FILED
Mar 10 2017, 10:05 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Daniel H. Pfeifer Benjamin D. Ice
Jerome W. McKeever William A. Ramsey
James P. Barth Barrett McNagny, LLP
Pfeifer, Morgan & Stesiak Fort Wayne, Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
The Estate of Robert Curtis, Sr., March 10, 2017
by its Personal Representative, Court of Appeals Case No.
Theresa Brade, 71A05-1610-PL-2438
Appellants-Defendants, Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit
Court
v. The Honorable David T. Ready,
Judge
GEICO General Insurance The Honorable Larry L. Ambler,
Company, Magistrate
Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No.
71C01-1501-PL-16
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A05-1610-PL-2438 | March 10, 2017 Page 1 of 11
[1] Drake Matovich and Robert Curtis engaged in a physical altercation in a
grocery store parking lot. Curtis was severely injured and eventually died,
allegedly as a result of the altercation. Matovich and Curtis’s estate entered
into an agreed judgment, pursuant to which Matovich admitted liability and
assigned his claims against his automobile insurer, GEICO General Insurance
Company (GEICO), to Curtis. GEICO filed a declaratory judgment action
against Curtis, seeking a declaration that the altercation was not covered under
GEICO’s insurance policy with Matovich because Matovich was not “using”
the covered vehicle at the time of the incident. The trial court granted GEICO’s
summary judgment motion. On appeal, both parties make multiple arguments,
but we find one dispositive—whether this altercation was covered by the policy
as a matter of law. Finding that it was not, we affirm.
Facts
[2] During the relevant period of time, Matovich was insured by GEICO under an
automobile liability policy (the Policy) covering a 2004 Chevrolet truck. On
September 17, 2009, Matovich was sitting in his parked truck in the parking lot
of a Meijer in Mishawaka. Another vehicle, being driven by Curtis, bumped
into Matovich’s parked vehicle but did not stop.
[3] Matovich pursued Curtis’s vehicle, pulling his truck alongside Curtis and asking
him to roll down his window. Curtis stopped his vehicle and Matovich stopped
his truck next to it. Curtis rolled down his window and Matovich said, “You
just hit my truck. I need you to stop.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 110.
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Matovich then exited his truck and walked over to Curtis’s window, saying,
“You hit my truck. You can’t just drive away. I’m going to need your
information.” Id. at 111.
[4] Curtis exited his vehicle and approached Matovich aggressively, saying, “f*ck
you” repeatedly. Id. at 112. Curtis then chest bumped Matovich, who retreated
to the rear of his truck, with Curtis following. Curtis made contact with
Matovich again, and Matovich told Curtis to take it easy, stay back, and calm
down. Curtis made contact with Matovich again. Matovich then put his hand
out and said, “You need to stop and stay back.” Id. at 115. Curtis made
contact with Matovich, walking into his outstretched hand; Curtis’s eyes rolled
up, his arms went limp, and he collapsed. Curtis eventually died on June 21,
2010, and his Estate contends that his death stemmed from the altercation with
Matovich.
[5] On May 20, 2011, Curtis’s Estate filed a wrongful death suit against Matovich,
alleging that Matovich’s recklessness and negligence had resulted in Curtis’s
death. GEICO paid for Matovich’s defense but reserved its rights to later deny
coverage. Following mediation, the parties entered into an agreement. The
Agreed Judgment, which was entered as an order by the trial court on July 31,
2014, provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
2. After the minor bump of the two vehicles, Mr. Matovich
in connection with the use of his vehicle, exited his
vehicle. In the process of exiting his vehicle, Mr.
Matovich negligently came into contact with [Curtis]
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causing [Curtis] to fall on the parking lot at the Meijer
store.
***
4. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
[Matovich], [Curtis’s Estate] has sustained medical
expenses in the amount of $357,868.45 and [Curtis]
incurred extensive pain and suffering until his ultimate
death on June 21, 2010.
5. The parties agree and stipulate that the negligence of
[Matovich] caused [Curtis’s] injury.
***
8. The parties agree and request the Court enter an Order for
judgment against [Matovich] in the amount of
$357,868.45.
9. In consideration of the mutual agreements contained
herein, Matovich hereby assigns any and all claims which
he may have against his own automobile insurance
company as a result of the matters contained within this
litigation.
Id. at 211-12. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Curtis, finding that
Matovich owed damages to the Estate in the amount of $357,868.45 plus the
costs of the action.
[6] Curtis filed a proceeding supplemental against GEICO, which filed a motion to
stay the proceedings. That motion was granted, and GEICO then filed a
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declaratory judgment action against Matovich and Curtis on January 9, 2015.
GEICO alleged that it had defended Matovich under a reservation of rights and
that it had determined that it had no obligation to pay the judgment, as the
incident was not covered by the Policy. GEICO eventually filed a motion for
summary judgment. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of GEICO. In pertinent part, the trial court found
that
[t]he undisputed facts in this case show that coverage does not
exist because the injuries to the Deceased did not arise out of
Matovich’s ownership, maintenance or use of the insured motor
vehicle within the meaning of the coverage clause of the policy.
***
. . . Matovich and the Deceased had already exited from their
motor vehicles when Matovich’s physical contact of the
Deceased caused the latter’s injuries. Even prior to Matovich
making physical contact, the Deceased “chest bumped”
Matovich three (3) times. Matovich’s actions did not arise out of
the use or ownership or maintenance of the insured motor
vehicle within the meaning of the Policy’s coverage term. The
injury occurred at a time and a distance away from the physical
contact of the vehicles and after both Matovich and the
Decease[d] exited their respective vehicles, and after a heated
“conversation” between them. Matovich’s physical contact was
not [causally] connected to the use of his motor vehicle and can
not be construed to be within the contemplation of [Curtis] and
Malovich [sic] to be covered under the Policy.
Id. at 12-13. Curtis now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[7] Our standard of review on summary judgment is well established:
We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of . . . the non-moving parties, summary judgment is
appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v.
Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A
fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the
case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to
resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the
undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable
inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).
[8] This Court has noted that where, as here, a primary issue is a question
regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy, the case is especially
appropriate for summary judgment because it turns solely on a matter of law.
Marling Family Trust v. Allstate Ins. Co., 981 N.E.2d 85, 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Our Supreme Court has described the appellate review of insurance policies as
follows:
Insurance policies are contracts that are subject to the same rules
of construction as are other contracts. When the language of an
insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, we will assign to
the language its plain and ordinary meaning. An insurance
policy that is unambiguous must be enforced according to its
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terms, even those terms that limit an insurer’s liability. Thus, we
may not extend insurance coverage beyond that provided by the
unambiguous language in the contract. Also, insurers have the
right to limit their coverage of risks and, therefore, their liability
by imposing exceptions, conditions, and exclusions.
Sheehan Constr. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 935 N.E.2d 160, 169 (Ind. 2010) (internal
citations omitted), opinion adhered to as modified on reh’g, 938 N.E.2d 685 (Ind.
2010).
II. Coverage
[9] Although the parties each raise multiple arguments, we find one issue to be
dispositive—whether Matovich’s actions were covered under the Policy as a
matter of law. The Policy’s liability provision states that GEICO agreed to pay
damages for which Matovich became legally obligated to pay because of bodily
injury “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the owned
auto . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 172. The primary issue in the case
before us is whether the altercation between Matovich and Curtis arose out of
the “use” of Matovich’s vehicle.
[10] Our Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “ownership, maintenance, and
use” of a vehicle, in the context of an insurance policy, to mean “being caused
by use of” the vehicle. Ind. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Statesmen Ins. Co., 260
Ind. 32, 34, 291 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1973). Therefore, an accident arises out of
the ownership, maintenance, and use of a vehicle only if such ownership, use,
or maintenance is the incident’s “efficient and predominating cause.” Id.
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Indiana has intentionally adopted a narrower construction of the phrase than
that used by courts in other jurisdictions. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barron, 615
N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
[11] Coverage under an “ownership, maintenance, or use” clause “‘does not extend
to results distinctly remote, though within the line of causation.’” Moons v.
Keith, 758 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting 6B Insurance Law &
Practice § 4317 (Buckley ed. 1979)). In other words, if a vehicle’s use is only
tangentially related to an incident, coverage does not exist under such a clause.
Id.; see also Sizemore v. Erie Ins. Exch., 789 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003) (finding no coverage where the vehicle merely transported tortfeasor to
the scene of an incident); Barron, 615 N.E.2d at 506 (finding no coverage where,
“[a]t most, the truck was little more than a platform that was only incidentally
related to the accident”); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spotten, 610 N.E.2d 299, 302
(Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a passenger’s random act of violence did not
qualify for coverage); Miller v. Loman, 518 N.E.2d 486, 492-93 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) (finding connection between passenger kicking a truck’s muffler out of
the road and the “use” or “maintenance” of the truck was “too unsubstantial”
and “simply too farfetched” to qualify for coverage).
[12] Curtis directs our attention to Argonaut Insurance Company v. Jones, 953 N.E.2d
608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), in support of his argument that summary judgment
was improper. In Argonaut, Monroe County Sheriff’s Deputy Sarah Jones was
called to the scene of a traffic accident. Following procedure, she placed her
vehicle in the southwest-bound lane of the road, left the engine running, and
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activated her police vehicle’s emergency lights. Deputy Jones then began to
direct traffic using hand signals and a flashlight. After about fifteen minutes,
Deputy Jones was struck by a vehicle and later died as a result of her injuries.
Id. at 611-12. Her husband and her estate sued a number of entities, including
Argonaut Insurance Company, which insured Monroe County.
[13] The policy at issue in Argonaut contained a nearly identical version of the
liability provision at issue in the case at hand, providing coverage for bodily
injury resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered vehicle.
Id. at 617. The trial court found that the deputy was “using” her vehicle at the
time of the accident, granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on
that issue. Id. Argonaut appealed. After exploring a line of relevant cases, the
Argonaut Court synthesized the caselaw by holding that “whether there is an
‘active’ relationship between the claimant and the vehicle and the reasonable
expectations of the parties upon entering into the insurance agreement are the
crucial questions to answer in determining coverage issues.” Id. at 619 (internal
citation omitted).
[14] Emphasizing evidence that Deputy Jones’s vehicle and its specialized
equipment were “vital” and “integral” to the scene and to her role in traffic
control, this Court found that Deputy Jones had an “active relationship to the
vehicle at the time of the collision.” Id. We noted that neither distance from
the vehicle nor time spent away from the vehicle are critical; instead, what
mattered was whether Deputy Jones was in an active relationship with her
vehicle at the time of the accident. The Court found that because she had an
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active relationship to the vehicle and because the vehicle was central to her role
in controlling traffic at the scene, the vehicle was in “use” at the time of the
accident. Id. at 620. We also observed that the deputy’s relationship to her
patrol car at the time of the accident “was clearly within the contemplation of
the parties to the policy” and that “the reasonable scope of covered uses of
Deputy Jones’s patrol car necessarily includes its deployment and use in traffic
control situations like the one at issue.” Id. Therefore, we affirmed summary
judgment on the issue of coverage.
[15] We find Argonaut distinguishable from the case at hand. Most importantly, the
police vehicle in Argonaut had an integral role to the scene and to Deputy
Jones’s role directing traffic. It was being used to block a lane of traffic as she
directed vehicles around it. In other words, she unquestionably had an active
relationship with that vehicle at the time of the accident. Here, in contrast,
when Matovich exited his vehicle to confront Curtis, engaging in a protracted
and physical confrontation with the other man, he no longer had an active
relationship with his vehicle. His vehicle no longer played a role in the
incident; instead, it was merely an altercation between the two men.
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the reasonable expectations of the
parties at the time they entered into the Policy would have included coverage
for a physical altercation that merely happened to occur near the covered
vehicle. As a result, we find that the trial court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of GEICO based on a conclusion that, as a matter of law,
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Matovich was not “using” his vehicle at the time of the altercation with Curtis.
Because no coverage exists under the Policy, Curtis is not entitled to relief.
[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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