NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 16, 2017
Decided March 9, 2017
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
No. 16‐3439
SHEENA MCMILLON, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
v.
No. 2:15‐CV‐00780
JOANNA REINSTEIN, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees. Nancy Joseph,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Sheena McMillon claims that her constitutional rights were violated on three
separate occasions when she was fired by IRIS Financial Services Agency (“IRIS”) in
2012, when she was suspended from her job as a pharmacy technician at Walgreens in
2012, and when her license to operate a child care center was revoked by the Wisconsin
Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) in 2015. Perhaps McMillon is a victim of
some unconstitutional action. The problem is that the case before us is against the City
of Milwaukee and Joanna Reinstein, who at the time of the events in dispute was an
employee of the City of Milwaukee. Neither defendant had any “authority or control”
No. 16‐3439 Page 2
over either McMillon’s employment or her license, a fact which the district court relied
upon to dismiss her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on the pleadings. For the reasons that follow
and for the reasons set forth in the thorough opinion of the district court, we affirm the
district court’s judgment.
In 2012, Sheena McMillon and her mother, Cheryl Meeks, were employed by
IRIS as home‐care providers for Meeks’ adult, disabled daughter L.M. (McMillon’s
sister). The record is unclear whether IRIS is a state or private agency, but the business
arrangement is typical: IRIS serves as a conduit for Wisconsin state funds. In January
2012, Reinstein, an employee of Adult Protective Services, fielded a complaint that
Meeks had neglected L.M. This triggered an investigation which led, apparently, to
Reinstein concluding that McMillon had neglected and financially exploited her sister.
Reinstein subsequently notified IRIS of her conclusions, and IRIS terminated
McMillon’s employment. Reinstein allegedly also informed MaryKay Smet, McMillon’s
state licensing specialist, of her findings. Informing Smet allegedly resulted in two
harms to McMillon. First, it resulted in Walgreens suspending McMillon’s employment
as a pharmacy technician. Second, it resulted in the Wisconsin state DCF revoking
McMillon’s license to operate a child care center three years later.
While the legal gloss on the dispute is somewhat unclear, the factual allegations
are clear. McMillon alleges that Reinstein knowingly made a false internal report of
abuse and then told both IRIS and a Wisconsin state employee about it. Spreading this
misinformation caused reasonably foreseeable consequences: McMillon was terminated
by IRIS; various Wisconsin state agencies learned the misinformation; and McMillon’s
private employer learned of the misinformation and suspended her. Had McMillon
known of the false internal report, she would have requested a hearing to correct it.
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the
district court rejected the notion that McMillon had suffered a deprivation of property
or liberty without due process of law. Specifically, it held that McMillon did have a
property interest in her child care license, but that it could not find that the named
defendants had any “authority or control” over DCF and as such they were not
personally responsible for depriving McMillon of her property. Just so. This is made all
the more clear when considering the process McMillon asks for: notice and an
opportunity to contest Reinstein’s findings. Requiring such a hearing in this context
would not solve McMillon’s property deprivation, which is the subsequent revocation
of her license under Wisconsin state law. Any process required before revoking a
No. 16‐3439 Page 3
license is provided for in Wisconsin state law and DCF procedures binding on DCF, not
on Reinstein or the City of Milwaukee. If McMillon contends that DCF routinely relies
upon unreliable evidence provided by municipal agencies when arbitrarily revoking
licenses, the proper vehicle for that claim is a § 1983 lawsuit against DCF.1
The district court also rejected McMillon’s argument that Reinstein and the City
of Milwaukee had unconstitutionally deprived her of her liberty interest in her “good
name, reputation, honor and integrity.” As properly noted by the district court, this is
not a cognizable liberty interest, but McMillon’s job prospects are. If McMillon were
stigmatized by publicly disclosed information, which caused her to “suffer[] a tangible
loss of other employment opportunities,” then she would have a claim for a deprivation
of an occupational liberty interest. Townsend v. Villas, 256 F.3d 661, 669‐70 (7th Cir.
2001). Such a claim seems the fairest reading of McMillon’s allegations.
However, as correctly held by the district court, McMillon has alleged no public
disclosure by Reinstein or the City of Milwaukee. Reinstein is alleged to have disclosed
her findings to IRIS and to MaryKay Smet, a state regulator. Both disclosures are
authorized by Wisconsin law. Wis. Stat. § 55.043(6)(b)(6); Wis. Stat. § 55.043(6)(b)(9). Any
unauthorized disclosure of such reports is prohibited by Wisconsin law, so that
Reinstein and the City of Milwaukee cannot be considered to have made any “public
disclosure.” To the extent McMillon alleges that Smet or another Wisconsin state
employee or agency made an unauthorized disclosure downstream, again, that entity
represents the proper defendant. If each disclosure of Reinstein’s report was authorized,
perhaps McMillon believes the entire protective services regulatory scheme violates due
process. It is clear, however, that both Reinstein and the City of Milwaukee could not be
considered to have deprived McMillon of a liberty interest, so this claim was also
properly dismissed.
Accordingly, for these reasons and those set forth in the district court’s opinion,
the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
1 It is true that this might lead to on‐the‐record inquiry into the facts of whether abuse actually occurred
or not in a particular case.