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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
EDWARD CZAPLICKI, :
:
Appellant : No. 116 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 6, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0005061-2012
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 23, 2017
Edward Czaplicki (“Czaplicki”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following his conviction of three counts of criminal conspiracy, two
counts of robbery, and one count each of burglary and aggravated assault.1
We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court summarized the facts underlying the
instant appeal, which we incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court
Opinion, 7/19/16, at 1-3.
Following a jury trial, Czaplicki was convicted of the above-described
crimes. The trial court sentenced Czaplicki to an aggregate prison term of
20 to 40 years. Czaplicki filed a Post-Sentence Motion, which the trial court
denied. Thereafter, Czaplicki filed the instant timely appeal, followed by a
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 3701, 3502, 2702.
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court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of Matters Complained
of on Appeal.
Czaplicki presents the following claims for our review:
A. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on any of the counts of which
[Czaplicki] was convicted?
B. Was the evidence presented at trial against the weight of the
evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on any of
the counts of which [Czaplicki] was convicted?
C. Did not the trial court err by allowing into evidence irrelevant
and overly prejudicial testimony that [Czaplicki] was an alleged
member of the Pagan Motorcycle Club[,] and did not the trial
court err by allowing into evidence testimony about men with
motorcycle jackets and patches at the courthouse during the
preliminary hearing?
D. Did not the trial court err in allowing into evidence as
substantive evidence complainant Mark Smith’s [(“Smith”)]
statement to police?
E. Did not the trial court impose an excessive sentence[,] and
abuse [the] discretionary aspects of sentenc[ing,] by departing
from the guidelines[,] … entering a consecutive sentence[,] and
failing to properly weigh [Czaplicki’s] poor health, positive work
history an[d] position in the community, etc.?
Brief for Appellant at 7.
Czaplicki first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
convictions. Id. at 9. Specifically, Czaplicki claims that the Commonwealth
failed to establish that he was present in the house during the robbery,
“which was committed by two young white males wearing masks and/or
hoodies, and because [Czaplicki] was never seen in the getaway truck[.]”
Id.
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In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
[t]he standard we apply … is whether[,] viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the
facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need
not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[finder] of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 150-51 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim and concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to establish Czaplicki’s guilt based upon
accomplice liability. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/16, at 8-9; see also id.
at 6-7 (setting forth the evidence as to each particular crime charged). The
trial court additionally found the evidence sufficient to sustain Czaplicki’s
conviction as a conspirator in the commission of the crimes. See id. at 9.
The trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and its legal
conclusions are sound. We therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court’s
Opinion with regard to this claim. See id. at 6-9.
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Czaplicki next challenges the verdicts as against the weight of the
evidence. Brief for Appellant at 9. Czaplicki again challenges the lack of an
identification of him as one of the perpetrators. Id.
As our Supreme Court has explained,
[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based
upon a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 928 A.2d 1025, 1033,
1036 (Pa. 2007). Thus, “the function of an appellate court on
appeal is to review the trial court’s exercise of discretion based
upon a review of the record, rather than to consider de novo the
underlying question of the weight of the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 603 Pa. 340, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225
(Pa. 2009). An appellate court may not overturn the trial court’s
decision unless the trial court “palpably abused its discretion in
ruling on the weight claim.” Commonwealth v. Champney,
574 Pa. 435, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003). Further, in
reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, a verdict
will be overturned only if it is “so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 597
Pa. 28, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008).
Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1270 (Pa. 2016).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Czaplicki’s second claim and
concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/16, at 2 (setting
forth the evidence identifying Czaplicki as the owner/driver of the Ford F-150
pickup truck that transported the victim’s assailants from the scene), 6-10
(setting forth the evidence supporting the verdicts, and addressing in
particular Czaplicki’s challenge to the weight of the evidence). We agree
with the reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion and discern
no abuse of discretion in this regard. See id. at 2, 6-10. We therefore
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affirm on the basis of the trial court’s Opinion with regard to this claim. See
id.
In his third claim, Czaplicki argues that trial court improperly admitted
testimony regarding his membership in the Pagan Motorcycle Club, and the
presence of men at the courthouse during the preliminary hearing, who were
wearing wearing motorcycle jackets and patches. Brief for Appellant at 15.
Czaplicki argues that “the erroneously admitted evidence was essentially
that [Czaplicki] is a member of the Pagan[] Motorcycle gang and that he
employed several Pagan thugs to intimidate witnesses.” Id. Czaplicki
argues that such evidence was inflammatory and prejudicial. Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed this
claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/16,
at 12-15. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth
in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis with regard to Czaplicki’s third claim.
See id.
In his fourth claim, Czaplicki argues that the trial court improperly
admitted as substantive evidence the victim’s statement to police. Brief for
Appellant at 16. Czaplicki argues that at trial, Smith testified that he had no
independent recollection of the events or of a statement he made to police
two weeks after the shooting. Id. Czaplicki contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting the contents of Smith’s statement to
police as substantive evidence. Id.
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The trial court set forth the relevant law in its Opinion, addressed this
claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/16,
at 10-12. We affirm on the basis of the trial court’s well-reasoned Opinion
with regard to this claim. See id.
In his fifth claim, Czaplicki challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. Brief for Appellant at 16. Czaplicki specifically challenges the trial
court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence, and its failure to credit
mitigating circumstances as to his remorse, lack of significant criminal
offenses in the last 30 years, work history, health and position in the
community. Id. Czaplicki claims that the sentence is “especially
unreasonable in light of the fact that [he] was never accused of actually
possessing any weapon, entering any house, or of actually carrying out the
actual home invasion robbery.” Id. at 16-17. According to Czaplicki, the
trial court’s sentence is, in effect, a life sentence. Id. at 17.
A claim that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors
implicates the discretionary aspects of one’s sentence. Commonwealth v.
Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2014). A challenge to the
discretionary aspects of one’s sentence must be treated as a petition for
permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.
Id. When considering an appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects
of his sentence, we conduct a four-part analysis to determine
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
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preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from
is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [see] 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(quotation marks and some citations omitted).
Here, Czaplicki timely filed a post-sentence Motion and Notice of
Appeal. However, Czaplicki’s appellate brief fails to include the requisite
statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal, as required by
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and the Commonwealth has objected to this deficiency.
“Because the Appellant failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) and the
Commonwealth objected to the omission, this Court may not review the
merits of the claim[.]” Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 533 (Pa.
Super. 2004). We therefore affirm Czaplicki’s judgment of sentence.2
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/23/2017
2
Even if Czaplicki had included the required Rule 2119(f) statement, we
would conclude that his claim lacks merit for the reasons stated in the trial
court’s Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/16, at 16-19.
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