FILED
Mar 30 2017, 5:32 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen R. Buschmann Matthew M. Price
Thrasher Buschmann & Voelkel, P.C. Gregory A. Neibarger
Indianapolis, Indiana Jessica Whelan
Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Certain Tell City Annexation March 30, 2017
Territory Landowners, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Petitioners, 62A01-1603-MI-510
Appeal from the Perry Circuit
v. Court
The Honorable William E.
Tell City, Indiana, Weikert, Special Judge
Appellee-Respondent. Trial Court Cause No.
62C01-1407-MI-319
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] This case concerns the statutory question of what constitutes a necessary
signature on a remonstrance petition for purposes of challenging a city’s
proposed land annexation. The Appellants/Petitioners, Certain Tell City
Annexation Territory Landowners (“Property Owners”), filed a remonstrance
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1603-MI-510 | March 30, 2017 Page 1 of 20
petition (“Remonstrance Petition”) challenging a proposed annexation of their
land by Tell City (“The City”). The trial court dismissed the Remonstrance
Petition, holding that it did not contain the necessary signatures because many
of the Property Owners’ signatures were not compliant with statutory
requirements.
[2] On appeal, the Property Owners argue that the trial court misinterpreted the
statutory requirements for remonstrance petitions and erred in dismissing the
Remonstrance Petition. We agree that the trial court misinterpreted and added
additional statutory requirements, and we find that the Petition did contain the
necessary signatures. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the Petition.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
[3] We reverse and remand.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the Property
Owners’ Remonstrance Petition.
Facts
[4] On April 7, 2014, the City adopted Ordinance No. 1074, in which it proposed
to annex 1,776.4 acres of surrounding land (collectively, “Annexation
Territory”) into its corporate limits. Pursuant to Indiana law, owners of land in
an annexation territory may remonstrate against an annexation by filing a
written remonstrance and petition bearing the signatures of:
(1) at least sixty-five percent (65%) of the owners of land in the
annexed territory; or
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(2) the owners of more than seventy-five percent (75%) in
assessed valuation of the land in the annexed territory.
IND. CODE § 36-4-3-11(a). The Property Owners challenged the City’s
proposed annexation by filing such a petition, the Remonstrance Petition, with
the trial court on July 8, 2014. Each real estate parcel was allocated a dedicated
page within the Remonstrance Petition, and each parcel’s page listed the
parcel’s number and address; the Property Owner’s name as it appeared on the
parcel’s property tax duplicate; and a statement that the Property Owner
intended to remonstrate against the annexation. Each page also included a line
for the Property Owner’s signature, a line for the Property Owner to print his or
her name, and a line for the date the Property Owner signed the page. In total,
438 Property Owners signed the Remonstrance Petition.
[5] On May 12, 2015, after a pre-trial conference with the parties, the trial court
ordered the Auditor of Perry County (“the Auditor”) to review the
Remonstrance Petition and evaluate whether it contained the necessary
signatures for the Property Owners to have standing to remonstrate against the
annexation.1 Pursuant to the order, the Auditor was supposed to “create a
Schedule of the parcels in the Annexation Territory using the names of the
Owner(s) appearing on the tax duplicates for each of those parcels” and to
1
Although not stated by the trial court, we have previously held that the issue of whether a remonstrance is
signed by a sufficient number of landowners relates to the doctrine of standing. See City of Boonville v. Am.
Cold Storage, 950 N.E.2d 764, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh’g denied. If the remonstrance is not signed by a
sufficient number of landowners, then the landowners in the annexed territory do not have standing to
challenge the annexation. See id.
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“compare the Remonstrance Petitions . . . to the names on the Schedule.” (The
City’s App. 39). The Auditor was also supposed to “make a notation for each
parcel” regarding “whether a remonstrance petition, compliant with the
provisions of [INDIANA CODE §] 36-4-3-11(b) [had] been filed.”2 (The City’s
App. 39-40). If the Auditor determined that a “Remonstrance Petition was filed
for a particular parcel that [was] not compliant with the provisions of [INDIANA
CODE §] 36-4-3-11(b),” the Auditor was required to “make a notation on the
Schedule as to the reasons the Petition [was] not deemed compliant.” (The
City’s App. 40).
[6] The Auditor reviewed the Annexation Territory and Remonstrance Petition
and filed a schedule (“Schedule”) with the trial court as ordered. As
documented in the Schedule, the Auditor found that there were 637 total
parcels in the Annexation Territory and that 145 of the 438 signatures in the
Remonstrance Petition did not comply with INDIANA CODE § 36-4-3-11(b).
Based on these findings, only 45% of Property Owners in the Annexation
Territory had signed the Remonstrance Petition and complied with INDIANA
CODE § 36-4-3-11(b). The Auditor’s reason for finding 145 signatures non-
compliant was that they did not “exactly match any of the names listed on the
tax duplicate such that the signatures may not comply with Indiana law.” (The
2
As we will discuss further in a later portion of this opinion, INDIANA CODE § 36-4-3-11(b) does not contain
requirements for a “valid” signature. It provides that, “[i]n determining the total number of landowners of
the annexed territory and whether signers of the remonstrance are landowners, the names appearing on the
tax duplicate for the territory constitute prima facie evidence of ownership.” I.C. § 36-4-3-11(b).
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City’s App. 37). For example, one person had signed as “Joe” instead of
“Joseph,” and some people had added middle initials. Also, some of the non-
compliant signatures were those of trustees and authorized representatives of
corporations who had signed on behalf of their trusts and/or corporations.
[7] At the agreement of the parties, the trial court next ordered the Auditor to
revise and supplement the Schedule to include the assessed value for each
parcel in the Annexation Territory, as well as the total assessed value of the
Annexation Territory. The Auditor filed a revised schedule (“Revised
Schedule”) including these valuations. According to the Revised Schedule, the
total value of the property owned by the Property Owners was not more than
75% of the total value of the Annexation Territory, as was required for standing
to challenge the annexation pursuant to the property value prong of INDIANA
CODE § 36-4-3-11(a).
[8] Subsequently, on September 21, 2015, the Property Owners filed a
memorandum objecting to the Auditor’s Revised Schedule. In their objection,
the Property Owners argued that: (1) the Auditor’s interpretation that the
Property Owners’ signatures on the Remonstrance Petition had to exactly
match their names on their tax duplicates was arbitrary because no such
standard was required by the remonstrance statute; (2) the Auditor had
included parcels in the Annexation Territory that did not belong in the
Territory; and (3) the Auditor had improperly counted state-owned parcels in
the Annexation Territory as forty-eight separate parcels rather than one single
parcel. In support of this third argument, the Property Owners cited American
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Cold Storage v. City of Boonville, 977 N.E.2d 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), in which
this Court found that separate parcels acquired by the State for right-of-way on
a state highway should be counted as a single parcel for purposes of an
annexation remonstrance. Adjusting for these alleged errors, the Property
Owners contended that there were 591, rather than 637, total parcels in the
Annexation Territory and that the Remonstrance Petition contained 434 valid
Property Owner signatures.3 The Property Owners noted that 434 signatures
constituted 73.04% of the total 591 parcels, which was a sufficient number of
signatures for standing under INDIANA CODE § 36-4-3-11(a)(1).
[9] Thereafter, the City filed a response to the Property Owners’ objection, as well
as an objection of its own. In response to the Property Owners, the City argued
that the Auditor’s determination of which signatures complied with the statute
was entitled to deference and that the Property Owners had not provided
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the Auditor’s findings were
valid. Further, the City asserted that a plain reading of the statute supported
the Auditor’s interpretation. With respect to the signatures of corporate
representatives or trustees, in particular, the City contended that the Auditor
could not properly deem the signature valid if the Auditor was unable to tell on
the face of the Remonstrance Petition that the signor was authorized to sign on
behalf of the entity. The City contended that the burden was on the Property
3
It is not clear why the Property Owners contended that there were 434 valid signatures rather than 438, as
the Auditor found.
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Owners to prove the validity of the signatures, so any ambiguity should be
resolved against them. As for the total number of parcels in the Annexation
Territory, the City argued that the Property Owners had not proven that the
State’s forty-eight parcels in the Annexation Territory should qualify as only
one parcel for purposes of the Petition. Finally, in its own objection to the
Revised Schedule, the City noted that eleven of the Property Owners had
withdrawn their signatures from the Remonstrance Petition since the Auditor
had compiled the Revised Schedule.
[10] On December 10, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the parties’ objections.
At the hearing, the City described the inconsistencies between the names on the
tax duplicates and the signatures on the Remonstrance Petition as follows:
Basically[,] there are 26 that added a middle initial, there are 12
that did not fully spell out a middle name, there are 12 that did
not include a middle name, five (5) did not include the word
trustee, even though they were signed [by] the person who is the
trustee, two (2) did not use Jr. or Sr., two (2) added a middle
name, we have some that added middle initials, we have one (1)
that use[d] Joe instead of Joseph, one (1) that used Joseph
instead of Joe, we have a John not a Johnathon, [] three (3) by
personal representatives, one (1) of them a C looked like an E to
the auditor. [W]e have a Tom instead of Thomas, several that
did not include MD, signed the name but just didn’t put MD[.]
[T]hey are owned by doctors[.] [O]ne (1) signed, we had some
sign using a new married name and in some cases they even
identified [] that case, some we are not sure why they turned
them down. . . . One (1) of them . . . the name was misspelled on
the record card so in the signature the person signed their name
and said it is misspelled on the record card[.]
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(Tr. 10-11). Several Property Owners whose signatures the Auditor had
rejected testified to rebut the Auditor’s determination that they had not validly
signed the Remonstrance Petition. Each of the Property Owners testified that
he or she owned the land identified in the Remonstrance Petition and that he or
she had signed the Petition. The Property Owners also presented evidence that
the Auditor had incorrectly included several parcels in the Annexation Territory
that did not belong in the Territory.
[11] Subsequently, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon
concluding that the Remonstrance Petition did not contain the necessary
signatures for the Property Owners to have standing to challenge the
annexation. The trial court ruled that the Auditor had “acted appropriately in
invalidating certain signatures on the Remonstrance Petition [that] did not
match the names appearing on the [corresponding] tax duplicate.” (The
Property Owners’ App. 18). As for instances where the Remonstrance Petition
was signed by a trustee or authorized representative of a trust or corporation
owning property in the Annexation Territory, the trial court concluded that
“the Auditor [had] correctly exercised her discretion in determining that the
signatures were invalid” because the Auditor could not tell on the face of the
Petition whether the representative was authorized to sign on behalf of the
Property Owner. (The Property Owners’ App. 19). The Court did not decide
on the merits whether the State’s forty-eight parcels should be counted
individually or as one single parcel because it concluded that the Property
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Owners would not have sufficient signatures even if it ruled in their favor.4 The
Property Owners now appeal.
Decision
[12] This appeal concerns the statutory requirements for challenging an annexation
through a remonstrance. The process of annexation consists of multiple stages.
Generally, an annexation formally begins when a municipality adopts an
ordinance annexing territory pursuant to either INDIANA CODE § 36-4-3-3 or
INDIANA CODE § 36-4-3-4. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation v. Town of
Brownsburg, 32 N.E.3d 798, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The legislative adoption
of the ordinance is followed by an opportunity for affected landowners to
appeal the annexation through a remonstrance. Id. INDIANA CODE § 36-4-3-11
details the requirements for a valid remonstrance.5 As stated above, it provides
that the remonstrance must be signed by:
(1) at least sixty-five percent (65%) of the owners of land in the
annexed territory; or
(2) the owners of more than seventy-five percent (75%) in
assessed valuation of the land in the annexed territory.
4
Specifically, “[f]or the sake of this argument, [the court] accepted the Remonstrators’ argument that all
State-owned parcels should be counted as one (1) instead of the 48 parcels contained in the [Schedule].”
(The Property Owners’ App. 24).
5
This statute has since been amended, but the amended version of the statute applies the same language to,
and requirements for, annexation ordinances adopted before July 1, 2015.
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I.C. § 36-4-3-11(a). Also, the remonstrance “must be accompanied by a copy of
that ordinance, and must state the reason why the annexation should not take
place.” I.C. § 36-4-3-11(a). If the remonstrance is not signed by a sufficient
number of landowners, then the landowners in the annexed territory do not
have standing to challenge the annexation. See City of Boonville, 950 N.E.2d at
766.
[13] After receiving a remonstrance to an annexation, “the court shall determine
whether the remonstrance has the necessary signatures.” I.C. § 36-4-3-11(b).
According to INDIANA CODE § 36-4-3-11(b):
In determining the total number of landowners of the annexed
territory and whether signers of the remonstrance are
landowners, the names appearing on the tax duplicate for that
territory constitute prima facie evidence of ownership. Only one
(1) person having an interest in each single property, as
evidenced by the tax duplicate, is considered a landowner for
purposes of this section.
If, as a result of this review, the court determines that the remonstrance is
sufficient, it must then schedule a hearing on the merits of the remonstrance.
Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, 32 N.E.2d at 800. At the hearing, the
burden is on the municipality to demonstrate its compliance with annexation
statutes. Id. at 801.
[14] Because the trial court determined that the Remonstrance Petition was not
signed by a sufficient number of Property Owners, the Property Owners did not
have standing to challenge the annexation. See City of Boonville, 950 N.E.2d at
766. Accordingly, on appeal, they argue that the trial court erred in
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determining how many Property Owners had validly signed the Petition. They
essentially dispute the trial court’s interpretation of the statutory requirements
for the “necessary signatures” on a remonstrance petition under INDIANA CODE
§ 36-4-3-11. Their arguments apply to three categories of remonstrance signers:
(1) individual Property Owners; (2) trustees; and (3) authorized representatives
of corporations. They argue that the trial court’s interpretation of INDIANA
CODE § 36-4-3-11(b)—that the signature of each of these signers had to match
his or her respective name on his or her property tax duplicate exactly—was too
restrictive of a standard and was not supported by the statute. We agree.
[15] To decide this issue, we must interpret the signature requirements under
INDIANA CODE § 36-4-3-11. Our standard for statutory interpretation is as
follows:
Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the court
and is reviewed de novo. The cardinal rule of statutory
construction is that if a statute is unambiguous, then we need not
and cannot interpret it; rather, we must apply its plain and clear
meaning. Additionally, when construing a statute, the
legislature’s definition of a word binds us. When the legislature
has not defined a word, we give the word its common and
ordinary meaning.
Town of Whitestown v. Rural Perry Twp. Landowners, 40 N.E.3d 916, 921 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015) (quoting Vanderburgh Cty. Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh Cty. Democratic
Cent. Comm., 833 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)) (internal citations
omitted), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Importantly, we may not “‘engraft new
words’ onto a statute or add restrictions where none exist.” Kitchell v. Franklin,
997 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (Ind. 2013).
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[16] Here, the trial court concluded that “[INDIANA CODE] § 36-4-3-11 requires that
the remonstrator’s signature on the remonstrance petition exactly match the
landowner’s name on the tax duplicate.” (The Property Owners’ App. 18).
However, this conclusion misconstrues the language of the statute. INDIANA
CODE § 36-4-3-11(b) provides, in relevant part, that:
[When the trial court is] determining the total number of
landowners of the annexed territory and whether signers of the
remonstrance are landowners, the names appearing on the tax
duplicate for that territory constitute prima facie evidence of
ownership.
(Emphasis added). It is clear that the purpose of the review process delineated
in the statute is to verify that the signers are, in fact, property owners. See I.C. §
36-4-3-11 (providing that the trial court must “determin[e] . . . whether signers
of the remonstrance are landowners”). Towards this end, the statute implies
that the trial court may compare the name on the property tax duplicate to the
name on the petition because the property tax duplicate could not constitute
evidence unless the trial court could compare it to the petition. See id.
However, the statute does not provide that the name on the property tax
duplicate constitutes prima facie evidence only if it matches the signature on the
petition; nor does it provide that the name on either the petition or the property
tax duplicate must fit a certain format—and, by extension, “match”—to qualify
as prima facie evidence. The pages for each parcel must be “signed,” but the
statute does not require a particular form of signature.
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[17] This first point, that the statute does not require a match between the name on a
property tax duplicate and the signature on a petition, is important because it
allows for a trial court to find that other aspects of a comparison between a
petition and the corresponding property tax duplicates are relevant for
establishing prima facie evidence of ownership. For example, the statute does
not preclude the trial court from determining that any name, rather than
signature, on the remonstrance petition that matches a name on the property
tax duplicate establishes prima facie evidence of ownership. This distinction is
significant here because the Remonstrance Petition contained “names” in
addition to signatures. As stated above, each real estate parcel was allocated a
dedicated page within the Remonstrance Petition, and the page listed that
parcel’s number and address; the Property Owner’s name as it appeared on the
property’s tax duplicate for the parcel; a statement that the Property Owner
intended to remonstrate against the annexation; a line for the Property Owner’s
signature; and a line for the Property Owner to print his or her name.
Accordingly, each Property Owner’s name was listed in three places—the
Petition’s documentation of the Property Owner’s name as it appeared on the
Property tax duplicate, the owner’s printed name, and the owner’s signature.
The trial court concluded that the signature had to exactly match the property
tax duplicate, but we disagree in light of the language of the statute. Instead,
we conclude that the statute allowed for the tax duplicate to constitute prima
facie evidence of ownership if it was the same as the Petition’s statement of the
Property Owner’s name in any of these three contexts.
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[18] Utilizing this interpretation, we must recalculate the number of qualifying
signatures on the Remonstrance Petition. The Auditor initially accepted 293 of
the signatures on the Remonstrance Petition and rejected 145. Then, as
documented in the City’s objection to the Auditor’s Revised Schedule, owners
of eleven parcels withdrew their signatures from the Remonstrance Petition.
The Auditor had already rejected three of these signatures in the Schedule,
which meant that 285 signatures that the Auditor had approved and 142
signatures that the Auditor had rejected remained on the Remonstrance
Petition.6 Based on our review of the rejected petitions and the Auditor’s
documentation of the names on the property tax duplicates, we conclude that
the pages for 120 of the rejected signatures included a name, whether in typed,
printed, or signed form, that exactly matched the corresponding tax duplicate.
Of the remaining twenty-two signatures that the Auditor rejected and that do
not have an exact name match, an additional four signatures were confirmed as
belonging to valid Property Owners at the hearing. Accordingly, in sum, we
conclude that there was prima facie evidence—unrebutted by the City—that
there were compliant signatures of 409 Property Owners on the Remonstrance
Petition.
[19] While the above analysis applies to the names on the Remonstrance Petition
that matched the names on the property tax duplicates, we also noted above
6
The trial court found that the Auditor had already rejected four of these signatures and had approved seven,
but our review of the record has revealed that the Auditor had rejected three and approved eight.
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that the statute does not require a name on the tax duplicate to fit a certain
format—and, by extension, “match”—the name on the Petition to qualify as
prima facie evidence. This distinction is significant because many of the
signatures and names on the Remonstrance Petition differed, but differed only
slightly, from the corresponding names on the property tax duplicates. The
Property Owners argue that these slight deviations should not have disqualified
the Property Owners’ signatures. We agree.
[20] In support of the Property Owners’ argument, we note that in Wherry v.
Backelman, 130 N.E.2d 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1955), this Court considered a
similar question of how to count names on a petition to abandon a school. The
statutory language in that case required a “majority of the resident taxpayers of
any school township” to petition the trustee or board of trustees for the
abandonment of any high school. Id. at 778. When counting the names, the
trial court noted that several of the signatures on the petition contained
derivatives or expansions of the names on the property tax duplicates, such as
“Jim Springer” instead of “James L. Springer” and “Homer Studebaker”
instead of “H.J. Studebaker.” Id. at 777, 778. When affirming the trial court’s
decision that these derivatives constituted qualifying signatures, we noted that
“[i]t is a general rule that a person may be designated in a legal proceeding by
the name by which he is commonly known, even though this does not
constitute his true name.” Id. at 778. Further, we explained that “[i]n arriving
at whether the petition is a valid one, . . . the law is primarily concerned with
the question of the correct identity of the person so signing.” Id. at 779.
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Accordingly, when an individual signed the petition using the word “Mrs.” or
“using initials,” for example, “the same create[d] a presumption that she [was]
signing the petition for herself, and it then bec[ame] the duty of the
governmental official to determine whether or not the identification of such
individual so signing [was] the same person whose name appear[ed] upon the
tax duplicate.” Id.
[21] Similarly, in Marshall Cty. Tax Awareness Comm. v. Quivey, 780 N.E.2d 380 (Ind.
2002), our supreme court held that signatures that contained minor deviations
from the property owners’ names as listed on their property tax duplicates were
valid in a remonstrance petition to block a school building improvement plan.
There, the County Auditor had invalidated the signature of David Good, a co-
trustee of the “David A. Good and Norma Jean Good Rev Living Trust”
because he did not sign “as Trustee.” Id. at 385. On review, our supreme court
noted that there was no statutory requirement for a trustee to sign a
remonstrance petition in his capacity as trustee. See id. The only requirement
for signatures was that: “All names should be written and printed neatly, and as
they appear on the tax records in the Auditor’s office as nearly as possible.” Id.
(emphasis added). The supreme court noted that the Auditor’s disqualification
of David Good’s signature was an error because “[a]rguably the ‘name’ is only
‘David Good,’ even if his title is ‘trustee.’” Id. Regardless, the supreme court
held that “imperfect identification” of property owners on the petition was
allowable and that “[s]ignatures that [did] not violate any statutory or Board of
Accounts directive should [have been] counted if it [was] clear who the property
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owner [was] and that the person signing for that property [was] authorized to
do so.”7 Id. David Good’s signature on behalf of his trust met those criteria
because the Auditor had “no difficulty” identifying the signer “David Good” as
the co-trustee of the “David A. Good and Norma Jean Good Revocable Living
Trust.” Id.
[22] Notably, we have also previously clarified that:
A signing may be accomplished in a number of ways. When a
person intends for the mark or name to represent his signature on
a document, it meets the requirements of the law. In certain
situations, initials may constitute a legal signature.
Gibson v. State, 661 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. This is a
non-exacting standard that does not require an individual’s legal signature to
precisely match his or her name in order to represent the individual.
[23] Based on the above precedent, we conclude that a signature on a remonstrance
petition may qualify as proof of ownership and the Property Owner’s intent to
sign the remonstrance even if it deviates insignificantly from the property tax
duplicate. As stated above, it is clear that the Legislature’s primary concern
was that the court identify the signers as landowners. See I.C. § 36-4-3-11.
And, as we held in the cases above, it is possible to verify identity without
having an exact name match. Few would dispute that “Jim Springer” is the
7
The statute required that the verification of petitions and remonstrances be done “‘in the manner prescribed
by the state board of accounts.’” Id. (quoting I.C. § 6-1.1-20-3.2(4)).
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same person as “James L. Springer,” or that “David Good” is likely a trustee of
a trust titled “David A. Good and Norma Jean Rev Living Trust.” As an
extension of this principle, the Gibson Court noted that Indiana law recognizes
that a person may “sign” a document with only initials. See id.
[24] Our interpretation that signatures may contain minor deviations if it is still
possible to identify ownership is consistent with our rules of statutory
interpretation and the evidentiary standard that the legislature included in the
statute. First, as noted above, we are not allowed to “‘engraft new words’ onto
a statute or add restrictions where none exist.” Kitchell, 997 N.E.2d at 1026.
The statute here did not explicitly state that the signatures on a remonstrance
petition must match the property owners’ corresponding names as listed on
their property tax duplicates. Thus, we may not add such a requirement to the
statute.
[25] Second, the Legislature did not establish an exhaustive method for determining
property ownership. It provided that the name on the property tax duplicate
constitutes “prima facie evidence” of ownership. I.C. § 36-4-3-11. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “prima facie evidence” as “[e]vidence that will establish a
fact or sustain a judgment unless discredited by other evidence.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 677 (10th ed. 2014). The prima facie standard implies that while
certain evidence may be sufficient to establish a fact, it is not, by necessity, the
only evidence that may establish that fact. See City of Boonville, 950 N.E.2d at
768 (“[T]he tax duplicate, as the term is used in [INDIANA CODE §] 36-4-3-
11(b), is prima facie evidence of ownership. It is neither an irrebuttable nor a
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sole source of evidence.”)8 This is a flexible standard that does not require a
specific form of evidence to establish ownership.
[26] Based on this interpretation and our review of the record, we conclude that an
additional seven Property Owners whose signatures the Auditor rejected were
compliant with the statute. Combined with the signatures we have previously
found to be compliant, there were a total of at least 416 compliant signatures on
the Remonstrance Petition. The City disputes on cross-appeal how many total
parcels there were in the Annexation Territory for purposes of determining the
percentage of Property Owners that signed the petition. However, we conclude
that even if we find in favor of the City on that issue and determine that there
are 626 total parcels, the Property Owners had a sufficient percentage of
signatures for standing—66.29%. Accordingly, we need not address the City’s
cross-appeal issue that the court should have counted the State’s parcels as
forty-eight separate parcels rather than one parcel.9 We conclude that the trial
8
The City argues that, regardless of the statutory language, the standard that the Auditor used for
determining statutory compliance should be binding on the Property Owners because they agreed to the
Auditor’s process in a pre-hearing conference. However, while the trial court’s order stated that the Property
Owners had agreed to allow the Auditor to compare the Remonstrance Petition signatures to property tax
duplicates, there is no evidence in the record that they agreed to the Auditor’s interpretation that any
signatures that did not match the property tax duplicates exactly would be disqualified. Further, as our
supreme court noted in Marshall County Tax Awareness Committee, restrictions that are not authorized by
statute are not enforceable. See 780 N.E.2d at 385. There, even though all three parties had signed a
“Memorandum of Understanding” concerning requirements for valid signatures on a petition, the
requirements that were not authorized by statute were unenforceable. See id.
9
We also need not address whether trustees or corporate representatives were required to prove that they
were authorized to sign the Remonstrance Petition on behalf of their trusts and/or corporations. When we
subtract the parcels whose authorized representatives testified at the hearing, only eight parcels remain at
issue. Even if we exclude these parcels from the total number of compliant signatures on the Petition and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1603-MI-510 | March 30, 2017 Page 19 of 20
court erred in dismissing the Remonstrance Petition on the basis that it did not
contain the necessary signatures, and we reverse the trial court’s decision.
[27] Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
assume that there are 626 total parcels in the Annexation Territory, the Property Owners still have a
sufficient percentage of signatures for standing—65.17%.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1603-MI-510 | March 30, 2017 Page 20 of 20
Certain Tell City Annexation Territory Landowners v. Tell City, Indiana
Combined Opinion