UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4525
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TODD PHILLIP RADER, a/k/a Todd Phillip Radar,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:15-cr-00045-RLV-DCK-1)
Submitted: February 28, 2017 Decided: March 15, 2017
Before MOTZ, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James W. Kilbourne, Jr., DUNGAN, KILBOURNE & STAHL, PA,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Todd Phillip Rader, pursuant to a written plea agreement,
pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) (2012). The district
court sentenced Rader to 235 months of imprisonment and 5 years
of supervised release. In accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), appellate counsel has filed a brief
asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
raising several claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and questioning whether the sentencing court erred by
relying on a drug quantity supported only by a confession Rader
made while under the influence of drugs. Rader filed a
supplemental pro se brief in which he also challenged the use of
his confession to establish drug quantities. The government
elected not to file a response to the Anders brief. We affirm
the district court’s judgment.
“The voluntariness of a statement is to be determined from
the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics
of the defendant, the setting of the interview, and the details
of the interrogation.” United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067,
1071 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Voluntariness is determined by examining “whether the
defendant’s will has been overborne or his capacity for self-
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determination critically impaired.” Id. at 1071 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he mere fact that one has
consumed [intoxicating substances] does not mean that he is so
intoxicated as to make his confession involuntary.” Boggs v.
Bair, 892 F.2d 1193, 1198 (4th Cir. 1989). Rather, there must
be evidence that the individual was “so intoxicated that his
confession was not the product of his rational intellect and
free will.” Id. “An appellate court must make an independent
determination on the issue of voluntariness.” Pelton, 835 F.2d
at 1072. “Although the review of this ultimate issue is to be
independent, the district court's findings of fact on the
circumstances surrounding the confession are to be accepted
unless clearly erroneous.” Id. We conclude that the district
court did not err in relying on Rader’s statement to law
enforcement officials detailing the quantity of drugs involved
in the instant offense.
Turning to the allegations of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, unless an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively
appears on the face of the record, “[i]neffective assistance
claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal.” United
States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). Instead,
such claims should be raised in a motion brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit sufficient development
of the record. United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1
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(4th Cir. 2010). Because the record does not conclusively
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that
these claims should be raised, if at all, in a § 2255 motion.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case, as well as Rader’s pro se supplemental brief, and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore deny
counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation and affirm the
district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform Rader, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Rader
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Rader.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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