NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TYRONE EVERETT PAYNE, No. 16-35830
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 9:15-cv-00151-JCL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
T.J. McDERMOTT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jeremiah C. Lynch, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted March 8, 2017***
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Tyrone Everett Payne, a detainee at the Missoula County Detention Facility,
appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging federal and state law violations arising out of a delay in his release
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
from detention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Payne’s claim
against defendant McDermott in his individual capacity because McDermott is
immune from suit, given that he did nothing but comply with valid court orders.
See Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[P]ublic
officials who ministerially enforce facially valid court orders are entitled to
absolute immunity.”); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 300 (9th Cir. 1959) (the
failure of a jailor to release a prisoner held on a warrant or commitment cannot
form the basis for liability, even if the conviction was later set aside, so long as he
acted under the authority of the writ or warrant), overruled on other grounds by
Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 29-30 (9th Cir. 1962).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Payne’s claim
against McDermott in his official capacity because Payne failed to demonstrate
that the challenged delay resulted from a governmental policy or practice. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1984) (a suit against a government
employee in his official capacity is a suit against the government entity the
individual represents); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)
(municipalities are liable for violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if
such violations result from the execution of a government’s policy or custom).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Payne’s state law claim after dismissing his federal
claim. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth
standard of review; “[a] court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over related state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as without merit Payne’s contention that the district court’s grant
of summary judgment violated his right to a trial by jury.
Payne’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his notice of supplemental
statement of related case (Docket Entry No. 14), is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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