NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TIMOTHY R. PANNABECKER, No. 15-55520
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:14-cv-00788-ODW-
VBK
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, MEMORANDUM*
as Trustee for the CSMC Mortgage-Backed
Trust Series 2006-2; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CAL-WESTERN RECONVEYANCE,
LLC; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Timothy R. Pannabecker appeals pro se from the district court’s order
dismissing his action alleging violations of federal and state law arising from the
foreclosure of his home. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo the district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). AE ex rel.
Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). We may
affirm on any basis supported by the record. United States v. Washington, 969
F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that Pannabecker lacked standing to
pursue his wrongful foreclosure claim based on defendants’ alleged untimely
assignment of the deed of trust, because the California Court of Appeal has held
that an untimely assignment into a securitized trust is not void, but merely
voidable, and that borrowers lack standing to challenge such assignments. See,
e.g., Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 796 (Ct.
App. 2016) (“Yvanova expressly offers no opinion as to whether, under New York
law, an untimely assignment to a securitized trust made after the trust’s closing
date is void or merely voidable. We conclude such an assignment is merely
voidable.” (citation omitted)). Thus, dismissal of Pannabecker’s claim challenging
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the foreclosure of his home on this ground was proper.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pannabecker leave
to amend, see Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041
(9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court
may deny leave to amend where the proposed amendments would be futile), or by
declining to hear oral argument, see Spradin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926
F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth standard of review).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFRIMED.
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