UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1916
ANTONYA HERRING,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
VICKI MONTGOMERY, Individually and in her official capacity
as CEO/Director, Central State Hospital,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
CENTRAL STATE HOSPITAL; BERNADETTE SPRUILL, Individually and
in her official capacity as Head Supervisor, Forensic Unit,
Central State Hospital; S. YARATHRA, M.D., Individually and
in his official capacity as Chief Psychiatrist, Forensic
Unit, Central State Hospital,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:14-cv-00738-JAG)
Submitted: February 28, 2017 Decided: March 3, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
JeRoyd W. Greene, III, ROBINSON AND GREENE, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia,
Rhodes B. Ritenour, Deputy Attorney General, G. William Norris,
Jr., Gregory C. Fleming, Senior Assistant Attorneys General,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Antonya O. Herring appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Vicki Montgomery on her employment
discrimination claim raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Finding no error, we affirm.
We “review[] de novo [a] district court’s order granting
summary judgment.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts,
780 F.3d 562, 565 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). “A district court ‘shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 568 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, “we view the facts and
all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in the light most
favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” Id. at 565 n.1
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, “the nonmoving
party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere
speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather,
731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013). When a “district court’s
grant of summary judgment disposed of cross-motions for summary
judgment, we consider each motion separately on its own merits
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to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as
a matter of law.” Defenders of Wildlife v. N.C. Dep’t of
Transp., 762 F.3d 374, 392 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Montgomery did not take the allegedly discriminatory
employment actions at issue in this case. Instead, those
actions were taken by Montgomery’s subordinates. Thus, Herring
was required to demonstrate that (1) Montgomery had knowledge
that her subordinates engaged in “conduct that posed a pervasive
and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury,” (2)
Montgomery’s response to the knowledge was sufficiently
inadequate to amount to deliberate indifference, and (3) there
was a causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the
constitutional injury. Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226
(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Herring failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact to hold Montgomery liable for her subordinates’
actions. While Herring does proffer some inconsistencies
regarding employment decisions that Montgomery personally
approved, and that Montgomery did not follow the written
personnel policies at all times, these facts alone cannot show
that Montgomery condoned any discriminatory intent of her
subordinates. Montgomery did not sign the personnel form
documenting Herring’s assignment to Ward 8. In light of the
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large nursing staff employed by the hospital, it was perfectly
reasonable for Montgomery to delegate to the Director of Nursing
the task of assigning work to nurses. Thus, the district court
correctly held that Herring failed to proffer evidence
establishing a basis to hold Montgomery personally liable under
§ 1983.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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