UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1533
KATHRYN T. HOLLIS; ANDRE D. HOLLIS; M.H., an infant, by and
through his father and next friend, Andre D. Hollis,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY; AXIS SURPLUS INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., d/b/a Axis, d/b/a Axis Insurance, d/b/a Axis Capital,
d/b/a Axis U.S. Insurance; SCHAEFER PYROTECHNICS, INC.;
KIMMEL R. SCHAEFER; JACQUELINE M. GASS,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:15-cv-00290-JCC-JFA)
Submitted: March 3, 2017 Decided: March 22, 2017
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nathan D. Rozsa, Scott A. Surovell, SUROVELL ISAACS PETERSEN &
LEVY PLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellants. Paul D. Smolinsky,
JACKSON & CAMPBELL, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellee
Lexington Insurance Company. H. Robert Yates, III, O’HAGAN
MEYER PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee Axis Surplus
Insurance Company, Inc.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Kathryn Hollis and her two sons received injures from a
fireworks explosion. The underlying state court action alleges
that the fireworks company, its president, and another employee
committed 19 breaches of duty that resulted in M.H.’s injuries.
The issue in this declaratory judgment action is whether the
underlying complaint alleges a single occurrence or 19
occurrences under the fireworks company’s applicable insurance
policy with Lexington Insurance Company. The policy covers up
to $1 million per occurrence and $2 million in the aggregate.
In the present declaratory judgment action, the district
court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, found that
the underlying complaint alleged one occurrence. We agree and
thus affirm.
We review a district court’s resolution of cross-motions
for summary judgment de novo. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d
516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003). A district court may only award
summary judgment when no genuine dispute of material fact
remains and the record shows that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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Here, the district court resolved the cross-motions in
favor of the insurer, Lexington. * The dispute is subject to
Pennsylvania law.
In the liability insurance context, Pennsylvania law
applies a cause approach to defining occurrences. Donegal Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 293 (Pa. 2007). Under
the cause approach, Pennsylvania courts find a single occurrence
if there “was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing
cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damage.”
D’Auria v. Zurich Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986); see also Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 294-95.
Here, regardless of the number of alleged negligent acts or
victims, the injuries have a single proximate cause — the
misfired firework that exploded near Kathryn and her sons. See
Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 296. Because the injuries only have
one cause, only one occurrence took place.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order resolving
the cross-motions for summary judgment in Lexington’s favor. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
* The district court found the claim against the excess
insurer, Axis, non-justiciable. The Hollises have not
challenged that ruling on appeal.
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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