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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-15722
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-00922-CAP
DANIEL DAOGARU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
THOMAS BRANDON,
Acting Director of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(March 29, 2017)
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Before HULL, WILLIAM PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Daogaru appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of the United States. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Daogaru sought an order barring the officials from prosecuting
him under the federal statute that prohibits convicted felons from possessing
firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Daogaru argued that enforcement of the federal
statute infringed on his right to keep and bear arms, in violation of the Second
Amendment. The district court ruled that Daogaru lacked standing to sue because
“Georgia law independently bar[red] him from possessing a firearm.” We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Daogaru was convicted in the Michigan courts of six felonies related to
writing bad checks. Under Michigan law, Daogaru was barred from possessing a
firearm for three years after he completed his sentence and term of probation. See
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f(1). In 2005, Daogaru’s right to possess a firearm in
Michigan was restored by operation of law, but Daogaru remained ineligible to
obtain a license in Michigan to carry a concealed weapon, see id. § 28.425b(7)(f).
Daogaru moved to Georgia, where he filed a complaint in federal court
against the United States Attorney and the acting director of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. In the complaint, Daogaru requested
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a declaration that the federal firearms statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was
unconstitutional as applied to him and an injunction that barred the federal officials
from enforcing the firearm statute “so as to prohibit[] [Daogaru] from possessing a
firearm and ammunition in his home.”
The officials moved to dismiss Daogaru’s complaint and argued that he
lacked standing to challenge the federal firearms statute because Georgia law
independently prohibited him from possessing a firearm. The officials cited
Georgia law, which punishes “[a]ny person . . . who has been convicted of a felony
by a court of this state or any other state . . . who receives, possesses, or transports
any firearm.” Ga. Code § 16-11-131(b). That Michigan restored Daogaru’s right to
possess a firearm, the officials argued, did not qualify as a pardon that would
except him from prosecution. See id. § 16-11-131(c). The officials contended that
Daogaru could not, as required under Georgia law, produce a pardon that had been
prepared by “the person or agency empowered to grant pardons under the
constitution[] or laws of” Michigan that “expressly . . . authorize[d] [Daogaru] to
receive, possess, or transport a firearm.” See Ga. Code § 16-11-131(c). And the
prohibition against Daogaru obtaining a license in Michigan to carry a concealed
weapon established, the officials argued, that he had not been pardoned in
accordance with Georgia law, which required “a declaration of record that [the]
person is relieved from the legal consequences of a particular conviction” and the
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“restor[ation of] civil and political rights and remov[al of] all legal disabilities
resulting from the conviction,” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 475-3-.10(3).
Daogaru opposed the motion to dismiss and requested that the district court
strike the motion as untimely filed, but the district court rejected Daogaru’s
arguments and dismissed his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
district court ruled that Daogaru lacked standing because “the state-law firearms
ban applicable to convicted felons establishe[d] that [his] alleged injury is
attributable to a third-party not before the court, the State of Georgia, and that his
alleged injury’s relationship to the federal ban . . . is not fairly traceable to the
defendants, nor would a favorable ruling by this court redress his injury.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing.
McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1141 (11th Cir.
2014).
III. DISCUSSION
Daogaru challenges the dismissal of his complaint on two grounds. First, he
argues that he has standing to challenge the federal firearm statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Second, he argues that the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss was
untimely. Because Daogaru lacked standing and that determination is dispositive of
his appeal, we decline to address the timeliness of the motion to dismiss.
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The district court correctly determined that Daogaru lacked standing to
complain about the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1). Daogaru’s complaint is
nonjusticiable because he failed to satisfy at least two of the threshold
requirements for standing: causation and redressability. See Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To establish causation, Daogaru’s “injury ha[d]
to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of
the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. (internal
quotation marks, ellipses, brackets, and citation omitted). Daogaru’s inability to
possess a firearm is not traceable only to section 922(g)(1). Georgia law bars
Daogaru from possessing a firearm. Daogaru has not obtained from an official or
agency in Michigan a pardon with “terms . . . [that] expressly . . . authorize[] [him]
to . . . possess . . . a firearm.” See Ga. Code § 16-11-131(c). Daogaru also has not
had “remove[d] all legal disabilities resulting from [his] conviction[s]” in
Michigan, see Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 475-3-.10(3); he cannot obtain a license to
carry a concealed weapon, Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.425b(7)(f). And a ruling in
Daogaru’s favor would not, as the district court stated, “redress his injury.” See
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Daogaru would still face prosecution in Georgia for
possessing a firearm even if the district court issued an order that enjoined federal
officials from prosecuting him under section 922(g)(1). Regardless of the
timeliness of the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, the district court would
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have been obligated sua sponte to dismiss Daogaru’s complaint for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410
(11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into
subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Daogaru’s complaint.
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