J-A09032-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: S.A.K., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: A.M.K., MOTHER : No. 1621 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree September 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2014-0180
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 19, 2017
Appellant, A.M.K. (“Mother”), appeals from the decree entered in the
York County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court, which granted the
petition of the York County Office of Children, Youth & Families (“Agency”)
for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to her minor child,
S.A.K. (“Child”). We affirm.
In its opinions, the Orphans’ Court fully and correctly set forth the
relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no
reason to restate them.
Mother raises one issue for our review:
WHETHER THE [ORPHANS’] COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN INVOLUNTARILY TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MOTHER WHEN MOTHER, SINCE
THE PREVIOUS TERMINATION ORDER, HAD ACHIEVED,
INDEPENDENTLY AND WITHOUT THE HELP OF AGENCY,
THE GOALS OF STABLE HOUSING, STABLE EMPLOYMENT
AND MENTAL STABILITY?
J-A09032-17
(Mother’s Brief at 7).
Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent
evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate
consideration to the effect of such a decree on the welfare
of the child.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. … We must
employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record
in order to determine whether the trial court’s
decision is supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the
finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility
of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is
on the party seeking termination to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The standard of clear and convincing evidence means
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We
may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
-2-
J-A09032-17
exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197,
1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings
are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an
opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92
(Pa.Super. 2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d
1165 (2008)).
Agency filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights to Child on the following relevant grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
-3-
J-A09032-17
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing
and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b).
“Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any one
subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the
subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., supra at 1117.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section
2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination of…her parental rights does
the court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs
-4-
J-A09032-17
and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make
diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities.” Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of
In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the
petitioner for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley,
719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998).
“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires
that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six
months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child
continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the
-5-
J-A09032-17
needs and welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118.
“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the
following factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed
from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76
(Pa.Super. 2003). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12–month time frame for a
parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal by the
court.” In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12–
month period has been established, the court must next determine whether
the conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite the
reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time
period. Id. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the
court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to remedy the
conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of
Agency services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa.Super.
2003); In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
-6-
J-A09032-17
court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,
paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the
bond.” Id. Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and have…her rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d
1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association
with the child.
-7-
J-A09032-17
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental
duty requires that a parent exert [herself] to take and
maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of…her ability, even in difficult circumstances.
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve
the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with his or her physical and
emotional needs.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of…her child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill…her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Andrea
Marceca Strong, we conclude Mother’s issue merits no relief. The Orphans’
Court opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the question
presented. (See Orphans’ Court Opinions, filed September 2, 2016, at 21-
40, and October 28, 2016, at 2-7, respectively) (finding: Child was placed in
foster care in August, 2013, due to Agency’s concerns regarding Mother’s
-8-
J-A09032-17
mental health, instability, lack of housing, employment, and drug use;
Mother’s mental condition rendered her incapable of appropriately parenting
Child; Mother refused to acknowledge her mental health concerns and
completely abandoned treatment, despite credible testimony that indicated
Mother required ongoing therapy; Mother is unlikely to remedy her mental
health condition in foreseeable future; throughout proceedings, Mother failed
to maintain suitable housing long enough to achieve reunification and has
lived in 14 different places since Child’s adjudication; despite significant tax
refund and assistance from Agency, Mother refused to prioritize housing for
Child, and she is unlikely to maintain stable housing for Child in reasonable
timeframe; Mother had been employed for 10 weeks at time of July, 2016
hearing, but was unemployed for 8 months prior to her new job; Mother
could not produce pay stubs to establish income at any other time during
proceedings; Mother is unable to support Child financially because she
cannot properly manage her money or maintain budget; Mother consistently
tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana since Child was removed;
Mother demonstrated she is unwilling to cooperate with services designed to
assist her in reunification with Child; Mother was not credible witness and
has not been forthcoming with information with court or Agency; Child has
lived in foster care since his adjudication because Mother remained incapable
of providing Child with essential parental care, control, and subsistence
necessary for Child’s well-being; Child has lived with foster mother for
-9-
J-A09032-17
majority of his life; Child has stronger bond with foster mother than with
Mother, and calls foster mother “mommy;” foster mother provides Child with
safe, stable environment, which Mother cannot offer Child; foster mother
cooperated with Agency and facilitated ongoing biological family contact with
Child; foster mother acts with Child’s best interests in mind; termination of
Mother’s parental rights was proper pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (a)(5),
(a)(8), and (b)). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the Orphans’ Court’s
opinions.1
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/19/2017
____________________________________________
1
On April 3, 2017, Mother filed an application to correct the original record
in the above-captioned case, at Orphans’ Court No. 2014-0180. In the
motion she requests incorporation of a transcript from the Status Hearing
held on July 18, 2016, along with the Status Review Order and the Updated
Family Service Plan in the juvenile dependency action, at No. CP-67-DP-
0170-2013. The proposed supplement appears to be from a separate case
at another docket number, and Mother fails to explain its relevance to the
instant appeal. Accordingly, we deny the motion to supplement the certified
record as proposed, but without prejudice to Mother to seek that relief
before the appropriate division of the Orphans’ Court.
- 10 -
Circulated 04/07/2017 11:03 AM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
In Re: Adoption of
'$. 1-<. No. 2014-0180
A Minor Termination of Parental Rights
APPEARANCES:
Ci
if J i!.i
.... cr-.
Martin Miller, Esquire David Worley, Esquire g (/) ;;; .
Office of Children, Youth & Families
Guardian Ad Litem
Edward Lecates, Esquire -ur r','j =o -
For Mother, A.#,.,. k. i>:c: ~·:·c
-l
......!
ADJUDICATION
Presently before the Court is the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights of A. M. I<. to the above-captioned minor child filed on December 16,
2014. Evidentiary hearings were held on March 12, 2015 and March 20, 2015. The Final
Decree terminating Mother's parental rights was issued on May 8, 2015. Mother then filed an
appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which vacated the decree terminating her parental
rights. Following a remand by the Superior Court on May 17, 2016, an evidentiary hearing
was scheduled for July 5, 2016. Evidence was presented on that date, and the Court scheduled
an additional continued hearing to permit Mother to present further evidence on July 7, 2016.
Evidence was also presented on that date.
Based upon the evidence presented at the hearings on July s" and July ill, 2016, and
upon consideration of the record, the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
of Mother to : is GRANTED for the reasons outlined herein.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The record docketed at CP-67-DP-170-2013 with the Clerk of Courts in the Court of
Common Pleas in York County was incorporated into the Orphans' Court record docketed
as above with no objection.
2. C.~Jd (hereinafter "S.K.") was born November 2011.
3. A. J.\./<, (hereinafter "Mother") is the natural mother of S.K.
4. o. Cs-. (hereinafter "Father") is the biological father of S.K. Father's parental
rights have previously been terminated by decree entered on May 8, 2015; the reasons for
that termination were set forth in a previous Adjudication, which was not appealed.
5. An Application for Emergency Custody in the related Dependency action was filed by the
Agency on August 5, 2013. The allegations included:
a. On or about August 3, 2013, the Agency received a referral regarding the minor
child, S.K., due to allegations of homelessness and lack of supervision.
b. Allegations received were that the mother and the minor child were "living out of'
a car; there were also two small dogs inside the vehicle.
c. The car was parked on the street by Albemarle Park.
d. The mother requested a woman to assist her in "jump starting" the vehicle.
e. The woman requested that her son assist and he drove over to the mother's vehicle.
f. The man's dog jumped out of his car and was hit by another vehicle.
g. The man and the mother got into his car and drove the man's dog to a veterinarian;
the mother left her son and the two small dogs in the car.
2
h. The woman stood by the car and watched the minor child.
1. Upon the mother's return to her vehicle, she was allegedly acting and speaking
erratically [sic].
J. The York City Police were contacted and responded to the scene.
k. The mother stated that the father was a C>. 6-. J • however, was unable to
provide his address or telephone number.
1. The mother was transported to the York Hospital Psychiatric Unit where she was
admitted on a 302 commitment.
m. The York City Police Department took twenty-four hour protective custody of the
minor child on August 3, 2013.
n. On August 4, 2013, the Court was contacted and verbally awarded temporary legal
and physical custody of the minor child, S.K, to the Agency for continued foster-
care placement.
6. An Order to Reaffirm the Verbal Order, Schedule Protective Custody Hearing, and
Summons was entered on August 5, 2013.
7. A Shelter Care Order was filed on August 13, 2013. Legal and physical custody of S.K.
were awarded to the Agency. S.K.'s placement in foster care continued. Mother was
afforded supervised visitation with S.K. twice per week.
8. A Dependency Petition was filed regarding S.K. on August 14, 2015. The allegations set
forth in the Dependency Petition were consistent with the allegations in the Application
for Emergency Custody, but included several additional averments, including:
3
a. The mother was discharged from York Hospital on August 7, 2013 and has been
__ _ ---------~~~i~~-~~!~~-!~-~~-nd in York, Pennsylvania but cannot_continue there because of_her _
dogs.
b. The mother indicated she is in the process of securing an apartment from a friend;
she will be staying with her dogs in a hotel until she secures that apartment.
c. The mother allegedly has mental health issues and is prescribed Carbamazepine
and Fluphenazine.
9. Mother requested county-paid court-appointed counsel on August 19, 2013. In an Order
filed on August 20, 2013, the Court appointed Attorney Gillian Woodward to represent
Mother. At the time of the October 7, 2013 expedited review, Mother indicated a desire to
secure alternate counsel. Attorney Woodward agreed to remain Mother's counsel until
new counsel entered an appearance or Mother executed an entry of appearance form.
10. An Order of Adjudication and Disposition was entered on August 20, 2013 after
consideration of the petition and by the agreement of all parties. The contents of that
Order are hereby incorporated as if set forth more fully herein. The findings of the Court
in that Order include, but are not limited to:
a. Mother is returning to the home of her husband, but does not have stable housing
at this point. She has recently been released from York Hospital after a 302
admission. Father acknowledges that he is not a resource for the child at this time.
He does admit to paternity.
4
b. S.K. is to be placed, by the agency, in foster-care placement. S.K.'s placement is
the least restrictive alternative that meets the needs of the child and there is no less
restrictive alternative available, in that: neither parent is a resource for the minor
child at this time and no relative has yet been approved, whereby foster-care
placement is the least restrictive alternative available.
c. Maternal grandmother." . '., may also have supervised visits with the
view toward possible placement of the child with the maternal grandmother.
d. The child is safe in the current placement setting.
e. The current placement goal for the Child is return to parent or guardian.
f. The Court specified the following tests to occur: random drug and alcohol screens
of parents and maternal grandparents
g. Legal and physical custody of the minor child, S.K., shall continue in the Agency
for continued foster-care placement until further review for family placement.
11. As part of the Court-Ordered Services/Conditions appendixed to the August 20, 2013
Order, the Court ordered certain directives, which included but were not limited to the
following:
a. Mother shall maintain safe, stable and appropriate housing for the minor(s) and
shall maintain stable, lawful income to support the minor(s), and shall provide
proof of such to the Agency.
b. Mother shall cooperate in obtaining a psychological evaluation which shall be
performed by agreed upon evaluator or another appropriate organization or
5
evaluator. The named person(s) shall contact the designated evaluator, or an
appropriate organization or evaluator approved by the Agency to do the
evaluation, within 10 days of this date, and the evaluation shall be completed, and
the results made known to the Agency within 60 days of today's date. The named
person(s) shall follow through with any recommendations made as a result of any
evaluation conducted in this matter.
c. Mother shall attend counseling sessions with Wellspan Behavioral Health at Edgar
Square or another qualified counselor.
d. Mother shall cooperate with the following services: in-home team, Justice Works.
e. Supervised visitation at the Agency between S.K. and Mother from 9:00 a.m. to
11 :00 a.m. on Tuesday and Thursday. Father shall contact Agency to schedule his
visit.
f. Mother will cooperate and comply with the recommendations made upon
discharge from Wellspan Crisis.
g. Parents shall execute an acknowledgement of paternity.
12. A 45-Day Expedited Review occurred on October 7, 2013. The findings made by the
Court have been incorporated as if set forth more fully herein.
13. By November 13, 2013, Mother was exercising three visits per week. At that time, the
Court approved partially unsupervised contact.
14. Mother requested assistance from CPC.1 She was denied assistance.
I
CPC is the Community Progress Council. The Court is familiar with this community program that promotes
6
15. A Permanency Review hearing originally scheduled for January 21, 2014 was continued
until January 29, 2014 at Mother's request. She requested the continuance in order to
obtain alternative counsel and give the new counsel the opportunity to review the case.
16. A Permanency Review Order was entered on January 29, 2014. In said Order, the Court
made various findings and directives. The Order is incorporated as if set forth more fully
herein. The Court's findings included, but were not limited to:
a. The placement of the child continues to be necessary and appropriate.
b. There has been minimal compliance with the permanency plan as to the mother.
c. Mother has made minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated placement.
d. The current placement goal for the child is return to parent or guardian. The
projected date by which the goal for the child might be achieved is undetermined
due to lack of progress by his parents. It is hopeful that he can be returned within
three to six months, but unlikely in that time. The concurrent placement plan for
the child is placement with a fit and willing relative.
e. Legal and physical custody shall remain with the Agency.
f. Placement of the Child remains in foster-care placement with Christina Brooks.
17. As part of the Court-Ordered Services/Conditions appendixed to the January 29, 2014
Order, the Court ordered certain directives, which included but were not limited to the
following:
self-sufficiency for low- to moderate-income residents of York County. CPC provides emergency assistance
with food, heat, and other basic needs, as well as assistance with housing.
7
a. Mother shall maintain safe, stable and appropriate housing for the minor(s) and
...
shall maintain stable, lawful income to support the minor(s),
·•· ···-·
··•····
and shall provide .
proof of such to the Agency.
b. Mother shall attend counseling sessions. The counseling shall be Individual
Counseling.
c. Mother shall cooperate with Justice Works.
18. At the January 29, 2014 Permanency Review hearing, a Mental Health Evaluation Report
dated January 25, 2014 was entered as Mother's Exhibit 1. In the report, which was
drafted by Deborah Hill and based on two appointments with Mother where Mother self-
reported, Ms. Hill relayed that Mother's stressors were stated as: severe, lost custody of
child, legal issues, new job, unstable housing, and family of origin conflict. Ms. Hill
recommended the following course of treatment: (1) continued tri-monthly medication
management with her primary care physician; (2) continue counseling to improve personal
stability by learning and using self-evaluation techniques to improve judgment making
skills and improve quality of life through employment, stable housing and transportation;
and (3) continue to cooperate and work toward completion of Children and Youth goals in
order to regain custody of her son.
19. It was additionally reported that Mother disclosed she was not taking her prescribed
medication, though she was testing positive for amphetamines. Mother failed to attend a
medication check appointment scheduled at Edgar Square, despite the recommendationto
do so by Ms. Hill.
8
20. A Status Hearing Order was entered on April 21, 2014. Its contents are incorporated as if
set forth more fully herein. Mother struggled to maintain housing and employment.
. . ...• -···" . . ····-·····-··-·· ... ······---- ..·········
Additionally, Mother was not arriving timely to visits with S.K., as well as other court
proceedings. Finally, Mother did not complete a budget with or without the assistance of
the team. Despite securing a significant tax refund, she did not utilize the funds to secure
housing.
21. On June 20, 2014, Mother entered her appearance as a self-represented party.
22. A Permanency Review Order was entered on June 23, 2014. In said Order, the Court
made various findings and directives. The Order is incorporated as if set forth more fully
herein. The Court's findings included, but were not limited to:
a. The placement of the child continues to be necessary and appropriate.
b. There has been minimal compliance with the permanency plan as to the mother.
c. Mother has made no progress toward alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated placement. A recommendation was made to increase counseling and
to establish community support.
d. The current placement goal for the child is return to parent or guardian. The
projected date by which the goal for the child might be achieved is undetermined
due to lack of progress by his parents. The concurrent placement plan for the child
is placement with a fit and willing relative. The permanency plan developed for
this child, dated January 29, 2014 is appropriate and feasible except that it shall be
modified or supplemented as follows: Agency to explore permanency options for
9
the child, including change of the concurrent goal to adoption given the lack of
progress by the parents and failure of any viable
--·
family to come forward
,....
to. be. a
resource for the child. Although the maternal grandmother has contact, she has
indicated that she is not a resource for Child. Father has not had any contact and
has not shown any interest in his son.
e. Legal and physical custody shall remain with the Agency.
f. Placement of the Child remains in foster-care placement with Christina Brooks.
23. As part of the Court-Ordered Services/Conditions appendixedto the June 23, 2014 Order,
the Court ordered certain directives, which included but were not limited to the following:
a. Mother shall maintain safe, stable and appropriate housing for the minor(s) and
shall maintain stable, lawful income to support the minor(s), and shall provide
proof of such to the Agency.
b. Mother shall attend counseling sessions. The counseling shall be Individual
Counseling.
c. Mother shall cooperate with Justice Works.
24. From January until April 2014, Ms. Hill was meeting with Mother twice per week, though
at some point they decreased.
25. A Status Hearing Order was entered on September 22, 2014. Its contents are incorporated
as if set forth more fully herein. Mother continued to lack stable housing and
employment. Though she continued to have visits, she was frequently late and
occasionally missed visits.
lO
26. A Blended Perspective Meeting was held November 4, 2014.
27. A Permanency Review Order was entered on December 3, 2014. In said Order, the Court
.......• 1 .
made various findings and directives. The Order is incorporated as if set forth more fully
herein. The Court's findings included, but were not limited to:
a. The placement of the child continues to be necessary and appropriate.
b. There has been minimal compliance with the permanency plan as to the Mother.
She continued to lack stable employment. Though she had stable housing, she
stopped paying her rent once the Team closed. She continued to attend visits but
was also frequently late for her visits. Mother also refused to cooperate with drug
testing and services.
c. Mother has made minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated placement.
d. The current placement goal for the child is return to parent or guardian. The
projected date by which the goal for the child might be achieved is unlikely given
Mother's lack of progress. The concurrent placement plan for the child is adoption.
The concurrent goal shall be pursued by the Agency as the primary goal given the
lack of progress by S.K.'s parents.
e. Legal and physical custody shall remain with the Agency.
f. Placement of the Child remains in foster-care placement with Christina Brooks.
11
28. As part of the Court-Ordered Services/Conditions appendixed to the December 3, 2014
Order, the Court ordered certain directives, which included but were not limited to the
following:
a. Mother shall maintain safe, stable and appropriate housing for the minor(s) and
shall maintain stable, lawful income to support the minor(s), and shall provide
proof of such to the Agency.
b. Mother shall attend counseling sessions ... The counseling shall be Individual
Counseling.
c. Mother will provide the Agency with pay stubs, paid rent receipts or escrow
account and paid utility receipts.
29. On December 16, 2014, the Petition for Hearing to Change Court-Ordered Goal was filed
by the Agency.'
30. The Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights related to both Mother and
Father was filed on December 16, 2014.
31. Mother filed a Petition for Leave to Proceed In F orma Pauperis on January 2, 2015. She
also filed a document she titled a "Petition/Motion for Appeal of Child Dependency
Hearing Held December 3, 2014" on January 2, 2015. A number of documents, some
handwritten and others modified by Mother, were attached to the petition. She also filed a
"Petition/Motion for the Request of Following Transcripts Listed Below" on January 2,
2015. No Certificates of Service were filed regarding these petitions. The Court later
2
The court need not change the primary goal to adoption in order to terminate parental rights. However, once
rights are terminated, the primary goal of reunification is no longer appropriate or feasible, and a new goal would
then be established.
12
became independently aware of the existence of the documents. Without notice of the
documents, the Court was unable to timely rule upon them.
32. On February 20, 2015, the Court heard evidence on the termination petition as it related to
Father.
a. After the hearing, the Court found that the Agency had established by clear and
convincing evidence that Father had failed to perform parental duties on behalf of
the child for at least six months prior to the filing of the petition. 23 Pa. C.S. §
25JJ(a)(l).
b. The Court further found that Father's parental rights would best serve the child's
needs and welfare. 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511 (a)(b).
c. A Final Decree terminating Father's rights was issued on May 8, 2015.
d. No appeal was taken by Father.
33. On March 12, 2015, the Court heard evidence on the termination petition as it related to
Mother, as well as a Status Review hearing.
a. Mother appeared late to the hearing on March 12.
b. After the hearing, the Court directed that the parties attend a continued hearing on
the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights, and change the goal. The Court further
outlined specific deadlines to exchange exhibits. The parties were directed to
appear at 8:30 a.m. on March 20, 2016.
c. Mother appeared late to hearing on March 20, 2016.
13
d. The Court found that Mother had attended most of her visits. Mother had new
housing, but unverified employment. Mother had resumed drug testing, and tested
positive for THC on two occasions.
e. During the Status Review, the Court found that S.K. was doing well with his foster
placement, and there were no concerns. Evidence showed S.K. had formed a bond
with his foster mother.
f. After the hearing, the Court terminated Mother's parental rights with a Final
Decree and Opinion issued on May 8, 2015.
g. Mother filed her Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on June 8,
2015.
h. On May 17, 2016, the Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded the case and vacated
the Order Terminating Mother's rights as the Agency failed to file a copy of the
notice that provided Mother with notice of her right to be represented by counsel.
1. Upon remand, this Court appointed Attorney Edward LeCates to represent
Mother's interests for the rehearing as he had assisted with her appeal.
34. On July 5, 2016, and July 7, 2016, this Court conducted a rehearing on the Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Mother's rights. The Court considered the following credible
evidence:
a. Throughout the 35 months that S.K. has been dependent, Mother has been
noncompliant with the Agency. The main goals established for Mother by the
14
Agency were to secure stable housing, to maintain a stable income, and to work on
her mental health. Mother made minimal to no progress.
b. The Agency was aware of the following addresses for Mother since the
adjudication of S.K. in August 2013: at an efficiency in the Midway Hotel at 211
North Main Street in York, Pennsylvania from August 20, 2013 until December
12, 2013; with a friend at the Midway Hotel from December 13, 2013 until
December 17, 2013; at the Super 8 Motel in York, Pennsylvania from December
18, 2013 until December 22, 2013; with the same friend at the Midway Hotel,
Chateau Motel, and the Travelodge at various times between December 23, 2013
until January 2, 2014; with a friend named on Colony Drive in
York, Pennsylvania from January 2, 2014 until February 1, 2014; with a friend
named Patricia from February 2, 2014 until March 9, 2014; at the Motel 6 in York,
Pennsylvania from March 10, 2014 until April 24, 2014; with a friend from April
25, 2014 until May 15, 2015; at the Motel 6 in York from May 18, 2014 until June
28, 2014; with a friend on Roosevelt Avenue from June 29, 2014 until July 18,
2014; at 339 West Main Street in Dallastown, Pennsylvania from July 19, 2014
until sometime in February 2015, when she was incarcerated; with a friend on East
Cottage Place from her release from incarceration until May, 2015. Mother states
that she has now been in her current apartment for approximately 7 or 8 months,
though the Agency did not find it to be appropriate for S.K., nor have they been
able to confirm that she is current on her rent.
15
c. During the Spring of 2015, Mother had no physical address and no verifiable
income. She additionally declined to participate in a mental health evaluation as
was ordered by this Court that was meant to determine an appropriate diagnosis.
d. Mother received a tax refund of approximately $7 ,000 in 2014. She testified that
she used the money to pay back debts, to fix her vehicle, to buy unspecified things
for S.K., and to pay for a hotel room, which she stayed at for at least three months
in lieu of securing stable and appropriate housing.
e. Mother has been in her current job approximately ten weeks, and had no
employment from May, 2015 until approximately January, 2016. Mother has
provided limited paystubs throughout the dependency action. Since January 2016
until July, Mother reported 3 employers. Mother reported that she believed this
showed stable employment.
f. Jill Egbert from Families United Network began testing Mother for drugs
following a referral on August 20, 2013. Between September 10, 2013 and March
31, 2015, Mother was tested 52 times, and was unavailable 10 times. Mother had
30 positive tests during that time. Her drug tests were positive for amphetamines
and marijuana. Mother claimed to have a prescription for Adderall. Mother failed
to provide the prescription to the tester or Children and Youth. Because Mother
did not always test positive for amphetamines, she was not regularly taking any
prescription she might have had for Adderall. Beginning in approximately
October, 2014, and continuing until approximately the time that Families United
16
Network closed out, Mother began to decline tests, arguing that it was a violation
of her constitutional rights. Mother, by her own admission, continued to utilize
marijuana until recently for therapeutic purposes, despite her awareness that
marijuana was not legal in Pennsylvania.
g. Alyson Riedel from Justice Works Youth Care (hereinafter "Justice Works")
testified that she received a referral for Mother on August 13, 2013. Justice Works
established seven goals for Mother: ( 1) demonstrate basic economic self-
sufficiency; (2) participate in meaningful supervised visits; (3) address mental
health needs; (4) seek appropriate means of transportation; (5) demonstrate
effective communication skills with the team; (6) demonstrate a basic
understanding of household management; and (7) demonstrate basic employability
skills. While Mother would have positive visits with the child, she never
progressed to unsupervised visitation during the time she worked with Justice
Works. Further, Mother failed to obtain consistent employment, she failed to
obtain stable housing, she failed to provide any verification of progress with
managing her mental health concerns, and she never provided complete and
accurate information in order to create a budget. Mother also failed to provide
documentation that her vehicle was properly registered, insured, and inspected,
and had difficulty with being on time for appointments, including visits with S.K.,
and failed to keep appointments. The Court notes that Mother again does not have
any reliable form of transportation. Mother additionally had a pattern of securing
17
employment prior to Family Resource Meetings, and then losing that employment
after the meeting.
h. Tiffany Nulph, also from Justice Works, was a Family Resource Specialist who
worked with Mother for approximately six months. Ms. Nulph felt that Mother
made minimal progress on getting stable employment, and that she had mental
health issues that still needed to be addressed. Further, Ms. Nulph stated that
knowing whether income would be reliable was a consistent problem. Ms. Nulph
communicated to Mother that she needed to provide proof that she could maintain
a secure source of income, and stable housing in order to reunite with the child.
Mother failed to appear to approximately four appointments with Ms. Nulph, and
never provided any proof of employment beyond receipts created by Mother. The
team attempted to assist her to complete a budget, and though she provided a list
of expenses, she never provided a list of sources of income with which to pay her
expenses. Ms. Nulph also noted that Mother was not always on time for her visits
with the child.
1. Justice Works remained open until September, 2014, when they closed out
unsuccessfully as they determined that mother could not make any further
progress.
J. Mother was involuntarily committed to the York Hospital Psychiatric Unit from
August 4, 2013 until August 7, 2013. Mother was diagnosed with possible bi-polar
effective disorder, nicotine dependence, cannabis abuse, and a mood disorder. She
18
was prescribed mood stabilizers, and was recommended to follow up with Edgar
Square.
k. Deborah Hill, LCSW, began providing counseling services to Mother in January,
2014. Ms. Hill treated Mother for an adjustment disorder, ADD, and ADHD, but
disagreed that Mother had bipolar disorder or a mood disorder. Ms. Hill's
treatment plan for Mother included medication, though Mother never verified that
she had a prescription.
I. Though Mother was generally cooperative during counseling sessions, there were
sessions where Mother was too impulsive and disorganized to focus. Additionally,
Mother was supposed to attend sessions once per week, she frequently was late or
would cancel. Mother claimed transportation issues for her tardiness or
cancellations, though public transportation was regularly available.
m. Though Mother still had need for counseling, she decreased the frequency of her
counseling following the termination hearing in March, 2015, and ultimately
stopped attending altogether. Mother originallywas attending weekly sessions, but
only attended ten appointments in 2015, and several were by telephone. Mother
has not had a session since December, 2015, despite being extremely distraught at
her last session.
n. Mother's diagnoses make her disorganized in her thinking, impulsive, rash, and
cause it to be difficult for her to focus. Ms. Hill stated that it would be hard for her
to maintain employment, or to get to appointments on time. She further identified
19
Mother's triggers as her family, communications with the Agency, and the grief
over the loss of her son.
o. Mother reported to Ms. Hill that she was employed and working with the Agency,
though at that time, she was not employed, nor was she compliant with the
3
Agency.
p. Mother incredibly reported currently having stability in her employment, but has
had three jobs since January, and her current employment has been for ten weeks.
q. Since the child was removed, Mother has verified 1 out of 10 jobs", and since the
child was removed she has had at least fourteen housing changes.
r. Mother does not believe she has any mental health issues, or any problems that are
out of the ordinary. She has discontinued using Adderall because of the inactive
ingredients. She does not participate in any type of therapy, nor does she use any
type of medication. Mother's testimony lacks credibility as her perception is very
skewed toward positive self-assessment, when the factual circumstances do not
support her assessment.
s. When S .K. came into care, he was approximately a year and a half old. He is now
more than four and a half years old. He has resided in the same foster home for
the entire duration of the dependency proceedings, and now has a stronger bond
3 The Court could not establish a time frame for when this information was divulged, as the testimony and
evidence were so nebulous, but the information was not disputed at trial.
4
1\
At the re-hearing on July 51 2016, the Agency testified that it received two pay stubs from Mother's job at
, that Mother had approximately ten jobs, and that the Agency did not receive pay stubs from the
other rune jobs. Hr'g Tr. 168: 5-16. (July 5, 2016).
20
with his foster family than with his biological family. He refers to his foster
mother as "Mommy", while his bond with his Mother has lessened over time.
DISCUSSION
The Agency petitioned this Court to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of
Mother to S.K. on the grounds presented in 23 Pa. C.S. § 251 l(a)(l), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)
of the Adoption Act. The applicable provisions appear as follows:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental
duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of
the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a
voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the
parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to
remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a
voluntary agreement with the agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 l(a)(l), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8).
21
To terminate pursuant to Section 2511 (a)(l ), the Agency need not produce evidence of
both an intent to relinquish and a failure to perform necessary duties. In re CMS., 832 A.2d
457, 461 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citing Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M, fl 708 A.2d 88, 91
(Pa. 1998)). Also, the six month time period established by Section 251 l(a)(l) should not be
"applied mechanically." In Interest of A.P., 692 A.2d 240, 245 (Pa.Super. 1997). It is the role
of the court to "examine the individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all
explanations offered by the parent to determine it the evidence in light of the totality of the
circumstances clearly warrants the involuntary termination."
The Supreme Court of this Common.wealth has stated:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best
understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection,
guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by
a merely passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has
held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires
continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication
and association with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a
parent 'exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's
life.'
Id. (citing In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535 (Pa. 1977)). A parent must make a "sincere and genuine
effort" to maintain a relationship, use all available resources to preserve the bond, and resist
obstacles. Id. (citing In re Shives, 525 A.2d 801, 803 (Pa.Super. 1987)). A parent who yields
to obstacles may forfeit his or her parental rights. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights to E.A.P., a Minor, 944 A.2di7 ,,(citing In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 3.2.'J ~~o (\',.-s~,,.. 2.01t>2J.
(\'.;,.~'\,~,.. 22~)
Section 251 l(a)(2) focuses on the child's present and future need for proper care. In re
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights to E.A.P., a Minor, 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa.Super.
2008) (hereinafter "E.A.P.") (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 l(a)(2); see In re R.J., 361 A.2d 294
(Pa. 1976)). Whether termination is appropriate under Section 2511(a)(2) is not limited to
affirmative misconduct. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super, 2010)(citing In re A.L.D.,
797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). Subsection (a)(2) emphasizes the child's "need for
essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being." Id. (citing E.A.P., 944 A.2d at 82). The Superior Court has further explained the way
in which this subsection should be interpreted by this Court:
Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be read to compel courts to
ignore a child's need for a stable home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the
policy of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so
where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable
prospect for reuniting it. [Id.] Thus, while "sincere efforts to perform parental duties,"
can preserve parental rights under subsection (a)(l), those same efforts may be
insufficient to remedy parental incapacity under subsection (a)(2). [internal citations
omitted]. "Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt
assumption of full parental responsibilities." [internal citations omitted].
Id. at 1117-18.
Pursuant to Section 251 l(a)(8), " ... [wjhere a parent has addressed some of the
conditions that led to a child's removal, but other conditions still exist, a court may find
that...section 251 l(a)(8) has been satisfied." In re T.A.C., 119 A-~ lo'2!"6, l\)!>1 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(citing In re D.A.T., 91 A.3d 197 (Pa.Super. 2014)). This Court believes this principle applies
also to Section 251 l(a)(5).
Once the Court has determined that one or more of the statutory requirements under
23
§ 2511 (a) are satisfied, the Court must also engage in an analysis of"[ o ]ther considerations,"
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 l(b):
The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration
to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income,
clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With
respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(l ), (6), or (8), the court
shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described
therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing
of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (b). "A parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing
of. .. her child is converted, upon the parent's failure to fulfill ... her parental duties, to the
child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment." In re Adoption of R.JS., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa.Super.
2006)(internal citations omitted). A child has the right to care in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment. See In re K.M, 53 A.l~ 781, 792 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citing In re Adoption of
R.JS., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa.Super. 2006)). " ... [A] child's life simply cannot be put on hold
in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting."
Id.
When determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
child, love, comfort, security, stability and other intangibles must be considered during the
inquiry. In re CMS., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005). The Court must consider that
continuity of relationships is important to children and also weigh the safety needs of the
child. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa.Super. 2003)(citing In the Interest of
24
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa.Super. 2000)); In re A.D., 93 A.3d .~1'6/.(internal citations
omitted).
The Court is also required to analyze whether a bond exists between the parent and
child. The Court must ''examine the status of the bond [between parent and child] to
determine whether its termination 'would destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial
relationship." Id. When a child has a close relationship with a parent, severance of close
parental ties is usually "extremely painful." In Interest of C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202
(Pa.Super. 2000) (citing In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1241 (Pa. 1,1ca )). The mere
existence of an emotional bond does not preclude a determination that a termination is in the
best interests of the child. In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). It is but one of the
factors the Court must consider. In re A.D:, 93 A.3d at 897. As recently indicated by the
Superior Court, the Court is not required to ignore safety concerns simply because a bond
exists between the child and a parent. See In re MM., IO to A.!>d. I \4 (Pa.Super. 2014).
The party seeking termination of parental rights must demonstrate the asserted grounds for
termination are valid by "clear and convincing evidence." In re R.NJ., 985 A.2d 273, 276
(Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting In re SH., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa.Super. 2005)). Clear and
convincing evidence is defined as evidence "so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue." Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & JR.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super.
2003)).
25
The simple fact that something was stated and was memorialized in the transcript does
not mean that the statement itself is considered fact or that the statement is evidence for the
Court to consider. The Court is not required to accept all statements as true. The Court "is
charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any
conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these responsibilities, the ... court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence." In re NC., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa.Super. 2006)(citingIn re
Adoption of R.JS., 901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa.Super. 2006)). This Court, therefore, considers not
only to the evidence presented, but takes into considerationthe manner in which that evidence
is presented.
The Court did not find Mother to be a credible witness. Mother has not been
forthcoming with information with the Court or with the Agency, and has exhibited an
unrealistic perception of reality and circumstances. The Court took Mother's lack of
credibility into consideration in rendering its determination on the termination petition.
Section 2511(a)(l)
As was determined in the prior Termination of Parental Rights hearing, no credible
evidence was presented to demonstrate that Mother had a settled purpose to relinquish her
parental rights to S.K. On the contrary, from the time of the adjudication of S.K. in August
2013, until approximately March, 2015, Mother had continued to perform some parental
duties on behalf of her son. Mother kept in contact with S.K., visiting with him approximately
three days per week and speaking with him once per week by phone. She attended some of
26
S.K. 's medical appointments and provided him with gifts. It is clear that Mother loves the
child, and wants to see him, and would like him returned to her care. The Court finds that
although Mother's mental health is a barrier preventing Mother from fully performing her
parental duties, at one point she had made an effort to perform some parental duties on behalf
of her son. Since the initial termination hearing in 2015, Mother has not had any interaction
with S.K., though the Court does note that her rights were terminated. The Agency failed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that Mother evidenced a settled purposed to relinquish
her claim. Therefore, we decline to terminate on this ground.
Section 2511(a)(2)
The Court finds that sufficient credible evidence was presented in order for the Court
to make a finding that a termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) is supported
by the record. The Court finds that based on her mental condition, whichever diagnosis it may
be, Mother is incapable of appropriately and consistently parenting the child safely and that
Mother will not remedy the mental condition, as she has chosen not to treat it, get help for it,
or even acknowledge it.
The competent evidence presented does not suggest there was a history of repeated
and continued abuse of S.K. by Mother or a refusal of Mother to parent S.K. While the
credible evidence supports a finding that though Mother has made some steps towards
improving her circumstances since the adjudication of S.K., Mother remains incapable of
providing S.K. the essential parental, care, control, and subsistence necessary for his mental
and physical well-being, as her own mental health concerns cause her to neglect the needs of
27
the child. The credible evidence presented also indicates that the cause of the incapacity will
not be remedied by Mother, at least not within the foreseeable future.
Mother has not yet demonstrated an ability to operate in a fashion that would provide a
safe environment for S.K. During the course of S.K. 's adjudication, Mother was unable to
maintain stable housing. Mother has selected housing that was inappropriate for reunification
purposes, including her current apartment, which the Agency found was not appropriate for
S.K. Mother has also moved between various non-permanent locations, prioritizing her dogs
over establishing stability. Mother testified in the dependency proceeding that she lost at least
one motel due to her dogs. Although significant effort was made by Justice Works and the
Agency to assist Mother in creating a budget, she remains unable to provide information to
establish an income. Mother also, at times, acts erratically, evidenced before the Court during
her frequent disruptions and interruptions during various proceedings in the dependency
matter. Mother has shown that she is not capable of directing her efforts on obtaining stable,
appropriate housing; stable, consistent employment; or treating her physical and mental health
concerns.
Further, though Mother has not had an obligation to cooperate with the Agency since
the time of the prior termination, she has previously evidenced that she is unwilling to fully
cooperate with any services designed to assist Mother in the reunification effort. Though she
stated at the rehearing that she is willing to take steps to remedy the conditions, she still has
failed to do so, nearly three years after the child was adjudicated. She additionally does not
provide any documentation of any steps she claims to have taken. Mother has only ever
28
provided information that suits her, and when it suits her. She does not provide documentation
requested at the time it is requested; up until the hearing on July 7, 2016, Mother has
repeatedly failed to provide documentation of her prescriptions, employment, income, or
housing. Throughout the dependency action, and again during the termination hearing,
Mother appeared in Court with some unverifiable and unauthenticated exhibits, without any
prior notice to her counsel, or any other party. Many of the documents Mother attempted to
submit during the course of S.K. 's dependency were irrelevant and produced at inappropriate
times that prevented anyone from being able to authenticate them.
Most importantly to this Court's analysis, though Mother continues to dispute that she
has any mental health concerns, her previous counselor, Ms. Hill, diagnosed Mother with
adjustment disorder and attention deficit disorder. According to Ms. Hill, Mother's attention
deficit disorder is exacerbated in periods of stress. Further, while Mother was previously
inconsistent in treating her mental health, she has now completely abandoned any mental
health treatment. It is noted that Mother chose to treat with Ms. Hill in lieu of a psychologist
or other professional. Ms. Hill testified that she had approximately ten appointments with
Mother in 2015, many times only by phone, and that she has not heard from Mother since
January, 2016. Additionally, though Mother is prescribed Adderall for her diagnoses, Mother
reported that she no longer takes any medication. Maternal grandmother's testimony that
Mother no longer needs medication was not persuasive to this Court, nor was it credible, as
Maternal Grandmother's testimony was disproportionallyin support of her daughter, despite
professional evidence that contradicted her own. Though Mother has not been drug tested
29
smce the previous termination hearing, she was sporadically testing positive for
amphetamines,
_
to which
-··
Mother
....................................
.. ..
claimed she had a prescription.'. ..Further, . Mother.. stated
'•"' .,..,..
that
·-·······-······----------······ .. ._
she self-medicated with marijuana until approximately four months ago.
Due to the lack of sustained progress in the year-and-a-half prior to the March, 2015
termination, and the failure of Mother to remedy the conditions in the year and three months
since the hearing, the Court cannot determine that Mother can or will remedy the conditions
that render her incapable of providing S.l(. with the essential parental care and subsistence
that he requires. Though the Court does not hold against Mother the time since the last
termination hearing for purposes of showing love and affection to the child, we note that
Mother still has not shown the stability necessary to alleviate the stressors that exacerbate her
disorder, and substantially more concerning, she has completely abandoned any assistance in
dealing with her disorder, nor has she shown an ability to remedy the enumerated concerns.
Though the Court notes the environmental concerns continuing to exist, we make the finding
that remedying the environmental concerns are not beyond her control. Despite having
significant funds from a tax refund, and assistance from the Agency, Mother refused to
prioritize housing for her child. Therefore, the Court cannot, from the credible evidence
presented, speculate as to when Mother may have enough stability to render her capable of
independently providing S.K. with the care he needs. It is clear that Mother's failure to
address her own mental health needs has caused her, and will continue to cause her, to neglect
the child's needs. Mother has been unable to establish that she is capable of raising the child
5Jill Egbert from the Agency testified that Mother claimed to have a prescription for Adderall, that Adderall
would result in a positive test for amphetamines, that Mother never provided a prescription, and that there is no
record of the prescription being verified. Hr'g Tr. 17: 1-20 (July 5, 2016).
30
on her own, or that she has sufficient community support. Further, when Mother was offered
assistance to budget and other service, she failed to successfully complete goals. While she
relies upon churches and good will for cash assistance, she is unable to utilize assistance for
long term management or parenting. Though Maternal Grandmother testified in support of
her daughter, her testimony lacked any credibility, particularly against the weight of the
evidence that supports termination.
Therefore, based on the credible evidence presented, the Court finds that termination
of Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 251l(a)(2) is appropriate. A detailed
discussion of Section 2511 (b) appears hereunder.
Section 251l(a)(5)
S.K. has undeniably been in placement in excess of six months. S.K. was adjudicated
dependent on August 20, 2013; the termination petition was filed December 16, 2014, at
which time S.K. was in placement for approximately sixteen months. At the time the hearing
occurred on the petition related to Mother, S.K. had been in placement for approximately
eighteen months. Now, as of July, 2016, S.K. has been in placement for nearly three years,
though the Court does note that approximately one year of that time was during the appellate
period.
S.K. was removed from Mother's care and initially put in placement on an emergency
basis due to a significant safety concern. Mother was involuntarily hospitalized after an
incident where Mother left S.K. with a stranger while she took another person's injured dog to
31
receive veterinary care. S.K. was placed in foster care due to concerns regarding Mother's
mental health, instability, lack of housing and employment, and drug use.
Mother has been unable to obtain and maintain employment for any extended period
of time; most of her employment is in the food service industry and she has not lasted more
than a few weeks at any of these positions. At the time of the hearing, Mother had only been
employed at a job she considers stable for approximately ten weeks. She reported prior
employment at restaurants throughout York County, and some of those jobs were verified by
the caseworker, but she did not work at any of those jobs for any significant, consistent period
of time. Mother testified that she previously received income from performing some form of
spiritual work, but the few receipts Mother has provided were self-made, and none were
recent.
Mother asserted that she continued to use marijuana until recently, though it has been
unable to be verified whether she has truly stopped using drugs. Mother had stopped
cooperating with drug testing, arguing that it violated her constitutional rights. The Court
therefore cannot determine Mother's use of drugs is no longer a concern, and even by
Mother's own admissions, any cessation in drug use is extremely recent.
Most notably, significant concerns regarding Mother's mental health continue to exist.
Ms. Hill testified that individuals with Mother's diagnoses are impulsive, make snap
judgments, and have difficulty processing information and prioritizing tasks. Additionally,
Ms. Hill testified that Mother has evidenced a lack of time management skills and
impulsiveness, which makes parenting a child far more difficult. The Court has also seen
32
Mother demonstrate those very behaviors. Mother frequently appeared late to hearings,
appointments, and to visits throughout the child's adjudication.
Mother also has difficulty controlling her behavior, particularly, as pointed out by Ms.
Hill, during periods of stress. Mother still has not remedied many of the concerns that cause
her stress and, far more concerning to the Court, she has not been communicating with Ms.
Hill or any other counselor or therapist. Because Mother has not been addressing her mental
health concerns at all, and has simply been ignoring the existence of those concerns, safety
concerns still exist. Further, Ms. Hill believes Mother has an ongoing need for therapy, in
which Mother chooses not to engage. Though Mother indicates that she would be willing to
participate in counseling, there has been no follow through by Mother, which is consistent
with the concerns expressed by Ms. Hill regarding how Mother's mental health would impact
the child. Mother's disinterest in therapy is clear, as once Ms. Hill had to cancel one
appointment due to an emergency, Mother chose not to contact her again.
At this time, Mother is still unable to provide S.K. with stable housing suitable for
reunification and whether she could do so within a reasonable amount of time is unclear.
Though Mother has had housing that may have been appropriate for the child, Mother never
remained at one residence Jong enough to achieve reunification. She has been in-and-out of a
number of motels and friends' homes for most of the months S.K. has been in placement.
Though the Court notes that the Superior Court has previously stated that "the rights of a
parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing, and medical care if found to be beyond the control of
33
the parent," this Court finds that many of these issues were not beyond Mother's control. In
..... ····· .. ···--·--··
re: D. W, 856 A.2d ...1231 (Pa.Super. 2004). The sizeable tax
------- ... - .... -.-·--·--
.--·--····· .... , ,,.,._,,
return of approximately $7,000
..-.·· ···- ········--······· -·-------·- .. ·-····· ·····-····--- .. ·--····---··--·--······.
·• ..
" .....
Mother received in 2014 could have been used to secure stable housing. Further, the Court is
not making this determination based solely on environmental factors. The Court finds that
Mother's failure to prioritize these environmental factors is merely a symptom of the much
larger problem of her general neglect and denial of her mental health concerns.
Services or the assistance of the Agency will not assist Mother in remedying these
concerns within a reasonable period of time. Mother has been provided with services, but she
chose not to utilize those services or cooperate with them in any meaningful way. When the
Justice Works team terminated services in September 2014, after nearly a year of providing
assistance, Mother had not made substantial progress toward achieving many of the goals set
forth for her. Though Mother says she would now work with a team, based on Mother's
history of noncompliance, there is no indication to the Court that if a Justice Works team was
assigned to work with Mother at this point in time that she would cooperate in any substantial
way or for any substantial period of time. Mother additionally has unrealistic expectations of
her income and stability, as evidenced by her assertion that a job she has held for less than
three months is stable.
It would take Mother an unknown and unreasonable period of time to achieve and
maintain stability sufficient to support her reuniting with S.K. The child has already been in
care for the majority of his life. The termination of Mother's parental rights best serves S.K.'s
needs and welfare, as further outlined below. While Mother has continued to associate with
34
S.K. consistently throughout S.K. 's adjudication of dependency, S.K. 's daily needs have been
. . .. ···--- . met_by his foster mother, to whom he has a significant bond,
Section 2511 (a)(8)
Indisputably, S.K. has been in placement in excess of twelve months. From the time of
S.K.'s adjudication on August 20, 2013 until the time the petition on December 16, 2014,
S.K. was in placement for approximately sixteen months. He has now been in placement
nearly three years. Though the Court does not hold the year-long appellate period against
Mother for purposes of Section 2511(a)(l ), the Court notes that that the appellate period
afforded Mother the opportunity to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the child.
She has chosen to abandon her treatment and has not evidenced an ability or willingness to
remedy the safety concerns that have caused the child to be out of her care for those three
years.
S.K. was removed from Mother's care and initially put in placement on an emergency
basis due to a safety concern. Mother was hospitalized pursuant to a 302 hold after an incident
where Mother left S.K. with a stranger while she took an injured dog to receive veterinary
care. S.K. was placed in foster care at the time of his adjudication because Mother was not a
resource at the time of the adjudication, due to concerns regarding Mother's mental health;
instability, particularly in the areas of housing and employment; and drug use. Although she
may have at times made progress toward some of her goals or has been mostly cooperative
with services provided, the concerns that necessitated placement have not been alleviated and
the placement of S.K. continues to be necessary.
35
Even if the Court would accept that Mother has remedied the housing and employment
... ···-···-··· ···- concerns, there is no indication that she can sustain either.-·- Furthermore
. --· - ---·
her unwillingness to
··-·· -··---···--····-······---···----····· ..----------·····-~·-·- ······-···•·•
treat her mental health, other than with marijuana, places S.K. at risk for neglect if returned to
her care. Additionally, as previously noted, Mother's mental health continues to be a concern.
Mother, at this point in time, has completely abandoned any mental health treatment, and
denies having any mental health concerns. Mother has also declined the agency's request for a
mental health evaluation. Mother's analysis of her own mental health is clearly misguided, as
her counselor stated that at Mother's last therapy session, it was clear that she remained in
need of further treatment. She additionally refuses to take any medication, and even when she
was taking medication, her actual usage was sporadic at best, as evidenced by drug screens
that were negative at times. Mother did state, however, that until recently she continued to use
marijuana for therapeutic purposes, despite knowing it was illegal to do so.
The Court does not find credible that Mother is now in stable housing, or that she is
employed in a stable job. Mother has not verified that she has consistently paid her rent in her
new apartment, and further, it was found by the Agency to not be suitable for the child.
Though Mother states that she may possibly be able to remedy the issue by renting another
apartment once renovations are complete, this is a speculation by Mother. Further, Mother
has a history of speculating as to how she may remedy a problem, and failing to actually do
so. Additionally, though Mother does currently have employment, she has also not verified
her actual monthly income, and by her own admission, she has only been working at the
current position for approximately ten weeks. Given Mother's history of securing
36
employment prior to meetings and court hearings, and losing those jobs shortly thereafter, and
. also taking into account_ Mo_~~er' s intermittent work histor~~ it __is_~_i[~~~~--~~--sp~~~-!~!~.~~~!~~~ _
this is a job Mother might actually be able to maintain for a significant period of time.
Further, even if Mother can maintain employment, it is not likely that she will be in a
position to pay all of her expenses, especially in the event that the child is returned to her care.
There has been no evidence presented that she has an income sufficient to sustain the
expenses associated with basic living, let alone with raising a child. Though Mother believes
she is not spending more than she is making, she has shown that she is without the
understanding to truly evaluate budgetary needs. Mother demonstrated her lack of
comprehension of money management when she spent part of a $7,000 tax refund on her
"self-employment" as opposed to securing stable housing. Furthermore, despite her history,
she believes that she can budget by memory just by knowing her income.6
Lastly, the termination of Mother's parental rights best serves S.K.'s needs and
welfare. While Mother continued to visit with S.K. consistently until approximately May,
2015, S.K.'s daily needs have been met by his foster mother since 2013. Ms. Brooks is the
individual who makes medical appointments for S.K. and, although Mother has sometimes
attended those appointments, it is Ms. Brooks that takes him. Additional consideration as to
whether termination is in S.K.'s best interest is detailed in Section 2511(b).
6 At the re-hearing on July 7, 20 l 6, Mother testified that her budget was simply an account of all of her
expenses, but she did not provide that as evidence, and she stated she had it at her house. Hr'g Tr. 259: 7-25.
(July 7, 2016).
37
Section 2511 (h)7
Neither expert testimony nor a formal bonding assessment rs required for
---···------------ ----·------······----·-··----- ·---------- --·
consideration under this subsection of the Adoption Act. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103
(Pa.Super. 2011). The Court can consider the testimony that was presented by caseworkers
and other witnesses in making the determination whether termination would best suit S.K.'s
developmental, physical, and emotional welfare. See generally id.
Mother's feelings of love and affection for S.K. do not prevent termination of her
parental rights. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal citations
omitted). Moreover, the mere existence of a bond, if the Court did find credible evidence
supported such a finding, does not preclude termination. See In re N.A.M., 33 AJd at 103.
While there may have been a bond between S.K. and Mother, there is credible evidence that
he has a far stronger bond with his foster Mother. Further, evidence was presented that when
S.K. was having visits with his Mother, he frequently did not want to attend those visits.
The Superior Court has stated that "no bond worth preserving is formed between a
child and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care for most of the child's life,
and the resulting bond with the natural parent is attenuated." In re K.H.B., 107 AJd 175, 180
(Pa.Super. 2014)(citing In re K.Z.S., 946 A.~ 753, 764 (Pa.Super. 2008)). By the time the
termination petition was filed in December 2014, S.K. was three years old; he had been in
placement with Ms. Brooks since he was less than twenty months old. He has been with Ms.
7
Any facts as they relate to Mother's attempts to remedy conditions after the filing of the petition in October
2014 were considered only as this section relates to Section 251 l(a)(2) and (a)(5). Despite the directive in
Section 2511 (b ), the Court did consider efforts by Mother after the petition was filed in determining that
termination is still in the best interest ofS.K. pursuant to Section 251 l(a)(8).
38
Brooks for the majority of his life. Ms. Brooks is the individual who cares for S.K. on a daily
basis, he now refers to her as "Mommy". Ms. Brooks has provided S.K. with the safe, stable
···- · -···-·· ··-······--······-- ----···---···----··---.---- .•.•.... -.--•·
environment Mother has not demonstrated she has the ability to offer him.
Ms. Brooks has cooperated with the Agency and ensured continued contact with the
child's biological family. She has accommodated maternal grandmother, and has facilitated
ongoing family contact and fostered the biological connection for the child. It is clear that
Ms. Brooks is looking out for the best interest of the child, that he always comes first, and that
she ensures that he sees his maternal grandmother and other family members, even though it
may be contrary to her own interests.
This Court is constrained to follow the law, and under 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511, the Agency
has met its burden by clear and convincing evidence. Giving primary consideration to the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of S.K., the Court has found
credible evidence exists to support termination of Mother's rights pursuant to both Section
251 l(a) and Section 251 l(b), and the Court does GRANT the petition filed by the Agency.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Agency has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has
either demonstrated a settled purpose to relinquish her parental rights or has failed to
perform parental duties on behalf of S.K. for at least six months prior to the filing of the
petition. 23 Pa. C.S. § 251 l(a)(l).
2. The Agency has established by clear and convincing evidence that the incapacity, neglect
and refusal of Mother has caused S .K. to be without essential parental care, control or
39
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes
of the incapacity, neglect and refusal cannot or will not be remedied by Mother. 23 Pa.
········--- ---- -··· ··--·----·--·--------·-··--·-.··----···---·------· ..•....
C.S. § 251 l(a)(2).
3. The Agency has established by clear and convincing evidence that S.K. was removed
from the care of Mother for a period in excess of six (6) months and has since remained in
placement. The circumstances which led to S.K.'s placement continue to exist and
Mother cannot or will not remedy these conditions within a reasonable period of time and
the services or assistance available to Mother are not likely to remedy the conditions
within a reasonable period of time. Furthermore, the termination of parental rights is in
S.K.'s best interest. 23 Pa. C.S. § 251 l(a)(5).
4. The Agency has established by clear and convincing evidence that S.K. was removed
from Mother's custody more than twelve months prior to the filing of the termination
petition and that the circumstances that necessitated placement continue to exist.
Furthermore, the termination of parental rights is in S.K.'s best interest.
23 Pa. C.S. § 251l(a)(8).
5. Termination of Mother's parental rights will best serve S.K.'s needs and welfare.
23 Pa. C.S. § 251 l(a)(S); 23 Pa. C.S. § 251 l(a)(8); 23 Pa. C.S. § 251 l(b).
40
Circulated 04/07/2017 11:03 AM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
···· ·········· ······ ----··· -·--··· . -····-··· ·····-·· · ------ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION .
In Re: Adoption of:
S.K.
A Minor No. 2014-0180
Termination of Parental Rights
APPEARANCES:
'- ,:.r,.
Martin Miller, Esquire Daniel D. Worley, Ese;ui«2.J
- l
Office of Children, Youth & Families Guardian Ad Litem ;;~ ~
::Q''" r,1
;,(' co
. n
"'11'1'"1 U
Edward R. LeCates, Esquire )!> :J'.'. ::~:
-;
Counsel for Appellant ,.,.. r,.,
:r.:'
OPINION PURSUANT TO
PENNSYLVANIARULE OF APPELLATEPROCEDURE1925
AND NOW, thisae!'day of October, 2016, the Court is in receipt of the
Notice of Appeal and Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal
filed by A.K. (hereinafter referred to as "Appellant"), pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, the Court does hereby adopt its Adjudication
filed on September 6, 2016 as the place on the record where the reasons for the
decision are found and supplements as follows:
This Court considered the credible evidence presented at the evidentiary
· ---- hearings.held.on.July.S and 7, 2016, and the evidence __ admined.into the.record. ....
Appellant argues the Court erred in concluding she was not credible. Although
the Court agrees that compared to Appellant's past appearances, Appellant
appeared more focused, the Court still finds that Appellant's testimony and
evidence lacked credibility. Although her ability to present her issues has
improved, the Court found the evidence presented was not sufficient to
overcome the overwhelming evidence against her.
Appellant also argues that the Court erred in concluding she was not
forthcoming with information. Appellant has not been compliant with
submitting requested information throughout the dependency proceeding as well
as at the termination proceedings. Appellant consistently failed to produce or
timely submit documentation supporting her claims of stability to the team,
caseworker, counsel or the Court. Additionally, after refusing to submit
documentation, though she claimed that she could make it readily available, she
attempted to improperly introduce evidence at trial - without having submitted it
to any party, and without authentication or qualification that the document was
admissible.
2
Appellant argues that the Court erred in finding her non-compliant with
· · ···------ the AgenQy_,.Th~_c_purtJound that Appellant "evidencedjhat she isunwilling to _
fully cooperate with any services designed to assist Appellant in the
reunification effort." (Op. at 28.) The Court notes that this finding of non-
compliance with services applies particularly to §251 l(a) (5) and supports the
finding that services reasonably available to appellant will not remedy the
conditions due to Appellant's refusal to utilize those services. It is Appellant's
failure to provide credible evidence of her circumstances that further supports
the finding that Appellant was non-complaint with the Agency.
Appellant also argues the Court erred in concluding she had not
maintained stable housing and employment. Extensive testimony was provided
that Appellant remains unable to maintain stable housing and employment for
any significant length of time, even though maintaining stable housing and
employment have consistently been identified goals throughout the entire
dependency proceedings. At the hearing, evidence was presented that Appellant
has been at her employment for only approximately 10 weeks, had been
unemployed for approximately 8 months prior to that, and was unable to
produce pay stubs to evidence mcome from any other time. (Op. at 20.)
3
Additionally, Appellant has had at least fourteen housing changes throughout
·---·-·-·-- the __ dependency proceeding. Appellant unreasonahly_argu.es_JhaL.her__er:ratic
employment situation and constant housing change exhibits stability in housing
and employment.
As to Appellant's lack of reliable transportation, Appellant stated that her
vehicle was still not properly registered, insured, or inspected. (Hr'g Tr. 17: 1-
20, July 5, 2016). Appellant herself claimed transportation issues as the reason
Appellant was often late or cancelled appointments, and the Court noted that
Appellant would often be late to appointments, or cancel appointments entirely,
despite readily available public transportation. (Op. at 19.) The Court found in
the evidence presented that Appellant has not shown an ability to utilize the
readily available transportation consistently to attend appointments.
S.K.'s bond with Maternal Grandmother is of no moment to the issue
decided by the Court. Maternal Grandmother is not the foster parent. The
Court gave primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. Of consequence is the Court's finding that the
S.K. has a strong bond with his foster mother. Any post adoption contact
between the child and his biological family is not considered in the context of
4
termination of Appellant's parental rights. Similarly, Maternal Grandmother's
... . . ---testi.mony-was-simp.ly_unbelievable and inconsistent with.her.position.regarding .
Appellant in the underlying dependency proceedings. Maternal Grandmother
presented self-serving testimony in an apparent effort to garner favor with her
daughter to continue a relationship with the child had Appellant's rights not
have been terminated.
Appellant also argues that the Court erred in concluding that she lacks
sufficient community support and that the Court erred in concluding Appellant
had not made substantial progress with Justice Works. The Court found that
although Appellant has relied upon churches and good will for cash assistance in
the past, she failed to establish credible evidence that she was capable of
supporting herself and S.I(. capably and dependably. In regards to the
JusticeWorks involvement, the JusticeWorks team closed out on September
2014 unsuccessfully as it was determined that Appellant could not make further
progress. (Op. at 18.) It was noted that while Appellant would have positive
supervised visits with S.K., she was unable to progress to unsupervised
visitation. (Op. at 17.) The Court found the evidence presented by the team was
5
credible and supported the finding that Mother failed to make substantial
. -·--·-·····------··· ··- __ progress.and.frequently.made minimal progress on.major.goals.set forth.for.her.. . ---···· .
The Court also found there was no credible evidence presented to support
any correlation between inactive ingredients in Adderall and improved stability
and behavioral issues as argued by Appellant. As outlined above, Maternal
Grandmother's biased presentation lacked credibility and Ms. Hill's
observations of Appellant's appearance immediately prior to the court hearing,
fails to support that Appellant has adequately addressed her significant mental
health concerns.
The Court found that the Agency did establish by clear and convincing
evidence that Appellant's parental rights should be terminated under
§251 l(a)(2)(5) and (8) because Appellant did not demonstrate that the
conditions which led to the child's placement are being remedied. We noted that
while there was evidence that supported a finding that Appellant made some
steps towards improving her circumstances since the adjudication of the child,
there was also credible evidence which indicated that Appellant could not, in the
forseeable future, remedy the situation which led to S.K. 's placement. The Court
found that it would not be in the best interest of S.K. to wait any longer than the
6
three years in which he has already been in placement for Appellant to provide
- --him-with-stability .. --·---
Based on reliable and credible evidence that demonstrated Appellant's
continuing pattern of inability to remedy the situations that led to the placement
of S.K., the Court found that clear and convincing evidence indicated that
termination of parental rights was appropriate and in the best interests of the
child.
Competent evidence on the record supports the outcome.
BY THE COURT,
7
In Re: Adoption of S.A.K., a Minor
Combined Opinion