People v. Leverton

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA34

Court of Appeals No. 15CA0050
El Paso County District Court No. 13CR123
Honorable Robert L. Lowrey, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Randall Eric Leverton,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER
Dailey and J. Jones, JJ., concur

Announced March 23, 2017

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Katayoun A. Donnelly, Alternative Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 A jury convicted defendant, Randall Eric Leverton, of theft by

receiving and possession of drug paraphernalia. He appeals,

contending the trial court erred by (1) joining the two offenses in a

single trial and not allowing him to plead guilty to the

paraphernalia charge before joining them and (2) admitting into

evidence two witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements. He also

contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.

We address and reject these contentions and affirm.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶2 On a cold evening, the victim started her car and left it

running while she collected some belongings from inside her home.

She returned to where the car had been parked a few minutes later

and saw that the car was gone. She immediately reported the theft

to the police.

¶3 A few days later, a police officer pulled over the stolen car.

Leverton was seated in the front passenger side of the car, another

man was driving, and two women were in the back seat. When

asked who owned the car, Leverton told the officer that it belonged

to his girlfriend, the victim. The victim later testified at trial that

she did not know and had never met Leverton.

1
¶4 The officer searched the vehicle and discovered several small

baggies which he suspected contained cocaine and

methamphetamine. All four passengers were patted down,

arrested, and transported to the police station.1

¶5 Leverton and the other man were transported in the same

police vehicle. One of the transporting officers testified at trial that

while the other man apparently slept during the drive to the police

station, Leverton, who was handcuffed, “started moving around in

the seat, kind of bending over and just acting not normal.” After

removing Leverton from the vehicle, the officer searched the back

seat and discovered a type of pipe commonly used to smoke

methamphetamine.

¶6 Based on the discovery of the pipe, Leverton was charged with

possession of drug paraphernalia, a petty offense under section

18-18-428(2), C.R.S. 2016. Approximately two weeks later, in a

separate case filed in the same judicial district, Leverton was

1 Leverton was not charged with any crimes associated with the
officer’s discovery of these drugs.

2
 charged with theft by receiving, a felony under section 18-4-410(1),

(4), C.R.S. 2012.2

¶7 The day before trial on the felony theft charge, the prosecution

moved to amend the complaint to join the paraphernalia charge and

dismiss the petty offense case. Leverton’s counsel objected, stating

that his client intended to “enter a straight guilty plea” to the

paraphernalia charge, and then move to dismiss the felony case “for

failure to join.” The court granted the prosecution’s motion, stating

that the prosecution’s dismissal of the paraphernalia case and the

amendment of the complaint in the felony case “in fact, does join

[the petty offense case] into [the felony case]” and dismissed the

petty offense case because “it doesn’t have a count anymore.”

Leverton pleaded not guilty to both charges.

¶8 At trial, the two women in the back seat of the stolen car

testified under subpoena. Both women testified that, due to drug

use, they could not remember the events of that night, nor could

they remember making any statements to the police. The

prosecutor questioned both women based on oral statements they

2Section 18-4-410 has since been repealed, effective June 5, 2013,
and consolidated with the general theft statute, section 18-4-401,
C.R.S. 2016.

3
 allegedly had made to the police following their arrests. For

instance, the prosecutor asked one of the women, “Do you recall

telling [the police] that Mr. Leverton had had the vehicle for several

days and that someone had given it to him?”

¶9 Leverton’s counsel objected to these questions because he

argued that they “essentially just end up being testimony via the

question itself, particularly when the witness has testified she has

no recollection.” The court ruled that the questions were proper

impeachment questions. The witnesses’ oral statements later were

admitted into evidence over Leverton’s objection through the

testimony of the two police officers to whom the witnesses made

their statements.

¶ 10 The jury convicted Leverton as charged and the trial court

sentenced him to three years of probation and forty-eight hours of

useful public service.

II. Joinder of the Theft and Paraphernalia Charges

¶ 11 Leverton argues that the trial court erred when it rejected his

guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge and then permitted the

prosecution to add that charge to the complaint. He claims that the

trial court’s actions violated Colorado’s mandatory joinder statute,

4
 section 18-1-408, C.R.S. 2016, as well as the Double Jeopardy

Clauses of both the United States and Colorado Constitutions. We

reject these arguments.

¶ 12 The Attorney General argues that because Leverton did not

object to the procedure for joining the offenses, but only requested

that the trial court accept his guilty plea prior to joining them, his

claims should be reviewed only for plain error. We need not decide

whether Leverton preserved these claims because we perceive no

error, plain or otherwise. Cf. Marshall v. People, 2013 CO 51, ¶ 15

n.5 (declining to address whether the defendant preserved a

Confrontation Clause challenge because there was no confrontation

error).

¶ 13 The mandatory joinder statute “seeks to prevent vexatious

prosecution and harassment of a defendant by a district attorney

who initiates successive prosecutions for crimes which stem from

the same criminal episode.” People v. Talarico, 192 Colo. 445, 446,

560 P.2d 90, 91 (1977); see § 18-1-408(2). The statute requires

that all such offenses known to the prosecutor which were

committed in the same judicial district must be prosecuted by

separate counts in a single prosecution. § 18-1-408(2). Any offense

5
 not joined “cannot thereafter be the basis of a subsequent

prosecution[.]” § 18-1-408(2).

¶ 14 Whether a trial court properly joined multiple offenses under

the mandatory joinder statute presents a mixed question of law and

fact. See People v. Marshall, 2014 COA 42, ¶ 19 (applying the

“mixed question of law and fact” standard of review to the question

whether a trial court properly dismissed a criminal case under the

mandatory joinder statute). The trial court’s interpretation of the

joinder statute is a question of law we review de novo, People v.

Garcia, 2016 COA 124, ¶ 6, but we defer to factual findings

supported by the record, People v. Marshall, ¶ 19.

¶ 15 Leverton argues that the trial court erred in refusing to accept

his guilty plea in the paraphernalia case and in granting the

prosecution’s motion to amend the theft complaint because the

result was that he was effectively charged in two separate cases

with the same offense. He insists that “the only way the

prosecution could go forward with charging [him] for both charges

was to file a motion to join the two cases before the trial.”

(Emphasis added.)

6
¶ 16 We conclude, as did the trial court, that while the

prosecution’s motion was styled as a motion to amend, it was

effectively a motion to join the two offenses. In Jeffrey v. Dist. Court,

626 P.2d 631, 638-39 (Colo. 1981), the supreme court held that

“section 18-1-408(2) does not prohibit the court from permitting the

district attorney to add to a criminal information other counts that

arise from the same criminal episode as the original count so long

as the additional counts are filed prior to the jeopardy stage of the

prosecution.” That holding is dispositive here; the prosecution

moved to join the offenses prior to Leverton’s attempt to plead guilty

to the paraphernalia charge. See Jeffrey, 626 P.2d at 636.

¶ 17 Moreover, irrespective of whether the procedure utilized by the

court complied strictly with the mandatory joinder statute, it

nevertheless met the statute’s purpose of preventing successive

prosecutions. Leverton points to no unfair prejudice resulting from

the procedure used.

¶ 18 The court also did not abuse its discretion in rejecting

Leverton’s guilty plea. Trial courts have discretion to accept or to

reject a guilty plea because “[t]here is no absolute right to have a

7
 guilty plea accepted.” People v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807, 812 (Colo.

2001) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).

¶ 19 Had the court accepted Leverton’s guilty plea on the

paraphernalia charge prior to joining the two offenses, the

mandatory joinder statute may have prohibited prosecution of the

felony theft charge. Indeed, Leverton expressly sought to plead

guilty to the paraphernalia charge — a petty offense — for the

purpose of preventing prosecution of the felony charge. While

neither this court nor the supreme court has addressed such an

attempt to manipulate the criminal justice system to escape

additional charges, courts in other jurisdictions have squarely

rejected it.

¶ 20 In State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),

the Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its

discretion when it accepted the defendant’s guilty plea on a traffic

violation because doing so effectively nullified the state’s right to

prosecute the defendant on the more serious charge of negligent

homicide.

¶ 21 The Wisconsin Supreme Court similarly held that the trial

court did not err in rejecting a defendant’s guilty plea when the

8
 defendant intended to “create a situation of double jeopardy” to

protect himself from additional charges. State v. Waldman, 203

N.W.2d 691, 693 (Wis. 1973).

¶ 22 And in Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 298 (Ind. Ct. App.

2003), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that “a trial court does not

abuse its discretion in rejecting a guilty plea where the court

reasonably could have concluded that the request was a ‘ruse’

intended to manipulate the system.”

¶ 23 Consistent with these cases, and in view of society’s interest in

maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system, People v.

Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 440 (Colo. 1993), we conclude that the

court acted within its discretion when it rejected Leverton’s guilty

plea to the petty offense.

¶ 24 Finally, we reject Leverton’s argument that his constitutional

right to be free from double jeopardy was somehow violated when

the theft and paraphernalia charges were joined. The Double

Jeopardy Clauses comprise “three separate but related prohibitions:

(1) a rule which bars a reprosecution for the same offense after

acquittal; (2) a rule barring reprosecution for the same offense after

conviction, and; (3) a rule barring multiple punishment[s] for the

9
 same offense.” People v. Henderson, 810 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Colo.

1991) (citation omitted). Leverton does not allege that he was

reprosecuted for either the paraphernalia or theft offense after he

was convicted, or that he was sentenced or otherwise punished

multiple times for those offenses.

¶ 25 Moreover, double jeopardy protection does not attach until the

jury has been impaneled and sworn (or, in a bench trial, when the

first witness is sworn), or when the trial court accepts the

defendant’s guilty plea. Jeffrey, 626 P.2d at 636. Because the

court had not accepted Leverton’s guilty plea on the paraphernalia

charge (which, as we have concluded above, was appropriate under

these circumstances), double jeopardy had not attached, and there

was no double jeopardy violation.

III. Admission of Prior Inconsistent Statements

¶ 26 Leverton next argues that the trial court erred in permitting

the prosecution to examine two witnesses about their prior

statements to the police. He asserts that the prosecutor’s questions

exposed the jury to inadmissible evidence and violated his

confrontation rights. These arguments ignore well-established case

law and we reject them.

10
 A. Admissibility Under CRE 613 and
Section 16-10-201, C.R.S. 2016

¶ 27 Generally, we review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Tyme, 2013 COA 59, ¶ 8. But when a

defendant asserts that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings violated

his confrontation rights, we review de novo. People v. Brown, 2014

COA 155M-2, ¶ 18.

¶ 28 CRE 613(a) authorizes impeachment by prior inconsistent

statement “[w]here the witness denies or does not remember

making the prior statement[.]” To do so, “the examiner must call

the attention of the witness to the particular time and occasion

when, the place where, and the person to whom he made the

statement” and may give “[t]he exact language of the prior

statement.” CRE 613(a).

¶ 29 Similarly, section 16-10-201(1), C.R.S. 2016, provides as

follows:

Where a witness in a criminal trial has made a
previous statement inconsistent with his
testimony at the trial, the previous
inconsistent statement may be shown by any
otherwise competent evidence and is
admissible not only for the purpose of
impeaching the testimony of the witness, but
also for establishing a fact to which his

11
 testimony and the inconsistent statement
relate, if . . . [t]he witness, while testifying, was
given an opportunity to explain or deny the
statement or the witness is still available to
give further testimony in the trial; and . . . [t]he
previous inconsistent statement purports to
relate to a matter within the witness’s own
knowledge.

Under the statute, a witness’s inability to remember a statement “is

tantamount to a denial that [s]he made the statement.” People v.

Baca, 633 P.2d 528, 529 (Colo. App. 1981) (citing People v. Pepper,

193 Colo. 505, 568 P.2d 446 (1977)). The same result obtains

under the express language of CRE 613.

¶ 30 Both women testified that they did not remember what

happened the night the stolen car was pulled over, nor did they

remember any statements they made to the police. To impeach the

witnesses, the prosecutor was entitled to confront them with the

exact language of their prior statements. CRE 613. Indeed, under

section 16-10-201(1)(a), the prosecutor was required to give the

witnesses “an opportunity to explain or deny the statement[s]” prior

to introducing evidence of those statements for purposes of

impeachment or to prove a matter related to the statement.

12
¶ 31 Leverton argues that because the witnesses testified that they

did not recall making any statements to the police, they effectively

did not testify, and therefore their prior statements were not

admissible as inconsistent with their testimony. But this argument

was squarely rejected in Baca. In that case, the witness testified

that he did not remember the testimony he gave in a prior trial, nor

did he remember the facts underlying his statements at the prior

trial. Baca, 633 P.2d at 529. This court held the witness’s

testimony that he could not remember was inconsistent with his

prior testimony, and therefore his prior testimony was admissible

under section 16-10-201.

¶ 32 We believe that Baca was correctly decided and we apply it

here. Because both witnesses’ testimony amounted to a denial that

they made the statements to the police, the prosecution was

entitled to impeach the witnesses with the statements, and the

court properly admitted those statements. See also People v.

Thomas, 2014 COA 64, ¶ 20 (applying Baca).

13
 B. Confrontation Clause

¶ 33 We also reject Leverton’s related argument that admission of

the witnesses’ prior statements violated his right of confrontation

under the Sixth Amendment.

¶ 34 Out-of-court, testimonial statements by a declarant who is

unavailable to testify at trial are barred by the Confrontation Clause

unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the

declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).3

¶ 35 Leverton argues that when a witness claims to have no

memory of either the prior statements or the events that produced

those statements (or perhaps both), she is not “available” for cross-

examination within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause and

thus her prior statements are inadmissible. While Leverton

acknowledges that United States Supreme Court decisions have

rejected this argument, he nevertheless argues that these cases

3Leverton does not make a separate argument that the state
constitutional confrontation guarantee in article II, section 16 of the
Colorado Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal
Confrontation Clause, nor did he raise that argument in the trial
court. Consequently, we do not further address the Colorado
Constitution. People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 10 n.3.

14
 have been silently overruled by Crawford. Our reading of Crawford

does not support this argument.

¶ 36 The Supreme Court addressed the effect of a witness’s memory

loss on a defendant’s right of confrontation in three pre-Crawford

decisions: California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Delaware v.

Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); and United States v. Owens, 484 U.S.

554 (1988). Each of these cases rejected the argument that the

testifying witness was unavailable for confrontation purposes

because he or she suffered from some memory loss.

¶ 37 In Green, the witness had stated, in both a police interview

and at a preliminary hearing, that the defendant was his marijuana

supplier. 399 U.S. at 151. But at trial, the witness testified that he

could not remember how he had obtained the marijuana because

he was under the influence of drugs the day it was delivered. Id. at

151-52. Rejecting his Confrontation Clause challenge, the Court

concluded that “where the declarant is not absent, but is present to

testify and to submit to cross-examination, our cases, if anything,

support the conclusion that the admission of his out-of-court

statements does not create a confrontation problem.” Id. at 162.

15
¶ 38 In Fensterer, an expert witness presented his opinion at trial,

but could not recollect the basis of that opinion. The Court held

that because “[t]he Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee

that every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving

testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion,”

there was no Confrontation Clause violation. 474 U.S. at 21-22.

¶ 39 Finally, in Owens, the victim had been beaten with a metal

pipe, resulting in severe memory impairment. 484 U.S. at 556.

Despite these injuries, the victim identified the defendant as his

attacker. Id. At trial, however, the victim testified that while he

remembered telling the police who had attacked him, he had no

memory that the defendant was his attacker. Id. The defendant

argued that the victim’s loss of memory on this critical matter

rendered ineffective any cross-examination of the victim and that as

a result, he could not confront the witness in violation of his Sixth

Amendment confrontation right. Id. at 556-57. The Court rejected

this argument, holding that the defendant’s confrontation rights

were not violated because “[t]he Confrontation Clause guarantees

only ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-

examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever

16
 extent, the defense might wish.’” Id. at 559 (citation omitted).

Because “the traditional protections of the oath, cross-examination,

and opportunity for the jury to observe the witness’ demeanor” were

satisfied, there was no Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at 560.

¶ 40 Leverton does not contend that Crawford expressly overruled

Owens and nothing in Crawford would support such a contention.

Instead, Leverton claims that several words buried in one of

Crawford’s footnotes silently overruled Owens.

¶ 41 Footnote nine of Crawford states as follows: “[t]he

[Confrontation] Clause does not bar admission of a statement so

long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” 541

U.S. at 59 n.9 (emphasis added). From these italicized words,

Leverton argues that if a witness claims some memory loss, she

cannot “defend or explain” her prior statements and thus is

unavailable for confrontation purposes.

¶ 42 Virtually every court that has addressed this argument has

rejected it and has squarely held that the physical presence of the

witness at trial avoids any confrontation issue. See, e.g., State v.

Real, 150 P.3d 805, 807 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Pierre, 890

A.2d 474, 502 (Conn. 2006); People v. Bryant, 909 N.E.2d 391, 399

17
 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Smith v. State, 25 So. 3d 264, 270 (Miss. 2009);

State v. Legere, 958 A.2d 969, 977 (N.H. 2008); Woodall v. State,

336 S.W.3d 634, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Abney v.

Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 796, 802 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); State v.

Price, 146 P.3d 1183, 1191 (Wash. 2006).

¶ 43 Two courts have taken a more nuanced view. In Cookson v.

Schwartz, 556 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2009), relying on footnote

nine’s language, the Seventh Circuit held that Crawford’s statement

that “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the

Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on this use of his

prior testimonial statements” is not dispositive of whether a witness

suffering from total memory loss is “available” for confrontation

purposes. The court entertained the possibility that total, extreme

memory loss could render a witness unavailable for Confrontation

Clause purposes. Still, noting that the witness remembered at least

some of the underlying events described in her out-of-court

statements, the court concluded that the defendant had had “ample

opportunity to confront his accuser at trial,” and thus his

confrontation rights were not violated. Id. at 652.

18
¶ 44 The Mississippi Supreme Court relied on Cookson in

construing the Mississippi Constitution’s confrontation clause in

Goforth v. State, 70 So. 3d 174 (Miss. 2011). After the witness made

his statement to the police, but before the trial, he was injured in

an automobile accident that “substantially impaired his physical

and mental conditions,” and he testified that he “could not

remember anything that had occurred two years prior to the wreck.”

Id. at 182. The court, observing that the witness’s “total loss of

memory” was undisputed, held that the witness, “though physically

present at trial, did not have the requisite, minimal ability or

capacity” under the Mississippi Constitution to be cross-examined.

Id. at 186.4

¶ 45 This case does not require us to determine whether total

memory loss coupled with extreme physical disabilities could ever

4 Although Goforth v. State, 70 So. 3d 174 (Miss. 2011), analyzed
both Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and United States
v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), its holding was predicated on the
Mississippi Constitution’s confrontation clause, not the federal
clause. As a result, it provides little, if any, support for the federal
constitutional argument made by Leverton.

19
 render a witness unavailable under the Confrontation Clause and

we express no opinion on that question.5

¶ 46 Though both witnesses claimed at trial that they had no

memory of the night in question or of any of the statements they

made to the police, their actual trial testimony belied those claims.

Both witnesses testified that they remembered their car being

pulled over, that they remembered being arrested, and both were

able to identify who was in the car at the time. Thus, like in

Cookson, the witnesses were able to recall at least some of the

events underlying their statements to the police, and, unlike in

Goforth, neither witness suffered from “total loss of memory.”

¶ 47 Though Leverton claims that he could not effectively

cross-examine the witnesses, in fact he did so, emphasizing the

witnesses’ alleged drug-induced memory loss in an effort to

discredit their testimony. As the Court observed in Owens, 484

U.S. at 559, attacking a witness’s memory is often one of the prime

objectives of cross-examination. Leverton was able to do so in this

case and that dooms his Confrontation Clause argument.

5We note that the Supreme Court recognized such a possibility
both in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168-69 (1970), and
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985).

20
¶ 48 We also observe that a rule that a witness is unavailable for

Confrontation Clause purposes based entirely upon the witness’s

testimony that she suffers from memory loss is unworkable.

Memory loss may be real or feigned. It may be total or partial.

Sometimes lost memory may be refreshed in whole or in part. To

permit a witness to unilaterally control the admission into evidence

of the witness’s prior relevant statements merely by professing a

lack of memory is intolerable to the criminal justice system.

¶ 49 For similar reasons, we reject Leverton’s analogy of a witness’s

exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself or

herself to a witness’s professed lack of memory.

¶ 50 These situations are not analogous. In the Fifth Amendment

context, the witness has a constitutional right not to testify; so long

as that Fifth Amendment right has not been waived, the right is

absolute. A court cannot overrule the exercise of the right on the

basis that the testimony is essential, and no inquiry into the

reasons for the exercise of the right is permissible (other than

whether testimony on the subject might tend to incriminate the

witness). People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 976 (Colo. 1985). Thus,

a witness who exercises her Fifth Amendment right not to testify is

21
 unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes. United States v.

Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 776 (10th Cir. 2010). In contrast, the

availability inquiry in the memory loss context depends on a

multitude of factors beyond simply an assertion of constitutional

rights.

¶ 51 For all of these reasons, we hold that Leverton’s right to

confrontation was not violated.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 52 Leverton argues that the prosecution did not present sufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed

theft or possessed drug paraphernalia. We disagree.

¶ 53 “The due process clauses of the United States and Colorado

Constitutions prohibit the criminal conviction of any person except

on proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kogan v. People, 756

P.2d 945, 950 (Colo. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Erickson

v. People, 951 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998). A reviewing court faced with a

sufficiency challenge must determine whether the relevant evidence,

both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient

to support a conclusion by a reasonable person that the defendant

22
 is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Dempsey v.

People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005); People v. Gonzales, 666

P.2d 123, 127 (Colo. 1983).

¶ 54 In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a

conviction, “[t]he prosecution is entitled to the benefit of every

reasonable inference that may fairly be drawn from the evidence,

even if the record also contains evidence to the contrary.” People v.

Thornton, 251 P.3d 1147, 1149 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 55 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is solely

within the province of the jury, as is the specific weight to be

accorded to that testimony. People v. Sprouse, 983 P.2d 771, 778

(Colo. 1999); see also People v. Duncan, 109 P.3d 1044, 1045-46

(Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 56 We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction. Dempsey,

117 P.3d at 807.6

6Relying on People v. Lacallo, 2014 COA 78, ¶¶ 4-23, the Attorney
General argues that because Leverton did not raise the issue of
sufficiency in the trial court, we should review only for plain error.
We need not resolve that issue here because we conclude that
sufficient evidence supported Leverton’s convictions. People v.
Sena, 2016 COA 161, ¶ 8.

23
 A. Theft

¶ 57 “[A] person commits theft by receiving when he receives,

retains . . . or disposes of anything of value of another, knowing or

believing that said thing of value has been stolen, and when he

intends to deprive the lawful owner permanently of the use or

benefit of the thing of value.” § 18-4-410(1), C.R.S. 2012.

¶ 58 A few days after the car had been reported stolen, the police

found Leverton sitting in the car’s front passenger seat. Though

Leverton told the police that the car had been given to him by the

victim, his statement was directly refuted by the victim’s testimony

that she had never met him. Evidence also was presented at trial

that Leverton himself drove the vehicle to a gas station.

¶ 59 Based on all of this evidence, we conclude that the jury was

entitled to infer that Leverton intended to permanently deprive the

owner of the car of the rights of ownership. Thus, sufficient

evidence supported the theft by receiving conviction.

B. Possession of Paraphernalia

¶ 60 “[A] person commits possession of drug paraphernalia if he or

she possesses drug paraphernalia and knows or reasonably should

know that the drug paraphernalia could be used under

24
 circumstances in violation of the laws of this state.” § 18-18-

428(1)(a).

¶ 61 The prosecution presented evidence that, prior to placing

Leverton into the police vehicle, a police officer searched the

vehicle’s back seat and found nothing. While Leverton was being

transported to the police station, he was fidgeting. After removing

Leverton from the vehicle, the officer discovered in the back seat

where Leverton had been sitting a pipe of the sort commonly used

to smoke methamphetamine. The pipe contained a white residue

which the officer testified was consistent with methamphetamine.

¶ 62 Leverton argues that no jury rationally could have concluded

that the pipe belonged to him because if he had had the pipe on his

person, it would have been discovered when he was patted down

before he was placed into the police vehicle. He also argues that the

pipe could have belonged to the driver of the stolen car, who rode in

the police vehicle with him. But the fact that the officer did not find

the pipe during the pat-down search goes to the weight of the

officer’s testimony, an inquiry that is irrelevant in determining

sufficiency. Sprouse, 983 P.2d at 778. And while the pipe might

25
 have belonged to the other man, it was the jury’s role to decide to

whom the pipe belonged.

¶ 63 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the

jury to convict Leverton of possession of drug paraphernalia.

V. Guilt by Association

¶ 64 Leverton also contends that “the trial court erred by allowing

the prosecution to seek Mr. Leverton’s convictions on the basis of

guilt by association.” We have held that the prosecution presented

sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that every element of the

charged crimes was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Leverton’s

convictions were not based on his association with other persons;

they were based on evidence that proved that Leverton, not some

other person, committed the crimes.

¶ 65 To the extent that Leverton asserts a back-door Fourth

Amendment argument ― that the police officer’s search of the police

vehicle after Leverton exited the vehicle was unreasonable ― we

reject it for two reasons: (1) it was not sufficiently developed and we

do not address skeletal arguments, People v. Simpson, 93 P.3d 551,

555 (Colo. App. 2003); and (2) it was not raised in the trial court

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 and thus was waived, People v. Cordova, 293 P.3d 114, 120 (Colo.

App. 2011).

VI. Conclusion

¶ 66 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE J. JONES concur.

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