NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-56610
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00601-MMM-
JEM
v.
JOEL L. BOYCE; DELYNN E. BOYCE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Joel L. and Delynne E. Boyce appeal pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment for the United States in its action to reduce to judgment federal
income tax assessments from tax years 1998 to 2008. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the existence of subject matter
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction and summary judgment. Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 541
(9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that it had subject matter
jurisdiction over the action. See 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (district courts have such
jurisdiction to render judgments and decrees necessary or appropriate for the
enforcement of the internal revenue laws).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government to
reduce assessments to judgment because the government submitted Form 4340 for
years 1998 to 2008, and the Boyces failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to the insufficiency of the notices of deficiencies and assessments for those
tax years. See Palmer v. IRS, 116 F.3d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (Internal
Revenue Service assessments for unpaid taxes entitled to presumption of
correctness unless taxpayer submits competent evidence that the assessments were
“arbitrary, excessive, or without foundation”); see also Hughes, 953 F.2d at 535
(absent contrary evidence, official certificates, such as a Form 4340, constituted
proof of fact that assessments were actually and properly made).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government to
foreclose on the tax lien, and properly ordered the sale of the Boyces’ property,
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because the Boyces failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
there was a nominee relationship or fraudulent conveyance. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 7403(a), (c) (authorizing district court to decree a sale of property subject to
federal tax lien according to its findings regarding the interests of all parties); see
also Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(a)(1) (a transfer made by a debtor is voidable if it is
made with an “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor”); Fourth Inv. LP v. United States, 720 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding nominee relationship where taxpayer continued to exercise substantial
control over the property in question).
We reject as without merit the Boyces’ contentions concerning the
government’s authority to bring this action and alleged judicial bias.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Boyces’ request for judicial notice, set forth in their opening brief, is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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