J-A33027-16
2017 PA Super 60
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.B., A MINOR, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA : No. 527 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Dated March 11, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County,
Criminal Division, at No: CP-42-JV-0000063-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2017
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered on
March 11, 2016, which granted the motion to suppress filed on behalf of
N.B. (Appellee).1 We reverse the order and remand this case for further
proceedings.
On April 28, 2016, Appellee’s mother (Mother) received information
from her daughter that Appellee and his twin brother, D.B., then 14 years
old, had engaged in sexual conduct with a nine-year-old female who lived in
an adjacent apartment. Mother confronted Appellee and his brother, both of
whom confirmed the allegations. Mother reported the conduct to the boys’
school district. In response, Lieutenant Steve Caskey of the Bradford Police
1
The Commonwealth filed its notice of appeal on April 8, 2016; the
Commonwealth included in the notice its certification that suppression would
substantially hinder its prosecution of the case. See Notice of Appeal,
4/8/2016. “In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the
Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not
end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of
appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the
prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A33027-16
Department requested that Appellee and his brother be brought to the police
station for an interview. Based on the inculpatory statements elicited during
that interview, the Commonwealth filed a written allegation of delinquency.
On December 1, 2015, Appellee’s attorney filed a motion to suppress.2 A
hearing was held on that motion on February 17, 2016. On March 11, 2016,
the juvenile court granted Appellee’s motion. This timely appeal followed.
Both the Commonwealth and the juvenile court complied with the mandates
of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The Commonwealth presents the following issue for our review.
Did the [juvenile] court err in granting [Appellee’s] motion
to suppress where [Appellee] consulted with [Mother] prior to
police questioning, and where [Mother] voluntarily brought
[Appellee] to the police station, and where [Appellee] and
[Mother] were both read their Miranda[3] rights, with each
indicating that they understood those rights?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization and underlining
omitted).
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, the
relevant scope and standard of review is as follows.
[W]e are required to determine whether the record supports the
factual findings of the suppression court, and we are bound by
those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
2
Appellee’s case proceeded separately from that of his brother. The motion
and order at issue here concern only Appellee’s statements to police.
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-2-
J-A33027-16
therefrom are in error. Since [the j]uvenile prevailed below, we
consider only the evidence of [the j]uvenile and so much of the
Commonwealth’s evidence that is un-contradicted when read in
the context of the entire record. Concomitantly, where the
questions presented concern legal questions, we are not bound
by the suppression court’s determinations and our standard of
review is de novo.
In re T.P., 78 A.3d 1166, 1169 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Instantly, the Commonwealth argues that the juvenile court erred in
granting Appellee’s motion to suppress because the totality of the
circumstances presented here demonstrates that Appellee’s confession was
made voluntarily. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12.
In [Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283, 1287
(Pa. 1984)], which addressed a juvenile’s waiver of his Miranda
rights in the context of providing a confession during police
interrogation, our Supreme Court held:
The requirements of due process are satisfied,
and the protection against the use of involuntary
confessions which law and reason demand is met by
application of the totality of circumstances analysis
to all questions involving the waiver of rights and the
voluntariness of confessions made by juveniles. All of
the attending facts and circumstances must be
considered and weighed in determining whether a
juvenile’s confession was knowingly and freely given.
Among those factors are the juvenile’s youth,
experience, comprehension, and the presence or
absence of an interested adult.
Id. at 1288. Other factors to consider in this context also include
“(1) the duration and means of an interrogation; (2) the
[juvenile’s] physical and psychological state; (3) the conditions
attendant to the detention; (4) the attitude of the interrogator;
and (5) any and all other factors that could drain a person’s
ability to withstand suggestion and coercion.” In re V.C., 66
-3-
J-A33027-16
A.3d 341, 351 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (providing further that waiver must be made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently).
In re N.M., 141 A.3d 539, 543–44 (Pa. Super. 2016) (footnotes omitted).
The “interested adult” rule … provided that no person
under the age of eighteen years could waive his right to remain
silent and his right to the assistance of counsel without being
provided an opportunity to consult with an interested adult, who
is informed of the juvenile’s rights and is interested in the
welfare of the juvenile.” Williams, 475 A.2d at 1286–87. …[T]he
presence or absence of an interested adult is no longer a per se
requirement, but one factor in determining the voluntariness of a
juvenile’s waiver of his or her Miranda rights. Id. at 1288; In
re V.C., 66 A.3d [at] 351[].
Id. at 547 n. 2.
As to the aforementioned factors, the certified record establishes the
following.
A recording of the interview was introduced into evidence.
When Officer Caskey met with [Appellee], his brother, and
Mother, Officer Caskey read Miranda warnings to all of them
and explained that the room and interviews were being audio
and visually recorded. No waivers were signed by Mother,
[Appellee], or his twin brother. [Officer Caskey explained that,
due to the nature of the case, that criminal charges may be filed.
N.T., 2/17/2016]. Officer Caskey explained very clearly that
Mother was permitted to be present for the interviews, but he
preferred to speak with each of them individually. Mother
acquiesced and let the boys be interviewed individually. Officer
Caskey first interviewed [Appellee], then his twin. During the
interview, [Appellee] understood why he was there and was
forthright with Officer Caskey in answering the questions.
[Appellee] disclosed his actions in detail.
The interview took place in an office and was audio and
visually recorded. There was a desk between Officer Caskey and
[Appellee]. Officer Caskey remained seated in his desk for the
-4-
J-A33027-16
entirety of the interview. [Appellee] was seated across the desk
and the door was immediately behind him. There were no
barriers or obstacles between [Appellee] and the door. The door
was closed, but it remained unlocked at all times. Officer Caskey
maintained a calm and cool manner during questioning. He did
not yell or threaten [Appellee]. [Appellee] was never restrained.
[Appellee] did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs
or alcohol and had a normal physical appearance. [Appellee]
was responsive to questioning and disclosed many details to
Officer Caskey and agreed to meet again for additional
interviews. The interview in question lasted a total of twenty-
seven (27) minutes, with [Appellee] being interviewed
individually for approximately ten (10) minutes.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/12/2016, at 1-3 (unnumbered).
At the suppression hearing, Mother testified that she understood the
Miranda warnings. N.T., 2/17/2016, at 14. She also indicated that, at the
time of the interview, she understood there could be criminal consequences
as a result of her sons’ actions, although “not to the extent” to which she is
now aware. Id. However, on redirect examination, she stated that Appellee
could not have understood the legal ramifications of his statement because
she did not understand. Id. at 27. Appellee testified that he had difficulty
understanding in school, id. at 48-49; that he affirmed he understood his
Miranda warnings at the time of the interview but had no appreciation for
the meaning of those warnings, id. at 47-49; and that all he understood was
“that [he] was in trouble and that [he] had to own up to it,” id. at 54.
-5-
J-A33027-16
Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court determined that Appellee’s
statements should be suppressed because Appellee “participated in the
interview under compulsion of a parent[; therefore], the disclosures made
were not voluntary.” Juvenile Court Opinion, at 5 (unnumbered). Notably,
the juvenile court found Mother’s testimony “less than credible.” Id.
7/1/2016, at 4 (unnumbered). Rather, the court “considered most strongly
[Appellee’s] own testimony that he believed he was forced to be there by his
mother and that he was directed to confess.” Id. at 4-5 (unnumbered).
We are mindful that, in evaluating whether a statement to police
satisfies the requirements of due process we are “constrained to examine
only whether an individual’s confession was the product of coercion, duress,
or the use of other measures by interrogators deliberately calculated to
overcome his or her free will.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 14 A.3d 798,
815 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Accordingly, our
concern with respect to the voluntariness of Appellee’s confession is coercion
by law enforcement. Here, Appellee did not testify that Officer Caskey
behaved inappropriately during the interview. Rather, the record reveals
quite the opposite.
Specifically with respect to Mother, Williams and its progeny support
the presence of an interested adult who can advise a juvenile as to his rights
and act in his best interest as one factor in determining the voluntariness of
-6-
J-A33027-16
a juvenile’s confession. Here, Mother brought Appellee to the police station
and advised him to tell the truth. However, these actions cannot be
reasonably interpreted to rise to the level of coercion such that suppression
is warranted. The juvenile court erred in conflating the actions of Mother
with prohibited conduct by law enforcement.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellee, as we
must, the record demonstrates that the statements during Appellee’s
interview were made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Accordingly,
we hold that the juvenile court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to
suppress.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Lazarus joins.
Judge Solano files a dissenting opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/8/2017
-7-