Germanowski v. Harris

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 16-1306

HEIDI GERMANOWSKI,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

PATRICIA HARRIS, individually and in her capacity as Register of
Deeds; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Mark G. Mastroianni, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr. and Nuciforo Law Group LLC on brief
for appellant.
Heather A. Valentine, Assistant Attorney General, Government
Bureau, and Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, on
brief for appellees.

April 12, 2017
 KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Heidi Germanowski challenges

the district court's order dismissing claims that her former

employer violated her rights under the Family and Medical Leave

Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611–2654. According to

Germanowski, the facts pleaded in her complaint plausibly allege

that her supervisor fired her because she sought leave protected

by the FMLA. We disagree and thus affirm.

I.

Because this appeal follows a dismissal pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we accept

as true all well-pleaded facts in Germanowski's complaint and draw

all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Carrero-Ojeda v.

Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 712 (1st Cir. 2014).

Germanowski worked at the Berkshire Middle District

Registry of Deeds for more than a decade, ascending the ranks from

Recording Clerk to First Assistant Register. For much of her

tenure, Germanowski worked alongside Patricia Harris, a defendant

in this action. They enjoyed a strong friendship in addition to

a collegial working relationship. But sometime after Harris became

Germanowski's supervisor in January 2013, their relationship began

to deteriorate, culminating in Germanowski's termination in

February 2015.

According to the complaint, the trouble started a little

over a year after Harris became Register. Germanowski, then

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serving as First Assistant Register, began experiencing stress and

anxiety accompanied by fatigue, hair loss, aches, and

gastrointestinal pain. She sought medical attention, visiting her

primary care physician and other healthcare providers. She kept

Harris abreast of her symptoms and physician visits.

A few months later, in June 2014, Harris allegedly began

pressuring Germanowski to support William Galvin, the Secretary of

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in his upcoming bid for

reelection. Germanowski twice refused Harris's requests to make

financial contributions to Secretary Galvin's campaign committee.

Around the time of Germanowski's second refusal, Harris reassigned

certain tasks from Germanowski to other employees and boxed her

out of management meetings and decisions. Harris also redoubled

her efforts to extract a financial contribution from Germanowski,

cautioning that "it would look bad" if she declined to make a

contribution and demanding that she defend her decision. Fearing

that her continued employment was contingent upon making a

contribution, Germanowski ultimately caved to the pressure in

August 2014 and contributed.

The following month, Germanowski visited her

gynecologist and complained of uncontrollable crying, weight loss,

anxiety, and other symptoms of stress. The gynecologist diagnosed

Germanowski with anxiety disorder. Once again, Germanowski

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apprised Harris that she was seeking medical care and reported her

symptoms.

Weeks after the diagnosis, in October 2014, Germanowski

suffered a nervous breakdown while working. Harris drove

Germanowski home, notwithstanding Germanowski's protests that

Harris was the cause of her stress and anxiety. Germanowski saw

her primary care physician, who prescribed medication and

instructed her to contact a therapist. Over the following week,

Germanowski tried to connect with Harris to discuss her absence

from work and arrange coverage of her responsibilities. When they

finally connected, "Harris accused Germanowski of disloyalty,

and . . . of inappropriately informing staff members about

Germanowski's condition." According to the complaint, these

accusations worsened Germanowski's physical and emotional state.

Germanowski informed Harris that she had begun treatment

with both a psychiatrist and a therapist. She then tried to return

to work on October 20, two and a half weeks after her nervous

breakdown, but Harris suggested another week of rest. They met at

the conclusion of that week and agreed to Germanowski's return to

work the following day, October 28.

The next several weeks were uneventful. In early

December, however, Harris asked a question of Germanowski in the

presence of another employee. Germanowski alleges that the

question was "intended . . . to embarrass and humiliate

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Germanowski, and to have significant emotional and physical

consequences for Germanowski," and that it did so. Germanowski's

complaint does not reveal what the question was.

Later that month, on Christmas Day, Germanowski received

a sport pistol from her husband as a gift. She told Harris, who

was familiar with Germanowski's sport shooting hobby.

Approximately one month later, on January 28, 2015, Harris called

Germanowski's husband to express her discomfort with the gift and

ask whether Germanowski carried it to work. Germanowski's husband

emphasized during their telephone conversation that Germanowski

posed no danger to herself or others and denied that his wife

carried the pistol at work.

The next day, Harris accused Germanowski of having an

affair. According to the complaint, the accusation--which lacked

any factual basis--was "made . . . to provoke a response from

Germanowski" and "had its intended effect." The complaint does

not describe that effect. It does allege that, later the same

day, Harris left Germanowski two voicemails directing her not to

come to work the following day, Friday, January 30. When

Germanowski went to the Registry building on the morning of

January 30 to drop off keys to a basement storage room, a court

security officer denied her access to the building. Germanowski

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claims that Harris told the officer and others than she posed a

safety threat.

Two days later, on Sunday, February 1, Harris sent

Germanowski a text message indicating that they needed to speak

that day because Harris would not have time to do so on Monday or

Tuesday. It is unclear from the complaint whether they connected

that day or whether Germanowski reported to work the following

day. But on the afternoon of Monday, February 2, Harris left word

with Germanowski not to come to work on February 3.

At this point, Germanowski feared that her employment

was "in jeopardy." She sent an email to Harris on February 3

stating "that she would be out sick for the week, and that she was

scheduled to see her doctor." Two days later, on February 5,

Germanowski saw her psychiatrist, who gave her a letter advising

her to take a leave of absence in order to pursue treatment.

Germanowski does not allege that she provided this letter to anyone

at the Registry or that anyone at the Registry otherwise obtained

it.

The next day, February 6, Germanowski received a

voicemail message from the chief court officer. The message stated

that Germanowski was terminated effective immediately. Moments

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later, Germanowski received a written termination notice from

Harris via email.

Germanowski brought this lawsuit against Harris

(individually and in her official capacity) and the Commonwealth

of Massachusetts, alleging in a five-count complaint that the

defendants violated the FMLA as well as Massachusetts statutory

and common law. According to the complaint, the defendants

violated Germanowski's FMLA rights, discriminated against her on

the basis of a covered impairment, illegally required her to

participate in prohibited political activity, and wrongfully

terminated her with actual malice.

In subsequent course, the district court granted a

motion by the defendants to dismiss the case under Rules 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court

dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds all of Germanowski's FMLA

claims against the Commonwealth as well as those FMLA claims

against Harris in her official capacity seeking monetary damages.

It then considered the remaining FMLA claims against Harris and

dismissed them because Germanowski's complaint failed to allege

facts stating, or supporting the inference, that Harris knew or

had reason to know at the time of Germanowski's termination that

Germanowski intended to take FMLA-protected leave. Because Harris

lacked such knowledge, the district court reasoned, it was

implausible that Harris acted on account of it when terminating

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Germanowski. Having dismissed Germanowski's FMLA claims with

prejudice, the district court declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismissed

them without prejudice. This appeal followed.

II.

A.

Germanowski appeals the portion of the district court's

order dismissing certain FMLA claims against Harris not barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. She also asks this court to order

reinstatement of her state law claims upon reversing the dismissal

of her FMLA claims. "We review orders granting motions to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, applying the same criteria as the

district court." Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 717 (emphasis

omitted). In undertaking this review, we ask whether the well-

pleaded factual allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, state a claim for which relief can be granted. See

Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). A complaint clears this hurdle

when the facts alleged, which we take as true, and the inferences

they support, which we draw in the plaintiff's favor, "plausibly

narrate a claim for relief." Schatz v. Republican State Leadership

Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). By "plausibly," we mean

"something more than merely possible," id., or "merely consistent

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with a defendant's liability," Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 11

(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

"It is not necessary to plead facts sufficient to

establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage." Rodríguez-

Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). But

this does not mean "that the elements of the prima facie case are

irrelevant to a plausibility determination in a discrimination

suit. . . . Those elements are part of the background against which

a plausibility determination should be made." Id. In order to

give rise to a "plausible" claim, a complaint must plead "factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. While this standard does not impose a

"probability requirement," it does require "more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Engaging

in this plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense." Id. at 679.

B.

The FMLA, in relevant part, entitles "an eligible

employee . . . to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-

month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that

makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position

of such employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The leave can be

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unpaid. Id. § 2612(c). "Upon an employee's return, her employer

must reinstate her to the same or an equivalent position, without

any loss of accrued seniority." Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 718

(citing Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d

325, 330 (1st Cir. 2005)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).

The pertinent regulations place the burden on the

employee to notify the employer of the need for such leave. See

29 C.F.R. § 825.303. Where the leave is unforeseeable, "an

employee must provide notice to the employer as soon as practicable

under the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Id.

§ 825.303(a). In providing such notice, the employee must supply

"sufficient information for an employer to reasonably determine

whether the FMLA may apply to the leave request." Id.

§ 825.303(b). What constitutes "sufficient information" depends

on whether the employee has received leave for that FMLA-qualifying

reason before. If she has, "the employee must specifically

reference either the qualifying reason for leave or the need for

FMLA leave." Id. If she has not, "the employee need not expressly

assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA." Id. In

either case, however, the employee does not satisfy this burden

merely by calling in sick. See id. ("Calling in 'sick' without

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providing more information will not be considered sufficient

notice to trigger an employer's obligations under the Act.").

To protect the exercise of the substantive rights

described above, the FMLA makes it "unlawful for any employer to

interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt

to exercise" such rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Under this

provision, employees may assert so-called "interference" claims

alleging deprivations of their substantive rights. Colburn, 429

F.3d at 331. We also permit employees to advance claims under a

"retaliation" theory based on their employers' "use [of] the taking

of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as

hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions." 29 C.F.R.

§ 825.220(c); see also Colburn, 429 F.3d at 330-32 (identifying

the basis of retaliation claims and exploring the overlap between

retaliation and interference claims).

Germanowski's complaint might be read as seeking to

assert both an interference claim and a retaliation claim. Without

objection, the district court so construed it. On appeal, however,

Germanowski focuses her challenge on the district court's

dismissal of her FMLA retaliation claim. This narrowing of

Germanowski's focus makes good sense because the interference

claim necessarily fails if Germanowski was properly discharged.

Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 722 ("[T]he FMLA does not protect an

employee from discharge for any reason while she is on leave--

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rather, . . . it protects her only from discharge because she

requests or takes FMLA leave."). We therefore also train our

analysis of this appeal on Germanowski's contention that the

district court erred in dismissing her FMLA retaliation claim.

C.

We begin with the elements of a prima facie case of FMLA

retaliation, which "are useful 'as a prism to shed light upon the

plausibility of a [plaintiff's] claim.'" Id. at 719 (alteration

in original) (quoting Rodríguez–Reyes, 711 F.3d at 54). The prima

facie case has three elements that Germanowski need establish:

"(1) she availed herself of a protected FMLA right; (2) she was

'adversely affected by an employment decision;' and (3) 'there was

a causal connection between [her] protected conduct and the adverse

employment action.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Orta–

Castro v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme Química P.R., Inc., 447 F.3d 105,

107 (1st Cir. 2006)).

Like the district court, we find that the complaint's

allegations lack a plausible theory of causation connecting

Germanowski's attempt to exercise FMLA rights and her termination.

Our reasons are slightly different than the district court's but

are entirely consistent with its result. See Rocket Learning,

Inc. v. Rivera-Sánchez, 715 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013).

The district court homed in on the February 3 email,

finding that it gave no notice that Germanowski was asserting any

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right to unpaid leave of up to twelve weeks for a serious health

condition.1 Rather, the cryptic email, within its four corners,

bore many of the attributes of a simple "[c]alling in 'sick'"

missive. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b). So construing it, the district

court reasoned that Harris could not have retaliated against

Germanowski for an assertion of FMLA rights that did not plausibly

appear to have been made. See Ameen v. Amphenol Printed Circuits,

Inc., 777 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2015) ("To demonstrate that he was

fired in retaliation for engaging in FMLA-protected conduct, [the

plaintiff] 'must show that the retaliator knew about [his]

protected activity--after all, one cannot have been motivated to

retaliate by something he was unaware of.'" (second alteration in

original) (quoting Medina–Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 139

(1st Cir. 2013))).

Germanowski's email certainly could have been more clear

concerning the reason for which she was missing work. See Collins

v. NTN-Bower Corp., 272 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding

that where plaintiff had previously advised supervisors of her

depression, which "incapacitated her on a particular day[,] she

could have made clear the 'serious' nature of her condition by

referring to knowledge already in the employer's possession"; by

1 Contrary to Germanowski's argument on appeal, the complaint
does not "detail[] the repeated communications she had with
defendants on and after February 2, 2014 regarding her leave." It
instead describes only one communication: this February 3 email.

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instead saying only that she was "sick," plaintiff "not only

withheld important information from the employer but likely threw

it off the scent").

We nevertheless do not settle on the lack of notice as

a reason to dismiss the complaint. The allegations here depict

Germanowski's employer as already knowing that she was suffering

from a chronic and significant health condition, symptoms of which

were recently obvious to her employer. In this context, a notice

that Germanowski would be out for the week and would be seeing her

doctor might arguably be read as informing her employer that she

would be absent due to a serious health condition.

We rest our decision, instead, on an alternative ground

addressed and argued in the parties' briefs on appeal. In a

nutshell, no matter how one interprets the February 3 email, the

allegations in the complaint fail to make it plausible that the

email triggered the firing. Rather, Germanowski's own allegations

make it almost certain that the decision to fire her was already

in the works and had nothing to do with the email.

To explain why this is so, we begin with the allegations

that describe Harris's treatment of Germanowski's prior illness-

related absences. The complaint alleges that, during the year

preceding Germanowski's termination, Harris consistently

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accommodated Germanowski when she felt unable to work.2 As best

the complaint reveals, whenever Germanowski asked to stay out of

work, Harris agreed, and there is no indication that Harris

required that the absences be unpaid or even reduced Germanowski's

available FMLA leave time. As Germanowski describes it, Harris

actually urged Germanowski to stay out longer during her leave of

absence in October 2014.3 This record provides poor soil in which

to plant a claim that Harris's receipt of a notice that Germanowski

would be out sick for the week precipitated Germanowski's

termination.

Germanowski's principal rejoinder is to urge an

inference of a causal link between the February 3 email and the

firing because the firing came fast on the heels of the email.

Certainly there are circumstances in which a "'[v]ery close'

temporal proximity between protected activity and an adverse

employment action can satisfy a plaintiff's burden of showing

causal connection." Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT & T Mobility P.R.,

2
Germanowski argues in her brief on appeal that Harris made
"relentless barbs and negative comments concerning . . . her leave
taking for months before she was discharged." That
characterization lacks support in the complaint's allegations.
3
Germanowski advances a perfunctory argument without any
cited support to the effect that we should ignore these pleaded
facts as merely pleading in the alternative. While we doubt this
is so, we need not decide because the argument is waived. See
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues
adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort
at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.").

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Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Calero–Cerezo v.

U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004)). Imagine

an employee with an unblemished record and steady performance who,

shortly after requesting FMLA leave, is terminated by her employer

without explanation. In such circumstances, temporal proximity

would most likely suffice to allege a plausible claim. At the

same time, the notion that temporal proximity is not always enough

must also be correct. Imagine an employee shoots her boss,

immediately asks for FMLA leave, and gets fired the next day. We

would hope that our common sense would protect us from saying that

the close proximity between the FMLA request and the termination

makes retaliation plausible.

Here, there was no shooting. But the allegations relate

a history of an emotionally fraught and longstanding dispute

between the employer and the employee, an expressed fear by the

employer that the employee may have brought a gun to work, and a

subsequent lock-out of the employee, all in a context that caused

even Germanowski to suspect imminent termination, and all before

she sent her email saying she would be out sick. To think that an

employer in such a case fired Germanowski because she asked for

some time off while she was already locked out is to suggest that

common sense borne of real world experience has no role to play in

the plausibility analysis. We think otherwise. As the district

court observed, the "FMLA is not a tool an employee can use to

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delay or avoid a termination." Germanowski v. Harris, No. 15-CV-

30070, 2016 WL 696097, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2016).

Germanowski's remaining arguments fare even worse. She

contends that Harris was out to get her, intentionally aggravated

her condition, and began taking away her responsibilities. But

that, too, all preceded the February 3 email, and thus cuts against

the causal connection Germanowski's complaint need make plausible.

Germanowski alleges that Harris accused her of disloyalty for

telling other employees about her condition, but she offers no

reason why such an accusation bears on the issue at hand. All in

all, her arguments--even considered cumulatively--simply reinforce

the plausibility of other, preexisting motives behind a

termination that had been set in motion before the February 3

email.

To summarize, the only issue raised on appeal is whether

the complaint plausibly alleges that Harris terminated Germanowski

in retaliation for asserting rights protected by the FMLA. Pagán-

Colón v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.

2012) ("[A] crucial component of an FMLA retaliation claim is some

animus or retaliatory motive on the part of the plaintiff's

employer that is connected to protected conduct."). For the

foregoing reasons, we agree with the district court that it does

not.

Affirmed.

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