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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
STONECREST ACQUISITIONS, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DAYEN HALL, : No. 2077 EDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order, June 22, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No. 001560-12
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND MOULTON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 21, 2017
Dayen Hall appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County that granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings
of Stonecrest Acquisitions, LLC (“appellee”) and ordered appellee to take
immediate possession of the property located at 2222 Greenwich Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19146 (“the Property”).
The procedural history, as recounted by the trial court, is as follows:
On December 17, 2015, [a]ppellee initiated
this action by filing a Complaint in Ejectment against
John Does No. 1 to 3 with regard to the property
located at 2222 Greenwich Street in the City of
Philadelphia.[1] On January 5, 2016, [appellant]
filed an Answer to the Complaint. On February 22,
1
In the complaint, appellee indicated that it was the legal and record owner
of the Property and that appellant had been occupying the Property for an
indeterminate period of time without any legal or equitable right to do so
and without appellee’s permission.
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2016, [appellee] filed Preliminary Objections to
[appellant’s] Answer, which this Court sustained on
March 21, 2016 and further directed [appellant] to
file an Answer comporting with the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure. On April 12, 2016,
[appellee] filed an Amended Answer to the
Complaint.[2] On April 22, 2016, [appellee] filed
Preliminary Objections to [appellant’s] Amended
Answer. On May 17, 2016, this Court overruled the
Preliminary Objections without prejudice to raise the
issues in a motion for judgment seeking possession
of the property.
On May 31, 2016, [appellee] filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, to which no response
was filed. On June 23, 2016, this Court granted
[appellee] judgment in possession of the property
located at 2222 Greenwich Street in the City of
Philadelphia, with the caveat that no writ of
execution could be issued until [appellant’s] name
was substituted upon the docket, in accordance with
the Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 410. On
June 27, 2016, [appellee] filed a Praecipe to
Substitute John Does No. 1 to 3 with [appellant] and,
on June 28, 2016 [appellee] filed a Praecipe for Writ
of Possession. On June 29, 2016, [appellant] filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.
Trial court opinion, 8/23/16 at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
Appellant raises the following issue before this court:
[D]id the court err as a matter of law in holding a
summary judgment, the case was supposed to be
heard by the judge in January 2017 since the
ongoing debates over who has legal rights and that
Pennsylvania not recognize [appellee’s] claim of
property this matter should not be determent [sic]
2
In the answer, appellant claimed negligence, asserted that appellee was
partially responsible, and claimed that he had paid $88,500 to Bank of
America. Bank of America held the mortgage at one time.
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by default because true ownership is the
[appellant][?]
Appellant’s brief at 1.3
[Appellate review of an order granting a
motion for judgment on the pleadings] is
plenary. The appellate court will apply
the same standard employed by the trial
court. A trial court must confine its
consideration to the pleadings and
relevant documents. The court must
accept as true all well pleaded
statements of fact, admissions, and any
documents properly attached to the
pleadings presented by the party against
whom the motion is filed, considering
only those facts which were specifically
admitted. Further, the court may grant
judgment on the pleadings only where
the moving party’s right to succeed is
certain and the case is so free from
doubt that trial would clearly be a
fruitless exercise.
Steiner v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 426 Pa.Super. 84,
87-88, 626 A.2d 584, 586 (1993). (Citations and
footnote omitted). We must determine if the trial
court’s action was based on a clear error of law or
whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings
which should properly go to the jury. Kelly v.
Nationwide Insurance Company, 414 Pa.Super.
6, 10, 606 A.2d 470, 471 (1992).
Kafando v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 A.2d 675, 676
(Pa.Super. 1998).
3
Appellant’s brief contains no page numbers. For the ease of our
discussion, we have assigned each page a corresponding number.
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A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034, which provides:
(a) After the pleadings are closed, but within such
time as not to delay the trial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.
(b) The court shall enter such judgment or order
as shall be proper on the pleadings.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034.
The plaintiffs’ burden in an action in ejectment
at law is clear: they must establish the right to
immediate exclusive possession. Recovery can be
had only on the strength of their own title, not the
weakness of defendant’s title. The crux of an
ejectment action, therefore, rests with the plaintiffs’
ability to identify, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the boundaries of a parcel of land to which
they are out of possession but for which they
maintain paramount title.
Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 104, 108 (Pa.Super. 1991) (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court determined that appellee set forth in its complaint
that appellee acquired the Property from Bank of New York Mellon, that
appellee was in possession of the recorded deed, and that appellant
remained on the property without the authority or permission of appellee.
The trial court further determined that appellant’s amended answer did not
set forth any admissions or denials but provided a series of documents which
apparently attempted to challenge the original mortgage foreclosure action.
A review of the record confirms the trial court’s assessment.
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In his brief, appellant again focuses on his prior dealings with his
lender rather than whether appellee met its burden for ejectment and
judgment on the pleadings. He appears to argue that his lender engaged in
fraudulent foreclosures and that the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department was
involved in this corruption. He argues that appellee’s fight is not with him
but with loan servicer Bank of America and its inconsistent and fraudulent
practices. He also argues that his debt has been legally settled. A party is
barred from using an ejectment action to challenge the propriety of the
underlying foreclosure matter. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Citiano, 834
A.2d 645, 647 (Pa.Super. 2003).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/2017
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