UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4452
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LAQUAN MARCELL WILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:15-cr-00071-RJC-1)
Submitted: March 14, 2017 Decided: March 16, 2017
Before FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Parke Davis, Acting Executive Director, Ann L. Hester,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United
States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Laquan Marcell Wilson appeals from the 84-month sentence
imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2012). Wilson disputes the district court’s
application of a four-level sentencing enhancement for using or
possessing a firearm in connection with other felony offenses—
specifically, possession of controlled substances and possession
with intent to distribute controlled substances. Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review the district court’s factual determinations in
applying the Sentencing Guidelines for clear error. United
States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012). Where a
defendant “[u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition in
connection with another felony offense,” a four-level
enhancement shall apply. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2015). The “in connection with” element is
satisfied “if the firearm facilitated, or had the potential of
facilitating” the other offense, or if it “was present for
protection or to embolden the actor.” United States v. Jenkins,
566 F.3d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 2009); see USSG § 2K2.1 cmt.
n.14(A). Where the other felony is a drug trafficking offense,
a firearm “found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing
materials, or drug paraphernalia . . . necessarily has the
2
potential of facilitating another felony offense.” Jenkins, 566
F.3d at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing USSG
§ 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B)). This element is not satisfied, however,
where the presence of the firearm is “the result of accident or
coincidence.” United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404, 411 (4th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wilson argues that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court clearly erred in
applying USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). We review a sentence for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). Procedural error
includes improperly calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range.
Id. Wilson contends that there is no evidence that the firearm
was used in connection with the sale of controlled substances,
specifically crack cocaine, because the evidence was
insufficient to show that he possessed crack cocaine with the
intent to distribute it. Based on the record before us,
however, we conclude that the district court reasonably inferred
that Wilson possessed the firearm in connection with drug
trafficking.
Wilson stated that he obtained the firearm for his personal
protection. The firearm was on his person, loaded, and ready to
fire, and he possessed five plastic baggies containing a total
weight of .67 ounces of crack cocaine, six green pills
3
individually wrapped in plastic baggies, and three marijuana
cigarettes weighing .5 grams. See Jenkins, 566 F.3d at 162-63;
USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B).
Further, the court was correct that, because of Wilson’s
criminal history, simple possession would have been treated as a
felony. The court did not err in determining that the firearm
emboldened Wilson to commit the offense of possession of the
drugs, particularly in a public area. Therefore, the district
court’s decision to apply the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement was
not clearly erroneous.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4