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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JARED A. MOORE
Appellant No. 162 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 14, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0018117-2003
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 14, 2017
Jared Moore appeals, pro se, from the order entered in the Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, dated January 14, 2016, dismissing his third
petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) as
untimely.1 Moore seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of a term of
life imprisonment imposed on June 30, 2008, after he was convicted of first-
degree homicide, second-degree homicide, criminal conspiracy, kidnapping,
robbery, terroristic threats, unlawful restraint, theft by unlawful taking, false
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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imprisonment, and abuse of a corpse.2 On appeal, Moore claims the PCRA
court abused its discretion in finding he failed to provide support for his
averment that he was incompetent until April 17, 2014. Based on the
following, we affirm.
The facts underlying Moore’s convictions were recounted by this Court
in the memorandum decision affirming Moore’s judgment of sentence on
direct appeal:
The evidence revealed that [Moore] and his co-conspirator,
Melissa Galo [“Ms. Galo”], abducted the victim, Karen Hanyo
[“the victim”], on November 28, 2003, and [Moore] stabbed her
to death. [Moore] and Ms. Galo arrived at the victim’s residence
during the early morning hours of November 28, 2003, and
pushed their way into the residence, demanding to speak with
the victim. [Moore] demanded [that] the victim pay him the
$50.00 he claimed she owed him for crack cocaine, while Ms.
Galo angrily accused the victim of having sex with her man
([Moore]) for crack. Ms. Galo struck the victim[,] and [Moore]
used a knife to threaten the victim, jabbing her with his knife,
threatening to cut out her eyes, [and] then cutting off her
clothes. [Moore] continued to demand $50.00 from the victim.
The victim called a friend, Sharon George [“Ms. George”], but
was unable to obtain the $50.00. [Moore] responded by forcing
the victim to accompany him and Ms. Galo to Ms. George’s
house to request the money. The victim was allowed to put on a
coat, but was otherwise naked. [Moore] removed the cell
phones from the residence and cut the land-line wires.
Several witnesses testified to seeing the victim captive in
the back seat of the car driven by Ms. Galo. Ms. George saw the
victim in the back seat of the car but refused to give her any
money. [Moore’s] friend, Randall Stoddard, temporarily rode in
the car and testified that Ms. Galo drove the car while [Moore]
____________________________________________
2
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a) and (b), 903(a)(1), 2901(a), 3701(a)(1)(i),
2706(a)(1), 2902(a)(1), 3921(a), 2903, and 5510, respectively.
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held the victim captive in the back seat, blindfolded, with a knife
to her neck.
Ms. Galo testified for the Commonwealth and agreed to
enter a guilty plea to third degree murder, kidnapping, robbery,
etc[.], [] in exchange for a 20 to 40 year [prison] sentence. Ms.
Galo testified that after she stopped the car and duct-taped the
victim’s hands, legs, and mouth, [Moore] pulled the victim out of
the car and repeatedly stabbed the victim. [Moore] stabbed the
victim 17 times, inflicting fatal wounds to her chest and neck.
[Moore] gave a statement to detectives after he was properly
informed of his Miranda rights. [Moore] initially claimed that
Ms. Galo stabbed the victim, but then admitted that he also
stabbed the victim.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 990 A.2d 49 [1248 WDA 2008] (Pa. Super.
2009) (unpublished memorandum at 1-2), citing Trial Court Opinion,
2/23/2009, at 2-3, appeal denied, 992 A.2d 124 (Pa. 2010).
At the conclusion of a bench trial on April 4, 2008, the trial court
convicted Moore of the crimes stated above. On June 30, 2008, the court
sentenced Moore to life in prison on the first-degree murder conviction, but
imposed no further penalty on the second-degree murder conviction.
Additionally, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 76 to 152 months’
imprisonment on the remaining convictions, to run consecutively to the life
sentence.
Moore filed a direct appeal, claiming the court erred when it convicted
him of both first and second-degree murder for the same act. A panel of
this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on December 22, 2009, and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal
(“PAA”) on April 6, 2010. See id.
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Moore filed his first PCRA petition, which was denied by the PCRA court
on February 29, 2012, and dismissed by this Court on October 16, 2012, for
failure to file a brief.
On March 19, 2014, Moore filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, challenging his life imprisonment sentence because he was
under the age of 21 when he committed the offense, and therefore was
entitled to relief under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012).3
The PCRA court treated the petition as a PCRA petition, and after providing
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, the court dismissed the petition without a hearing
on June 24, 2014. Moore appealed. In a judgment order on February 11,
2015, a panel of this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order, concluding: (1)
Moore could not benefit from Miller based on his age; and (2) Moore filed a
patently untimely PCRA petition that did not come within any of the
exceptions to the time bar,4 and therefore, the PCRA court was without
jurisdiction to review the matter. Commonwealth v. Moore, 120 A.3d 378
[1082 WDA 2014] (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum).
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3
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that “mandatory life
without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual
punishments.’” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460. We note Moore was 19 years old
at the time he committed the offenses at issue.
4
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
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While his appeal was pending, Moore continued to file numerous
pleadings with the PCRA court, including a pro se third PCRA petition on June
12, 2014, which is at issue in the present appeal. In his third petition,
Moore alleged, in relevant part, that he was incompetent to stand trial and
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to order a competency hearing. See
Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 6/12/2014, at 8. The matter
was held until the resolution of the prior appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000). The Commonwealth then filed a
response on April 21, 2015. On May 1, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Moore
to file any supplemental documentation to support his claim of mental
incompetence. See Order, 5/1/2015. Moore filed a motion for medical
records on June 18, 2015, a supplemental addendum PCRA petition on July
9, 2015, a motion for leave to obtain discovery on September 25, 2015, and
another supplemental addendum PCRA petition on September 28, 2015.
On October 13, 2015, the PCRA court denied the motion for discovery
and filed a notice of intention to dismiss Moore’s petition without a hearing
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Specifically, the court found the petition was
untimely filed and Moore did not prove any exception to the timeliness
provisions of the PCRA. Moore did not file a response to the Rule 907 notice.
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On January 14, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Moore’s petition. This
timely, pro se appeal followed.5, 6
In his sole issue, Moore states the PCRA court erred by determining
that he failed to provide support for his averment that he was incompetent
until April 17, 2014. See Moore’s Brief at 1.
“Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of
the underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant
PCRA petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 A.3d 766,
768 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 53 A.3d 757 (Pa. 2012).
The PCRA timeliness requirement … is mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d
1035, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 715, 951
A.2d 1163 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa.
1, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (2000)). The court cannot ignore a
petition’s untimeliness and reach the merits of the petition. Id.
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5
In addition to his third PCRA petition, Moore also filed a pro se motion for
post-conviction forensic DNA testing on September 1, 2015. The PCRA court
denied his motion for DNA testing on November 3, 2015. Moore filed a
notice of appeal from that order on December 3, 2015 (it was docketed on
December 14, 2015), which is currently pending before this Court at Docket
No. 1962 WDA 2015. On March 21, 2016, this Court indicated the two
appeals would be listed consecutively before a single panel. Nevertheless,
based on the nature of the appeals, we have not consolidated them for our
review. This memorandum deals only with the pending appeal at Docket No.
162 WDA 2016.
6
The court did not order Moore to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On February 23, 2016,
the court issued an opinion, indicating it was relying on the reasons set forth
in its October 13, 2015, Rule 907 notice.
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Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S.Ct. 2695 (U.S. 2014).
A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the
underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment
is deemed final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3). Here, our review of the record reveals the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Moore’s PAA on April 6, 2010. See Commonwealth
v. Moore, 992 A.2d 124 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam). Therefore, Moore’s
judgment of sentence became final on July 5, 2010, 90 days after the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal and
the time for filing a petition for review with the United States Supreme Court
expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. As such, any
PCRA petition had to be filed by July 5, 2011. Moore did not file the present
PCRA petition until June 12, 2014. Accordingly, Moore’s petition is patently
untimely.
Nevertheless, an untimely PCRA petition may be considered if one of
the following three exceptions applies:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Furthermore, a PCRA petition alleging any of
the exceptions under Section 9545(b)(1) must be filed within 60 days of
when the PCRA claim could have first been brought. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(2).7
Turning to the present matter, Moore’s allegations touch upon the
newly discovered fact exception in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Specifically,
Moore states: “[H]e lacked a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings, and sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of understanding prior to and during trial, sentencing[,]
and up until April 17, 2014,” when he apparently regained competency and
filed his PCRA petition within a timely manner. Moore’s Brief at 1.
The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)
requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts
upon which he based his petition and could not have learned
those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.
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7
Moreover, we are mindful that “although this Court is willing to construe
liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers
no special benefit upon an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d
245, 252 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 879 A.2d 782
(Pa. 2005).
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Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 395, 930 A.2d 1264,
1271 (2007). Due diligence demands that the petitioner take
reasonable steps to protect his own interests. Commonwealth
v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2001). A petitioner
must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s)
earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v.
Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 330–31, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (2001);
Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super.
2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 607, 20 A.3d 1210 (2011). This
rule is strictly enforced. Id. Additionally, the focus of this
exception “is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly
discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.”
Commonwealth v. Marshall, 596 Pa. 587, 596, 947 A.2d 714,
720 (2008) (emphasis in original).
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal
denied, 125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015).
Moore claims the issue of whether a defendant was competent to
stand trial can never be waived. See Moore’s Brief at 1; see also
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 293 (Pa. 2004) (“Although the
lower courts are correct that there is no express exception for mental
incapacity found in Section 9545(b)(1), we are satisfied that, in some
circumstances, claims that were defaulted due to the PCRA petitioner’s
mental incompetence may qualify under the statutory after-discovered
evidence exception.”).8 He points to the following as indicative of his
incompetence: (1) his counsel referred to him as “a kid with ‘severe mental
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8
With regard to the limitation on the exception, Cruz also provides that a
defendant must demonstrate “that his incompetence rendered him unable to
discover the factual bases for the collateral claims he would raise, and that
he acted in a timely fashion once he became competent.” Cruz, 852 A.2d at
296-297.
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problems;’”9 (2) in 2002 and 2003, he was physically attacked and suffered
numerous injuries, including loss of consciousness; (3) he was diagnosed
with a depressive disorder and chronic poly-drug addiction; (4) he was seen
by two doctors prior to trial and they described him as “amnesiac;” 10 and (5)
since he has been imprisoned, he was involuntarily committed to the mental
health unit and declared a danger to himself and others. Id. at 1-2.
Nevertheless, Moore admits to the following:
However, [Moore] acknowledges the fact that beyond the
[Department of Corrections’] psychology staff documents there
is very little before the court in this case in terms of psychiatric
reports and other mental health records. There has not been a
determination that [Moore] is incompetent; nor [] has there
been a determination that [Moore] regained competency. But
[it] is indisputable that [Moore] has severe psychological
problems, and sustained serious brain injury, and brain injuries
impair cerebral functioning, and that healing takes time.
[Moore] was brain damaged. His subsequent recovery of brain
functioning has made him aware of facts that were previously
unknown to him. They were unknown by him not merely unable
to be communicated to counsel. They could not be ascertained
by the exercise of due diligence. [Moore]’s access to medical
care and legal information have been significantly comprised by
his incarceration.
Id. at 4-5. Moreover, Moore also alleges PCRA court’s reliance on the report
by defense expert, Dr. Stuart Burstein, that was admitted into evidence at
trial and stated Moore had mild depression but was capable of cooperating
with his attorney, is misplaced. See id. at 6; see also Notice of Intention to
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9
Moore’s Brief at 1.
10
Id. at 2.
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Dismiss [PCRA] Petition Without a Hearing, 10/13/2015, at 6. Moore claims
Dr. Burstein’s review was limited, lacking, and not relevant to the issue of
competency.11 See Moore’s Brief at 6.
The PCRA court found the following:
10) In the instant PCRA [petition], [Moore] claims that he
became competent on April 17, 2014, within 60 days of filing the
PCRA. A period of mental incompetence can satisfy the after-
discovered evidence exception of the PCRA time-bar. The
alleged mental incapacity can render the facts upon which a
PCRA is based to be unknowable until the defendant become[s]
competent. Additionally, the issue of competency to stand trial
may be raised for the first time on collateral review,
notwithstanding failure to raise the issue at trial or on direct
appeal. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739 (Pa. 2014).
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287 (Pa. 2003).
Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076 (Pa. Super. 2010).
11) To be deemed competent, [Moore] needed to have the
ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of
understanding, in order to participate in his defense, and must
have been able to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739 (Pa.
2014).
12) [Moore] has failed to provide support for his averment that
he gained competency on April 17, 2014. A PCRA petition must
show where the underlying facts appear in the record or, if they
are not in the record, then a petitioner must identify any
affidavits, documents and other evidence that shows such facts.
Otherwise, the PCRA [petition] has no arguable merit and can be
dismissed. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)[(12)]. Commonwealth v. Cruz,
852 A.2d 287 (Pa. 2003).
13) This Court [o]rdered [Moore] to file any supplemental
documentation to his claim of incompetency by June 30, 2015,
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11
Rather, Moore contends the doctor’s medical analysis was based on a
diminished capacity defense. Id. at 7.
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and thereafter granted [Moore]’s motion for an extension to file
supplemental documentation on or before September 30, 2015.
14) On July 9, 2015, [Moore] filed a Supplemental Addendum
Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief. In the Addendum
[Moore] refers to his co-defendant Melissa Galo who described
him as “psycho” and “hearing voices” and that he was declared a
“danger to himself and others” and “suicidal” by Allegheny
County Behavior Psychologists before trial. [Moore] further
stated that both Dr. Burstein and Dr. Wright described him as
amnesiac. This is insufficient to demonstrate mental
incompetence during any period of time, including mental
incompetence until April 17, 2014, the date [Moore] claims he
gained competency.
15) Additionally, [Moore] attaches exhibits from the Department
of Corrections indicating that he was a danger to himself or
others on the dates of review, May 31, 2011, June 4, 2013,
November 19, 2013, and April 15, 2014. These documents do
not show that [Moore] was incompetent for any period of time.
16) On or about September 24, 2015, [Moore] filed a
Supplemental Addendum Petition for Post Conviction Collateral
Relief, in which he avers that he was so grossly impaired that he
could not offer assistance in his defense at the time of trial and
that he could not express any emotion or discuss the facts of his
case in any sensible way. [Moore] alleges that he lived a
marginal existence and used drugs regularly, was slow moving,
slow talking and could have had brain damage. [Moore] claims
that he was experiencing auditory hallucinations and amnesiac
symptoms before and during trial and refers to page 286 of the
trial transcript, which is where the Commonwealth’s expert
paraphrases some of [Moore]’s prior statements and concluded
that [Moore]’s claims are malingering. This does not support
[Moore]’s claim that he was incompetent until April 17, 2014,
when he gained competency.
17) Dr. Stuart Burstein testified for [Moore] that he had
examined [him] on March 19, 2008, and prepared a
psychological profile and report based on the examination. The
report was entered into evidence. The report stated that
[Moore] has mild symptoms of depression, but he remains fully
capable of cooperating with his attorney. Dr. Burstein diagnosed
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[Moore] as having a depressive disorder, not otherwise specified.
Dr. Burstein did not conclude that [Moore] was incompetent.
18) Dr. Bruce Wright testified for the Commonwealth that he
had examined [Moore] on March 29, 2008 and prepared a report
that was entered into evidence. Dr. Wright diagnosed [Moore]
as having a depressive disorder not otherwise specified. Dr.
Wright did not conclude that [Moore] was incompetent.
…
21) This Court has independently reviewed the record and
examined the claims raised by [Moore] and determined that
there are no meritorious issues and that [Moore] is not entitled
to post-conviction collateral relief.
Notice of Intention to Dismiss [PCRA] Petition Without a Hearing,
10/13/2015, at 4-7 (record citations omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the
relevant case law, we find the PCRA court’s opinion comprehensively
discusses and properly disposes of the question presented in this appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion, but add these
additional comments.
First, other than mere allegations, Moore fails to set forth any evidence
that he was ever incompetent.12 Indeed, he admits there has never been an
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12
With respect to competency, we are guided by the following. The courts
presume a defendant is competent to stand trial. Commonwealth v.
Brown, 872 A.2d 1139, 1156 (Pa. 2005). Moreover,
[c]ompetency to stand trial is measured by the relationship
between counsel and client: to be deemed competent, the
defendant needs to have the ability to consult with counsel with
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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actual determination that he was incompetent at the time of trial. See
Moore’s Brief at 4. Furthermore, Moore does not aver what occurred around
April 17, 2014, to explain how he regained competency on that date. It also
merits mention that Moore is familiar with legal proceedings, and he has
filed multiple petitions and motions prior to the present PCRA petition, but
has never alleged that he was incompetent. Second, other than baldly
stating that previously unknown facts were revealed to him, he provides no
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
a reasonable degree of understanding, in order to participate in
his defense, and he must be able to understand the nature or
object of the proceedings against him.
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 752 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2817 (U.S. 2015); 50 P.S. § 7402(a). The trial court is only
required to order a competency hearing if there “is reason to doubt the
defendant’s competency.” Commonwealth v. Uderra, 862 A.2d 74, 88 (Pa.
2004).
The court, either on application or on its own motion, may order
an incompetency examination at any stage in the proceedings
and may do so without a hearing unless the examination is
objected to by the person charged with a crime or by his
counsel. In such event, an examination shall be ordered only
after determination upon a hearing that there is a prima facie
question of incompetency. Upon completion of the examination,
a determination of incompetency shall be made by the court
where incompetency is established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
50 P.S. § 7402(d).
While Moore would like this Court to disregard his own defense
expert’s report, the expert did not conclude Moore was incompetent. See
Notice of Intention to Dismiss [PCRA] Petition Without a Hearing,
10/13/2015, at 6; see also N.T., 4/1/2008-4/4/2008, at 140-169.
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argument regarding what substantive claims he was unable to advance
because of his alleged incompetence. As such, he cannot rely on these mere
assertions to overcome his burden pursuant to the PCRA. See Cruz, supra.
We conclude Moore has not established any of the timeliness
exceptions to the PCRA requirements. Therefore, we agree with the PCRA
court that it lacked jurisdiction to address Moore’s claim, and we discern no
abuse of discretion by the court. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/14/2017
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