one-year time restriction applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). If a PCRA
petition is untimely, “neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction
over the petition.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super.
2014) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d
520, 522 (Pa. 2006). “A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
In this case, we affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence in all
respects on May 10, 1999. Her sentence became final thirty days thereafter,
or on June 9, 1999. Appellant had until June 9, 2000, to file a timely PCRA
petition, and her 2009 petition is patently untimely. There are three
exceptions to the one-year time bar of § 9545:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Herein, Appellant does not invoke any exception. Her complaints, as
noted, all relate to ineffective assistance of counsel. However, as our
Supreme Court plainly articulated in Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886
A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005)
It is well settled that allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness
requirements of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Pursell,
561 Pa. 214, 749 A.2d 911, 915-16 (2000) (holding a
petitioner's claim in a second PCRA petition, that all prior counsel
rendered ineffective assistance, did not invoke timeliness
exception, as “government officials” did not include defense
counsel); see also Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562
Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780, 785-86 (2000) (finding that the “fact” that
current counsel discovered prior PCRA counsel failed to develop
issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness was not after-discovered
evidence exception to time-bar); Commonwealth v. Lark, 560
Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585, 589 (2000) (holding that allegation of
ineffectiveness is not sufficient justification to overcome
otherwise untimely PCRA claims).
Accord Commonweatlh v. Pollard, 911 A.2d 1005 (Pa.Super. 2006).
As Appellant has failed to establish that her PCRA petition was timely,
a jurisdictional prerequisite to merits review of her claims, we affirm its
dismissal.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/1/2017
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Com. v. Coles, C.
Combined Opinion