NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELIE K. MAMBOLEO, No. 15-15562
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00648-DJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; CHEX
SYSTEMS INCORPORATED, AKA Chex
Systems,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Elie K. Mamboleo appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from the
reporting of negative items on his consumer credit report. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We may affirm on any basis supported by the
record, Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
Dismissal of Mamboleo’s action was proper because Mamboleo abandoned
his federal claims and failed to allege facts sufficient to support his state law
claims. See Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] litigant may abandon a claim by communicating his desire to do so to the
district court.”); Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief).
The district court properly denied Mamboleo’s motion to remand the action
to state court because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, and the action was properly removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See
D-Beam Ltd. P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 974 n.2 (9th Cir.
2004) (denial of a motion to remand a removed case is reviewed de novo).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by retaining supplemental
jurisdiction over Mamboleo’s state law claims after dismissing the federal claims
because the district court considered the interests of judicial economy and
convenience, comity and fairness to the parties. See Satey v. JPMorgan Chase &
2 15-15562
Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mamboleo’s
motion to amend his complaint because the proposed amendments would not have
cured the defects in the complaint. See Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d
998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and stating that a
“district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend if it determines that allegation
of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the
deficiency . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28
F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an
appellant . . . .”).
AFFIRMED.
3 15-15562