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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: TESTAMENTARY TRUST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ESTABLISHED BY THE LAST WILL : PENNSYLVANIA
AND TESTAMENT OF LUCY B. :
NORTHCRAFT, LATE OF MANN :
TOWNSHIP, BEDFORD COUNTY, :
PENNSYLVANIA, DECEASED :
:
:
APPEAL OF: DARRELL NORTHCRAFT : No. 1105 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered June 29, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2014-00072
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and SOLANO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2017
Appellant, Darrell Northcraft, appeals from the order entered in the
Bedford County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court, which terminated
the testamentary trust established by the last will and testament of Lucy B.
Northcraft (“Decedent”), and distributed the trust property to the third-class
beneficiaries, Decedent’s great-grandchildren. We affirm.
In its June 29, 2016 opinion, the Orphans’ Court set forth the relevant
facts of this case as follows:
The facts of the matter are not in dispute.
Decedent[1]…created a non-charitable testamentary trust
(“Trust”) in her Last Will and Testament. The sole
property of the testamentary trust consists of two parcels
of land in Southampton and Mann Townships of Bedford
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1
Decedent died on May 7, 1986.
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County, Pennsylvania. The Trust granted a life estate[2]
interest to Decedent’s oldest child, with said life estate
progressing through each of her other children, prioritized
by their ages. Life estate interests were then extended to
Decedent’s grandchildren upon the death of her last child,
again prioritized by age. Upon the death or disclaimer of
Decedent’s youngest grandchild, the Trust was to
terminate with all property to be distributed to Decedent’s
great-grandchildren. [Appellant] is Decedent’s last
remaining child. For several years, the formal terms of the
Trust have not been carried out, including the replacement
of Trustees.
[Appellant] seeks to have the Trust terminated and the
Trust property distributed solely to him as the sole
remaining child of Decedent. Respondents from the
second-class beneficiaries (i.e., grandchildren) and third-
class beneficiaries (i.e., great-grandchildren) consent in
the termination of the Trust, but seek to have the Trust
property distributed to the [great-grandchildren]. …
(Memorandum Opinion, filed June 29, 2016, at 1-2). Specifically, the
relevant language of the Trust provides:
THIRD: I devise all of my real estate to my Trustees,
hereinafter named, IN TRUST, NEVERTHELESS, for the
following uses and purposes:
* * *
B. My son, Ernest A. Northcraft, shall have the right
to make his home on the premises, and to occupy the
land, my house, the barn and all other farm buildings
existing on the date of this Will or which I or he may
hereafter erect so long as he shall live, provided, however,
my son, Ernest, shall be solely responsible for all taxes,
maintenance and other expenses involved in maintaining
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2
The parties dispute whether the Trust actually created a “life estate”
interest in, or merely a right to reside on, the Trust property. We will
discuss this issue more fully later in this decision.
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the property and shall receive all income from any and all
sources whatever received in respect to the property. Said
income shall be considered the sole property of my son,
Ernest, while he resides on the property, and this trust
shall have no right or other access to said income and it
shall not be considered a distribution from the trust estate
to my said son. On the death of my said son or in the
event he should choose not to continue to reside on the
premises, my next oldest child shall have the right to make
his/her home on the premises. This privilege of residing
on the premises shall be extended to each of my children
in order of priority based on their ages. On the death of
the child having and exercising the privilege or in the
event any child having the privilege should choose not to
make his/her home on the premises, the privilege shall be
extended to the next oldest child, and so on, provided any
child exercising the privilege shall assume the
responsibility for taxes, maintenance and upkeep required
of my son, Ernest, and provided, further, any such child
making his/her home on the premises shall be entitled to
receive all of the income earned in respect to the property
in the same manner discussed in subparagraph A above up
to but not in excess of the sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($15,000.00). All such income in excess of Fifteen
Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) shall be receivable by the
trust and distributed as trust income as hereinabove
provided to all of my beneficiaries, including any of my
beneficiaries who then may be residing on the property.
* * *
E. On the death of the survivor of my children this
trust shall continue under the same terms and conditions
for the benefit of my grandchildren including the privileges
granted by paragraph B of this Article THIRD above with
the privilege therein granted concerning the right to make
his/her home on the premises being granted in order to
the oldest grandchild then living. When none of my
children, my granddaughter, Betty Ann Northcraft, nor any
of my grandchildren are then living, this trust shall
terminate and the then remaining principal, and
accumulated or undistributed income shall be distributed,
in equal shares, to the then living children of my
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grandchildren, without regard to any distribution made
under any other provision of this Article THIRD.
* * *
EIGHTH: I appoint as Trustees of the trust created herein
each of my children as shall survive me, they to serve as
Co-trustees for so long as they live. Upon the death of any
trustee, the remaining Trustees shall elect from among my
grandchildren a replacement trustee to succeed to all the
rights and privileges of my deceased trustee.
* * *
(Decedent’s Last Will and Testament, dated January 22, 1979, at 1-3, 5).
Procedurally, on August 6, 2014, Appellant filed a petition for
termination of the Trust, alleging the original purpose of the Trust could no
longer be served. Specifically, Appellant claimed the expenses necessary to
maintain the property exceeded any potential income produced from the
property. Appellant also maintained that he resided elsewhere and did not
want to move onto the property and make necessary expenditures where,
upon Appellant’s death, the right of life occupancy and the benefits of any
improvements Appellant made would pass to Decedent’s eldest then-living
grandchild, whose identity was still unknown. Appellant asked the court to
terminate the Trust and to distribute all Trust property solely to him because
Decedent’s “probable intent” was to distribute her property to her surviving
children. As well, Appellant insisted he was entitled to reimbursement for
expenses he allegedly paid relating to the preservation of the property and
its maintenance and upkeep since the interest in the property passed to him
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in 2006. Appellant averred his claim for reimbursement should constitute a
lien on the property.
On March 6, 2015, Respondents Michael P. Northcraft (Decedent’s
grandchild) and Michael E. Northcraft (Decedent’s great-grandchild),3 filed
an answer and new matter opposing termination of the Trust. Respondents
claimed, inter alia, the property could be income producing if used properly.
Respondents insisted they offered to assist Appellant with expenses
necessary to maintain the property but Appellant refused their offers.
Respondents alleged Appellant maintained sole and exclusive control of the
property since at least 2006, and excluded all other beneficiaries from the
property except for his own children. Respondents asserted the affirmative
defense of unclean hands, alleging Appellant breached his duties as trustee
by, inter alia, failing to select replacement trustees. Appellant filed a reply
on May 29, 2015. On September 10, 2015, the court appointed counsel for
the remaining third-class beneficiaries. The court held a hearing on the
matter on February 17, 2016, at which time the court received argument
from all counsel. The court deferred its ruling pending the submission of
post-hearing memoranda. In post-hearing memoranda, all parties agreed
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3
Michael P. Northcraft died during the pendency of this case. Michael E.
Northcraft is the son of Michael P. Northcraft and the executor of his estate.
Michael E. Northcraft states on appeal that he made no request to substitute
the estate as a party because any interest Michael P. Northcraft had in the
Trust property ceased upon his death.
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that termination of the Trust was proper. Respondents and the remaining
third-class beneficiaries asked the court to distribute the Trust property to
the third-class beneficiaries.4 Appellant sought distribution solely to himself.
On June 29, 2016, the court entered an order terminating the Trust
and distributing the Trust property to the third-class beneficiaries,
Decedent’s great-grandchildren. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on
July 28, 2016, per Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(4) (explaining appeal may be taken as
of right from order terminating trust). The next day, the court ordered
Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely complied on August 18,
2016.
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
SHOULD THE [ORPHANS’] COURT HAVE CONSIDERED
OTHER PROVISIONS OF [DECEDENT’S] WILL IN
ASCERTAINING WHAT DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRUST
PROPERTY UPON TERMINATION WAS CONSISTENT WITH
THE PURPOSES OF THE TRUST?
WHERE A TESTATRIX HAS CREATED A TESTAMENTARY
TRUST IN REAL ESTATE AND PROVIDED FOR A SEQUENCE
OF LIFE INTERESTS VESTING SUCCESSIVELY IN THE
ELDEST SURVIVOR AMONG FIRST A CLASS CONSISTING
OF HER CHILDREN, AND SECOND A CLASS CONSISTING
OF HER GRANDCHILDREN, WITH REMAINDER IN FEE PER
CAPITA TO A THIRD CLASS CONSISTING OF HER THEN
LIVING GREAT-GRANDCHILDREN, MAY THE COURT UPON
TERMINATION UNDER 20 PA.C.S.A. § 7740.2 BECAUSE OF
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4
Respondents and the remaining third-party beneficiaries also opposed
Appellant’s claim for reimbursement of expenses.
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CIRCUMSTANCES THAT APPARENTLY WERE NOT
ANTICIPATED BY THE TESTATRIX, BEFORE THE DEATH OF
ALL MEMBERS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND CLASSES,
AWARD THE TRUST PROPERTY EXCLUSIVELY TO THE
THIRD CLASS, EFFECTIVELY EXTINGUISHING THE LIFE
INTERESTS?
(Appellant’s Brief at 3).
Our standard and scope of review are as follows:
Our standard of review of the findings of an [O]rphans’
[C]ourt is deferential.
When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans’
Court, this Court must determine whether the record
is free from legal error and the court’s factual
findings are supported by the evidence. Because the
Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines
the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we
will not reverse its credibility determinations absent
an abuse of that discretion.
However, we are not constrained to give the same
deference to any resulting legal conclusions.
In re Estate of Harrison, 745 A.2d 676, 678-79
(Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 563 Pa. 646, 758 A.2d
1200 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he Orphans’ [C]ourt decision will not be
reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion or a
fundamental error in applying the correct principles of
law.” In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 951
(Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 722, 847 A.2d
1287 (2003).
In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 206-07 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 A.3d 603 (2013).
For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant
argues Decedent’s will, read in its entirety, sheds the best light on
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Decedent’s probable intent concerning how to distribute the Trust property.
Appellant avers Decedent made numerous provisions throughout her will
intending to benefit her “then surviving children.” For example, Appellant
highlights Article SECOND of the will, in which Appellant bequeathed tangible
personalty to her surviving children, as well as the residuary clause of the
will at Article SEVENTH, which vests the remainder of Decedent’s estate in
“such of my children as survive me.” Appellant suggests Decedent’s purpose
in formulating the trust was to benefit only one child at a time in each
generation (the eldest survivor), even if that meant excluding any or all
younger members of the same generation or all members of the next
generation. Appellant insists Decedent designated her children as trustees,
vesting them with certain authority Decedent did not similarly grant to later
generations. Appellant maintains the court erred by focusing its analysis
predominately on the language at Article THIRD of Decedent’s will without
examining the will in its entirety to ascertain Decedent’s probable intent in
light of the present circumstances. Given her testamentary plan as a whole,
Appellant suggests Decedent would have intended the Trust property to pass
to the person with whom she enjoyed the closest relation—her only surviving
child.
Even if the court’s decision not to award Appellant the Trust property
was proper, Appellant argues he is entitled to reimbursement for the value
of the life estate he held in the property. Appellant claims the court ignored
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Decedent’s purpose to provide a benefit to her children (and then
grandchildren) during their lifetimes by distributing the Trust property only
to the third-party beneficiaries, Decedent’s great-grandchildren. Appellant
concedes the language of Article THIRD provides for distribution to the
great-grandchildren upon termination of the trust, but he suggests this
purpose was to occur only after the death of all of Decedent’s children and
grandchildren. Appellant contends Decedent would not have wanted to
bypass her living children and grandchildren upon early termination of the
trust. Appellant concludes the Orphans’ Court erred by distributing the Trust
property solely to Decedent’s great-grandchildren, and this Court must
reverse and remand for the Orphans’ Court to reconsider its decision
concerning the Trust property; or, in the alternative, conduct further
proceedings regarding the valuation of Appellant’s life interest. 5 We
disagree.
The Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code (“Code”) provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
§ 7740.2. Modification or termination of
noncharitable irrevocable trust by court—UTC 412
(a) Unanticipated circumstances.—The court may
modify the administrative or dispositive provisions of a
noncharitable irrevocable trust, make an allowance from
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5
On appeal, Appellant abandoned his claim for reimbursement of expenses
Appellant allegedly paid relating to the preservation of the property and its
maintenance and upkeep.
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the principal of the trust or terminate the trust if, because
of circumstances that apparently were not anticipated by
the settlor, modification, allowance or termination will
further the purposes of the trust. To the extent
practicable, the modification or allowance shall
approximate the settlor’s probable intention.
(b) Inability to administer effectively.—The court
may modify the administrative provisions of a
noncharitable irrevocable trust if adherence to the existing
provisions would be impracticable or wasteful or impair the
trust’s administration.
(c) Distribution of property.—Upon termination of a
trust under this section, the trustee shall distribute the
trust property in a manner consistent with the purposes of
the trust.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7740.2.
“A life estate is defined as an estate whose duration is limited to the
life of the party holding it, or some other person.” In re Paxson Trust I,
893 A.2d 99, 115 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 759, 903 A.2d
538 (2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
A life estate arises when a conveyance or will expressly
limits the duration of the created estate in terms of the life
or lives of one or more persons, or when the will or
instrument creating the interest, viewed as a whole,
manifests the intent of the transferor to create an estate
measured by the life or lives of one or more persons. A
life estate has the quality of alienability, thus the life
estate can be conveyed to a third person; but, the life
estate holder cannot convey a greater interest than he/she
possesses. Generally, the life estate holder is responsible
for interest on any mortgage on the property, and has a
duty to pay current taxes and assessments, by a
municipality or other public authority, which do not exceed
the probable duration of the life estate.
Id. (internal citations omitted). “[T]he use of any particular phrases or
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words of art is not required in order to create or reserve a life estate.” Id.
(holding trust deed executed by children’s maternal grandfather conveying
family home to children’s parents as trustees for children granted parents
life estate in home; trust deed conveyed property to parents “for their sole
and separate use, for [and] during the term of their natural life”; deed
stated that upon parents’ death, premises shall vest in their children,
absolutely and in fee simple; upon termination of trust, parents were
entitled to reimbursement for value of their life estates). Compare Estate
of Culig, 134 A.3d 463 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding will which granted
decedent’s wife “right to reside” in his residence without payment of rent
until her death, or other certain events occurred, did not grant wife life
estate but merely license or privilege to continue to occupy or reside at
decedent’s residence; Orphans’ Court erred by construing nature of wife’s
interest in real estate as that of life tenant; even though wife was not “life
tenant,” she was still obligated to make routine repairs and maintenance to
property while she enjoyed use of property). See also Baldesberger v.
Baldesberger, 378 Pa. 113, 105 A.2d 713 (1954) (distinguishing between
life estate and right to reside or occupy; decedent’s will granted his children
right to use their father’s farm as home if they remained unmarried; holding
interest in question was incorporeal right to reside on property; while
decedent gave his wife farm for her life without qualification, decedent gave
his children right to use farm as home only if they remained unmarried;
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thus, decedent’s will granted children privilege to occupy property as their
home, nothing more).
Instantly, the Orphans’ Court addressed Appellant’s issues as follows:
[Appellant] contends that the Trust has become
unworkable in that, inter alia, no replacement trustees
have ever been elected and that [Appellant] has become
solely responsible for the maintenance of the property with
no desire to exercise the benefits, or continue the
responsibilities, of his interest. Both groups of
Respondents agree that [Appellant’s] inaction and
unwillingness to disclaim his interest, have so frustrated
the purpose of the Trust that termination is necessary. We
concur with the position of all parties. While we note that
the consent of all interested parties to terminate a trust
does not necessitate such a result, we are left with no
other conclusion in this case. Given the longstanding
noncompliance with the terms of the Trust, and the current
stalemate in which the Trust is now mired, we find that
only termination of the [T]rust will ultimately further the
original purposes of the Trust.
* * *
Having found that termination of the Trust is necessary,
we now turn to the issue of how the Trust property should
be distributed. …
[Appellant] argues that the Trust property should be
distributed solely to [him] as the sole remaining child of
Decedent. In support of this argument, [Appellant] points
to what he views as the scheme of distribution in
Decedent’s Last Will and Testament. [Appellant] claims
that there is a clear intent by Decedent to benefit a
generation of descendants—regardless of the number of its
members—to the exclusion of the next generation of
descendants. We are unpersuaded by [Appellant’s]
argument.
The plain language of Section 7740.2(c) commands that
we distribute the property consistent with the purposes of
the Trust, not what may be perceived as the overall
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testamentary scheme of Decedent’s Last Will and
Testament. And, the clear purpose of the Trust was to
provide a life estate to Decedent’s children (and then
grandchildren) individually in succession, thereby affording
a benefit to Decedent’s heirs and providing a manner of
maintaining the Trust property. Once the life estate
successions had run their course through Decedent’s
children and grandchildren, however, the purpose of the
Trust then changes to provide for Decedent’s great-
grandchildren by distributing the Trust property amongst
them upon termination. Therefore, we view the ultimate
purpose of the Trust as providing for Decedent’s great-
grandchildren with the prior generations supporting this
purpose by maintaining the Trust property. Accordingly,
we are of the opinion that the Trust property should be
distributed to the great-grandchildren upon termination.
In support of our decision we note that, under no language
of the Trust (nor by any normal operation thereof), was
the Trust property ever to be distributed to Decedent’s
children—nonetheless a sole child. Therefore, Decedent
never contemplated, nor intended, the result for which
[Appellant] argues. Decedent did, however, intend for the
Trust property to ultimately vest amongst her great-
grandchildren. While we understand that our decision
arrives at Decedent’s intended result in a manner that is
unintended, we nonetheless find this result to
exponentially further the purposes of the Trust [more]
than [Appellant’s] proposal.
(Memorandum Opinion at 2-4) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). We see no reason to disrupt the court’s decision to terminate the
Trust and to distribute the Trust property to Decedent’s great-grandchildren,
consistent with the ultimate purpose of the Trust. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. §
7740.2(a), (c); Estate of Whitley, supra.
We depart from the Orphans’ Court’s analysis only to the extent that it
characterizes the interest granted to Decedent’s children and grandchildren
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as “life estates.” Decedent granted her children (and then grandchildren)
“the right to make [their] home on the premises.” (Decedent’s Last Will and
Testament at 2). Upon the death of each child (prioritized by age) “or in the
event [the child] should choose not to continue to reside on the premises,”
the “right to reside” passed to the next oldest child. Decedent repeatedly
referred to the rights granted to each child and grandchild as the “privilege”
of residing on the premises. Id. Significantly, Decedent did not intend for
her children or grandchildren to enjoy certain benefits of the property if they
chose not to reside there, such as the ability to collect rent from the
property. Likewise, Decedent did not intend to grant children or
grandchildren the right to convey the property to a third party. Rather, if
the child or grandchild chose not to exercise his/her right to reside on the
property, the interest then passed to the next child/grandchild in line. Under
these circumstances, Decedent granted each child and grandchild a “right to
reside,” not a life estate. See Baldesberger, supra; Culig, supra.
Compare In re Paxson Trust I, supra. Because Appellant did not have a
life estate interest in the Trust property, he is not entitled to reimbursement
for the value of his interest in the property. See id. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/9/2017
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In Re: Testamentary Trust of Northcraft, L.
Combined Opinion