SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Qing Lin, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the BIA’s affir-mance of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Qing Lin, No. A200 594 144 (B.I.A. Mar. 30, 2015), aff'g No. A200 594 144 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Feb. 26, 2013).
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA, see Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005), applying well established standards of review, see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). In so doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
For asylum applications like Lin’s, the agency, upon “[cjonsidering the totality of the circumstances,” may base a credibility finding on the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of her account, and. inconsistencies in her statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We defer therefore to an IJ’s credibility determination unless ... it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 167.
Here, the agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies among Lin’s testimony, the testimony of her alleged uncle, and a letter from her alleged cousin regarding whether they were related. See Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 166-67. Specifically, Lin referred to the cousin as either sponsor or cousin, but the cousin’s affidavit said Lin was his nephew, while the uncle, who was called as a witness to corroborate Lin’s church attendance, claimed not to know the cousin (who allegedly was his son) and denied that he and Lin were related. These inconsistencies alone are sufficient support for the adverse-credibility determination because they indicate that Lin fabricated her claim of continuing church attendance. See Siewe v. Gonzales, *93 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“So a single false document or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”). When confronted with these discrepancies, Lin gave a series of inconsistent responses that did fully explain the contradicting evidence. The IJ was not required to credit Lin’s various shifting justifications. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The adverse credibility determination is further supported by an inconsistency between Lin’s testimony and documentary evidence regarding her practice of Christianity in China. She confirmed that she first attended church in China on June 21, 2009, but submitted a letter from the church that she accepted Jesus Christ as her savior on June 1, 2009. The agency was not required to accept Lin’s explanation that the letter contained an error. See id.
Given the multiple inconsistencies within and among the testimony and documentary evidence, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 165-66. That finding is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).