NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLARENCE EDWARD LANCASTER, No. 16-15815
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:14-cv-01994-RM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MIKE McEUEN; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Rosemary Marquez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Clarence Edward Lancaster appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations arising out
of his pretrial detention at Graham County Jail in Arizona. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Williams v. Paramo,
775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lancaster’s due
process claim because Lancaster failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether he properly exhausted his administrative remedies or whether
administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . .
means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the
agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (emphasis, citation, and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Paramo, 775 F.3d at 1191 (a prisoner who does not
exhaust administrative remedies must show that “there is something particular in
his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies
effectively unavailable to him . . . .”); see also Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 827
(9th Cir. 2010) (prisoner must have “reasonable good faith belief that
administrative remedies were effectively unavailable . . . .”).
We reject as without merit Lancaster’s contention that Graver is estopped
from asserting non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as a defense.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
2 16-15815
We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. See United
States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not
presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
AFFIRMED.
3 16-15815