Antonya Herring v. Vicki Montgomery

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1916

ANTONYA HERRING,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

VICKI MONTGOMERY, Individually and in her official capacity
as CEO/Director, Central State Hospital,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

CENTRAL STATE HOSPITAL; BERNADETTE SPRUILL, Individually and
in her official capacity as Head Supervisor, Forensic Unit,
Central State Hospital; S. YARATHRA, M.D., Individually and
in his official capacity as Chief Psychiatrist, Forensic
Unit, Central State Hospital,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:14-cv-00738-JAG)

Submitted: February 28, 2017 Decided: March 3, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS,
Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
JeRoyd W. Greene, III, ROBINSON AND GREENE, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia,
Rhodes B. Ritenour, Deputy Attorney General, G. William Norris,
Jr., Gregory C. Fleming, Senior Assistant Attorneys General,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Antonya O. Herring appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to Vicki Montgomery on her employment

discrimination claim raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).

Finding no error, we affirm.

We “review[] de novo [a] district court’s order granting

summary judgment.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts,

780 F.3d 562, 565 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). “A district court ‘shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 568 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists, “we view the facts and

all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in the light most

favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” Id. at 565 n.1

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, “the nonmoving

party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere

speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather,

731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013). When a “district court’s

grant of summary judgment disposed of cross-motions for summary

judgment, we consider each motion separately on its own merits

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to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as

a matter of law.” Defenders of Wildlife v. N.C. Dep’t of

Transp., 762 F.3d 374, 392 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Montgomery did not take the allegedly discriminatory

employment actions at issue in this case. Instead, those

actions were taken by Montgomery’s subordinates. Thus, Herring

was required to demonstrate that (1) Montgomery had knowledge

that her subordinates engaged in “conduct that posed a pervasive

and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury,” (2)

Montgomery’s response to the knowledge was sufficiently

inadequate to amount to deliberate indifference, and (3) there

was a causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the

constitutional injury. Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226

(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Herring failed to raise a genuine dispute

of material fact to hold Montgomery liable for her subordinates’

actions. While Herring does proffer some inconsistencies

regarding employment decisions that Montgomery personally

approved, and that Montgomery did not follow the written

personnel policies at all times, these facts alone cannot show

that Montgomery condoned any discriminatory intent of her

subordinates. Montgomery did not sign the personnel form

documenting Herring’s assignment to Ward 8. In light of the

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large nursing staff employed by the hospital, it was perfectly

reasonable for Montgomery to delegate to the Director of Nursing

the task of assigning work to nurses. Thus, the district court

correctly held that Herring failed to proffer evidence

establishing a basis to hold Montgomery personally liable under

§ 1983.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED