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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-12975
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cv-02480-LSC
CHARLES HUNTLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(March 29, 2017)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Charles Huntley appeals the order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of
his application for disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Huntley
argues that the administrative law judge gave too little weight to the evaluations of
two examining physicians, gave too much weight to the opinion of a non-
examining physician, and substituted his own opinion for those of the medical
experts. We affirm.
We review the decision of an administrative law judge as the
Commissioner’s final decision when the administrative law judge denies benefits
and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d
1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We review the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de
novo and her decision to deny benefits for substantial evidence. Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence
that a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.
Winschel v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). We do not find facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Id. We instead defer to the Commissioner’s decision, so long as it
is supported by substantial evidence, even if the evidence may preponderate
against it. Crawford v. Comm’r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).
Eligibility for disability insurance benefits requires that the applicant be
under a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). And an applicant is under a disability
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if he is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically
determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). The applicant bears the burden of proving his disability.
Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
In determining whether an applicant has proved that he is disabled, the
administrative law judge must complete a five-step sequential evaluation. Jones v.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). The applicant has the burden to prove
(1) that he “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity,” (2) he “has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments,” and (3) his “impairment or
combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment” so that he is
entitled to a finding of disability, or if not, (4) that he “is unable to perform her past
relevant work” in the light of his residual functional capacity. Id. “At the fifth step,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to determine if there is other work available
in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Id.
When assessing medical opinions, the administrative law judge must
consider several factors to determine how much weight to give each medical
opinion, including whether the physician has examined the claimant; the length,
nature, and extent of a treating physician’s relationship with the claimant; the
medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician’s opinion; how
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consistent the physician’s opinion is with the “record as a whole”; and the
physician’s specialty. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). These factors apply to
both examining and non-examining physicians. Id. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e).
The administrative law judge must state with particularity the weight given to
different medical opinions and his supporting reasons. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.
The administrative law judge need not defer to the opinion of a physician who
conducted a single examination because that physician is not a treating physician.
McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987). The opinion of a
non-examining physician “taken alone” does not constitute substantial evidence to
support an administrative law judge’s decision. Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222,
226 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990). But an administrative law judge can rely on a non-
examining physician’s report in denying benefits where it does not contradict
information in the examining physicians’ reports. See Edward v. Sullivan,
937 F.2d 580, 584–85 (11th Cir. 1991). Although the opinion of an examining
physician is ordinarily entitled to greater weight than that of a non-examining
physician, the administrative law judge is free to reject the opinion of any
physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Sryock v. Heckler,
764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985).
When considering an examining, non-treating medical opinion, “[t]he more
a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly
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medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight [the administrative law
judge] will give that opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for an
opinion, the more weight [the administrative law judge] will give that opinion.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). Moreover, “because nonexamining sources have no
examining or treating relationship with [the applicant], the weight [the
administrative law judge] will give their opinions will depend on the degree to
which they provide supporting explanations for their opinions.” Id. In addition,
“the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the
administrative law judge] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(4).
Substantial evidence supports the weight the administrative law judge gave
to the medical opinions of the examining and non-examining physicians. The
decision to assign little weight to examining physicians’ opinions is supported by
substantial evidence. As one-time examiners, the physicians were not treating
physicians, and the administrative law judge was not required to afford special
deference to their opinions. See McSwain, 814 F.2d at 619. And neither of the
examining physicians provided an explanation in support of their determinations of
Huntley’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). The physicians instead
apparently relied upon Huntley’s subjective complaints. And their opinions about
Huntley’s extreme limitations were not supported by their medical examinations of
him. Sryock, 764 F.2d at 835.
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Substantial evidence also supports the administrative law judge’s decision to
assign more weight to the non-examining physician’s opinion. Although the
opinion of an examining physician is ordinarily entitled to greater weight than the
opinion of a non-examining physician, the administrative law judge was free to
reject the opinions of the examining physicians because they were not supported
by the record. Sryock, 764 F.2d at 835. The non-examining physician also
explained his conclusion about Huntley’s residual functional capacity with specific
reasons, and his opinion was consistent with the treatment records.
AFFIRMED.
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