J-S12032-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
KENYATTA GENE BROOKS, :
:
Appellant : No. 845 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 31, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-22-CR-0006494-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 23, 2017
Kenyatta Gene Brooks (“Brooks”) appeals the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of three counts of unlawful delivery of a
controlled substance (heroin), and one count of criminal use of a
communication facility.1 We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and
procedural history of this case, which we adopt for the purpose of this
appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/26/16, at 1-4.
The trial court denied Brooks’s post-sentence Motion on April 18, 2016.
Brooks thereafter filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
On appeal, Brooks raises the following issue for our review: “Did not
the trial court err in refusing to find entrapment as a matter of law, where
1
See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a).
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the court correctly found that the issue of entrapment had been properly
raised, and there was no dispute as to the operative facts relating to the
defense?” Brief for Appellant at 5 (capitalization omitted).
Brooks contends that he bought drugs from third parties with money
provided by the police to a confidential informant, Kimberly Staub (“Staub”),
“only after Staub feigned friendship and had sex with him to gauge his
potential as a target for her [confidential information] activities.” Id. at 23.
Brooks asserts that “feigning friendship – especially with sexual favors – and
then exploiting that friendship can create an entrapment situation.” Id. at
25. Brooks argues that Staub was motivated by her need to establish
targets for Detective James McBride (“Detective McBride”), noting that Staub
had approached Detective McBride before she and Brooks had met in
person. Id. at 26.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Brooks’s issue, set forth the
relevant law, and determined that the issue lacks merit. See Trial Court
Opinion, 9/26/16, at 4-7. We agree with the trial court’s determination that
Brooks failed to prove entrapment as a matter of law, as the record discloses
no egregious conduct by the police that would rise to the level required to
find entrapment as a matter of law. See id. at 6. Nothing in the record
indicates the police originated, implanted, or induced the crimes committed
by Brooks. See Commonwealth v. Marion, 981 A.2d 230, 241 (Pa. Super.
2009). We further conclude that the trial court did not err in submitting the
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question of entrapment to the jury. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/26/16, at 5-
6. Accordingly we affirm Brooks’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/23/2017
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Circulated 03/08/2017 03:44 PM