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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
KENYATTA HOLLOWAY
No. 3758 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order November 16, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009122-2015
BEFORE: BOWES AND MOULTON, JJ., AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2017
The Commonwealth appeals from the order denying its request to
refile charges of first-degree murder or murder generally against Appellee,
Kenyatta Holloway. We reverse and remand.
This matter arose following the death of Antoine Wilkinson. On March
28, 2015, Appellee and Wilkinson were living together. Appellee’s ten-year-
old brother, J.F., overheard Appellee and Wilkinson become ensnared in a
heated argument regarding Wilkinson’s alleged rough treatment of
Appellee’s three-year-old son, and objects breaking while the two adults
loudly argued. When J.F. entered the room, Appellee told him to go outside
with her son. J.F. complied, but soon after, was called back into the
residence.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Upon returning, the boy observed Wilkinson sitting on the floor.
Unbeknownst to the boy, Wilkinson was either dead or dying. Appellee
directed him to clean up broken glass scattered throughout the house. As
they cleaned, Wilkinson did not move, and J.F. noticed a knife on the floor
nearby. The police arrived some time later; however, when they arrived,
the knife was no longer in the living room.
Wilkinson died of a single, fatal stab wound to his chest. Appellee
spoke with Detective Jeff Burke who was assigned to investigate the death.
She told Detective Burke that Wilkinson had returned home with the stab
wound, apparently inflicted by a third-party. Appellee identified that person,
but further investigation proved this recounting of events to be fabricated.
Appellee was arrested and charged with murder generally and possession of
an instrument of crime.
On September 9, 2015, a preliminary hearing was held before the
Philadelphia municipal court. The Commonwealth proffered the testimony of
J.F., Detective Burke, and stipulated to the contents of the medical
examiner’s report as to Wilkinson’s cause of death. Nevertheless, the court
barred the Commonwealth from pursuing a first degree murder charge,
finding no evidence that Appellee exhibited a specific intent to kill Wilkinson.
On September 14, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a notice of its intent
to refile the criminal complaint. The court held a hearing on the matter on
November 16, 2015, and after considering additional evidence, denied the
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Commonwealth’s motion to refile the criminal complaint including a charge
for first degree murder. The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal and
complied with the trial court’s directive to file a Rule 1925(b) statement of
matters complained of on appeal. The court authored its Rule 1925(a)
opinion and this matter is now ripe for review.
The Commonwealth brings one issue to our attention: “Did the lower
court err in declining to permit refiling of the charge of murder of the first
degree or murder generally where the evidence was sufficient to establish a
prima facie case that [Appellee] fatally stabbed the victim in the chest?”
Commonwealth’s brief at 1.
At a preliminary hearing the Commonwealth must establish a prima
facie case. Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80 A.3d 780, 788 (Pa.Super.
2013). A prima facie case requires evidence tending to prove the existence
of each material element of the charged offenses and probable cause to
believe the defendant committed the crimes such that, if that evidence were
proffered at trial, the court would be warranted in presenting the case to the
finder-of-fact. Id. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case is a question of law. Thus, our
standard of review is plenary, and we are not bound by the legal
determinations of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d
1109, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2016).
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When determining whether the Commonwealth established a prima
facie case, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and we are to consider all reasonable inferences based on
that evidence which could support a guilty verdict.” Commonwealth v.
Landis, 48 A.3d 432, 444 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted). This
standard “does not require that the Commonwealth prove the accused’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage.” Id. (citation omitted). Instead,
the Commonwealth must simply present evidence of each element of the
crime charged. Id.
To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the court must find
that: (1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the defendant was
responsible for the killing; and (3) the defendant acted with malice and a
specific intent to kill, that is, a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.”
Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 490 (Pa. 2015); 18 Pa.C.S. §
2502(a), (d). Specific intent to kill can be proven through circumstantial
evidence, such as the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s
body. Commonwealth v. Mattison, 82 A.3d 386, 392 (Pa. 2013).
The trial court determined that the Commonwealth failed to produce
evidence of Appellee’s specific intent to kill Wilkinson. The court asserted
that the evidence proffered by the Commonwealth demonstrated that
Appellee and Wilkinson were involved in a heated argument. It observed
that, “[a] single stab would under these circumstances, during a mutual
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affray, clearly demonstrates legal malice.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/16, at
5. However, it stated that, “without more, a finding of specific intent to kill
would be based on speculation rather than reasonable inference.” Id.
Moreover, the court was not persuaded that Appellee’s post-incident attempt
to cover-up Wilkinson’s death was probative of her intent to kill him. It
discounted this evidence, and further referred to the Commonwealth’s
reliance on evidence that Appellee used a deadly weapon on a vital area as a
“quasi-presumption.” Id. at 6. Thus, it concluded that the Commonwealth
had not met its burden of presenting evidence of every element of first
degree murder.
The Commonwealth assails the trial court’s ruling that it failed to
produce evidence of Appellee’s specific intent to kill Wilkinson, contending
that the evidence that Appellee stabbed the victim in the chest creates an
inference that she specifically intended to kill him. In addition, it asserts
that Appellee’s specific intent is bolstered by her attempt to conceal her
involvement in the homicide, first by cleaning up the crime scene, and then
by falsely accusing a third-party of committing the crime. The
Commonwealth reasons that the trial court’s reliance on the mutuality of the
altercation does not preclude the possibility that Appellee intended to
murder Wilkinson. The Commonwealth concludes that, when considering
this evidence together, it offered sufficient proof to establish a prima facie
case that Appellee stabbed Wilkinson with the intent to kill him. We agree.
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At the first preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth offered the
testimony of Appellee’s brother, J.F., who recounted the events leading up to
Wilkinson’s death. J.F. intimated that, during a heated exchange with the
victim, Appellee directed him to leave the house. Preliminary Hearing,
9/9/15, at 14. When he reentered the house, his sister did not call 9-1-1,
but rather, instructed him to help clear the broken glass scattered
throughout the house. Id. at 15; 17. Moreover, the alleged murder
weapon, which had been lying on the floor near Wilkinson, disappeared
before police arrived. Id. at 18-19. J.F. stated that he did not move the
knife, but that it had been moved. Id. at 19.
The Commonwealth also entered a stipulation as to Wilkinson’s cause
of death. It produced a medical examiner’s report indicating that he died
from a single stab to the lower anterior chest wall, which penetrated his left
lung and lacerated the left main pulmonary artery. Id. at 31-32. Finally,
the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective Burke who was
responsible for the homicide investigation. Detective Burke indicated that,
upon arriving at the scene of the murder, Appellee stated that Wilkinson had
returned home with the wound, and that the wound was inflicted by a third
party. Id. at 33-34. That person was identified, but further investigation
proved that the third party did not stab the victim. Id. at 34.
A second hearing was held after the Commonwealth refiled the
criminal complaint. At this hearing, the Commonwealth again offered
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testimony by Detective Burke. Detective Burke relayed further information
obtained during his ongoing investigation from Wilkinson’s brother, C.W.
C.W. had provided the detective with information regarding an earlier
incident in the summer of 2014 between Appellee and Wilkinson wherein
Appellee had purportedly attacked Wilkinson with a razor blade. Preliminary
Hearing, 11/16/15, at 7-8. C.W. then supplied the detective with
photographs of Wilkinson’s alleged injuries.
Upon our review of the certified record, the trial court did not give
effect to the reasonable inferences available to support intent. The court
grounded its conclusion on its belief that a single stab wound to a vital part
of the body inflicted during an argument is a mere “quasi-presumption,”
which it found could not alone support a finding that Appellee acted with the
requisite intent to kill when she stabbed Wilkinson. Although it is not clear
from the trial court’s opinion what a “quasi-presumption” is, we find that the
evidence, when considered as a whole, is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of first degree murder.
As noted above, the trial court determined that Appellee’s behavior
before and after Wilkinson’s slaying was probative of malice, but not intent.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/14/15, at 5-6. Indeed, it stated that, without more
evidence, a finding of specific intent would be based on “speculation.” Id. at
5. We agree with the court that Appellee’s behavior is proof of legal malice,
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but disagree that the additional evidence does not support the reasonable
inference that Appellee had the specific intent to kill Wilkinson.
Instantly, we can reasonably infer from the circumstances outlined
above that Appellee’s conduct on the day in question evidences that Appellee
deliberately killed Wilkinson. Despite being engrossed in an animated
exchange, Appellee ordered her brother to exit the house. Shortly
thereafter, she called him in to help clean up the evidence of her battle with
Wilkinson. In the interim, Appellee attacked and killed the victim by
stabbing him in a vital portion of his body. A reasonable person could find
that Appellee had formulated a plan to kill Wilkinson, but did not want her
brother and son present for the encounter. Following the attack on
Wilkinson, Appellee did not call the paramedics, but rather, evinced a
determination to avoid accountability. Not only did she hide the supposed
murder weapon before police appeared at her house, when they did arrive,
she deceived the officers as to the cause of Wilkinson’s death.
Although there is no indication that Appellee formed her intent to kill
Wilkinson prior to their argument on the day in question, the period of
premeditation necessary to form the specific intent to kill may be very brief
and can be formulated in a fraction of a second. Commonwealth v.
Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731, 746 (Pa. 2015). When we view this evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and in light of the presumption
that the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body raises the factual
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presumption of a specific intent to kill, we can reasonably infer that Appellee
possessed the conscious purpose to slay Wilkinson when she stabbed him in
the chest, and then sought to cover up her crime. Landis, supra. These
actions not only corroborate a consciousness of guilt, but also substantiate
the inference that Appellee formulated a plan to murder Wilkinson, albeit
during a heated dispute, and then carried out that plan in order to escape
prosecution for his death.
The evidence proffered by the Commonwealth supports the
presumption that Appellee acted with specific intent to kill when she used a
deadly weapon on a vital part of his body. Thus, for the purposes of
establishing a prima facie case, we find that the Commonwealth bore its
burden of supplying probable cause to believe the defendant committed first
degree murder such that, if that evidence were proffered at trial, the court
would be warranted in presenting the case to the finder-of-fact.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/13/2017
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