J-S17002-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: V.M.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: A.P., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 3243 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered September 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000106-2015,
FID: 51-FN-000096-2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: V.M.C. , A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: A.P., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 3244 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree September 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000726-2016,
FID: 51-FN-000096-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2017
A.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree, entered on September 12,
2016, terminating her parental rights to her female child, V.M.C. (born in
J-S17002-17
August 2014) (“Child”). Mother also appeals from the order, entered on that
same date, changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.1 We affirm.
The trial court made the following factual findings:
The family in this case became known to [the Philadelphia
County Department of Human Services (“DHS”)] on January 9,
2015, when DHS received a general protective services report
that Mother and K.C. (“Father”) used crack cocaine while caring
for Child. On January 13, 2015, DHS visited Mother and Father
in the home of M.P. (“Grandmother”), Child’s maternal
grandmother. DHS implemented a safety plan whereby Child
would remain in the home in Grandmother’s care, and Mother
and Father would move out. Upon further investigation, DHS
discovered that Grandmother was not an appropriate caregiver.
DHS obtained an order for protective custody and removed
Child, placing her in a foster home. On January 25, 2015, Child
was adjudicated dependent and fully committed to DHS custody.
The case was then transferred to a community umbrella agency
(“CUA”) which developed a single case plan (“SCP”) with
objectives for Mother. Over the course of 2015 and 2016,
Mother did not complete her SCP objectives. . . .
The goal change and termination [hearing] was held on
September 12, 2016. The CUA case manager testified that
Mother’s objectives since the start of this case were to attend
the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for parenting classes
and housing services, engage in mental health and drug and
alcohol treatment, and attend weekly visits with Child. CUA
referred Mother to ARC on February 5, 2015, immediately after
the SCP was developed.
CUA has been in contact with Mother for the life of the case, and
has routinely informed her of her objectives. Mother enrolled at
Greater Philadelphia Health Action (“GPHA”), for drug and
alcohol treatment, but has attended inconsistently. Mother was
discharged from GPHA twice for non-attendance, and had to be
re-enrolled. Because of attendance problems and positive drug
____________________________________________
1
K.C., Child’s father (“Father”), also appealed the September 21, 2016
decree and order. Father’s appeal is addressed at No. 3155 EDA 2016.
-2-
J-S17002-17
screen results, drug and alcohol treatment is still an objective for
Mother. Mother is supposed to give drug screens twice monthly
as part of her GPHA treatment. [During the five months prior to
the hearing,] Mother gave two drug screens.
The trial court also ordered Mother to attend the clinical
evaluation unit (“CEU”) for drug screens and an assessment.
Mother failed to appear for the first scheduled appointment. She
appeared for the second appointment, but did not provide a drug
screen or take the assessment. Mother’s drug screen results
show positives for benzodiazepines and cocaine, numerous
instances of high trace amounts of benzodiazepines and
cocaine[,] and abnormally low creatinine levels. Mother has not
provided her treatment documents from GPHA, though this has
been an objective since June 2016. Mother is prescribed
medications for her mental health issues, but has never provided
those prescriptions to CUA or CEU. Mother was evicted from her
housing in June 2016, for nonpayment of rent. CUA had assisted
Mother financially so she could keep her housing, but [she] was
[still evicted.]
Mother’s only income is [Supplemental Social Security Income],
which she receives for depression and anxiety. Mother has been
diagnosed with anxiety and major depressive disorder. Mother is
enrolled in mental health [treatment] and is supposed to attend
twice monthly. She attended three sessions in 2016, and has
not engaged since July 2016. The sessions Mother attended
were all group therapy; she has never attended individual
therapy.
Mother’s visits have never been unsupervised. Mother is
appropriate during visits, but Child has no trouble separating
from Mother when visits end. Since April 18, 2016, Mother has
missed six visits: five were no-call, no-show, and for one Mother
arrived after the conclusion of the visiting time. Child is happy
to see the foster parents after visits. . . . Child [ha]s bonded
with her foster parents and calls them “mom” and “dad.”
Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/16, at 1-3 (internal citations, footnote, and
certain capitalization omitted; paragraph breaks added).
-3-
J-S17002-17
The procedural history of this case is as follows. On August 12, 2016,
DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights with
respect to Child. On September 12, 2016, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on the termination petition. Mother and Father were present and
represented by counsel. A child advocate was present and represented
Child. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a decree
terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child and an order changing her
permanency goal to adoption. This timely appeal followed.2
Mother raises four issues for our review:
1. Did the [trial court err] by terminating Mother’s parental
rights where [DHS] did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Mother had not relieved the circumstances which
brought [C]hild into care and could not relieve[] them within a
reasonable amount of time?
2. Did the [trial court err] by terminating Mother’s parental
rights where there is no clear and convincing evidence that
Mother has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental
claim to [C]hild or has refused or failed to perform her parental
duties?
3. Did the [trial court err] by terminating Mother’s parental
rights as there was insufficient evidence presented to break the
bond [C]hild shared with Mother and where there was no clear
and convincing evidence that [C]hild would not be harmed by
the termination of Mother’s parental rights?
____________________________________________
2
Mother filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
(“concise statement”) contemporaneously with her notice of appeal. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On November 15, 2016, the trial court
issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. All of Mother’s issues were included in her
concise statement.
-4-
J-S17002-17
4. Did the [trial court err] when it changed [C]hild’s goal to
adoption as substantial, sufficient, and credible evidence was
presented at the time of trial which would have substantiated
denying the [p]etition for [g]oal [c]hange?
Mother’s Brief at 4.
We consider Mother’s first three issues together as they challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to terminate her parental rights. We
must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a
trial court’s determination of a petition for termination of
parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review
requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision
may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
In re C.M.C., 140 A.3d 699, 704 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).
“The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are
valid.” In re K.H.B., 107 A.3d 175, 178 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental
rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). This Court
may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental
rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). In re
Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
-5-
J-S17002-17
omitted). We focus our attention on subsection 2511(a)(2). Section 2511
provides, in relevant part:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
As this Court has explained:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control[,] or
subsistence necessary for [her] physical or mental well-being;
and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal
-6-
J-S17002-17
cannot or will not be remedied. The grounds for termination due
to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to
affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may
include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mother asserts that she remedied the conditions that caused the
placement of Child and she is now able to care for Child. Mother alleges that
she has worked to meet the goals required of her, and that she attended
and completed the ordered parenting classes in July 2015 through ARC.
Mother states that she completed a housing workshop at ARC, and currently
resides in a three-bedroom home that is an appropriate residence for her
and Child. What Mother fails to recognize, however, is that she was recently
evicted from a residence for failing to pay rent. She was evicted despite
CUA providing her with rent assistance. Thus, the trial court reasonably
concluded that Mother was unwilling or unable to maintain appropriate
housing for Child.
Mother also states that, although she was twice discharged from
GPHA’s drug and alcohol treatment program due to inconsistent attendance,
each time she re-enrolled. Mother fails to acknowledge that in addition to
being discharged from the program multiple times for inconsistent
attendance, she has repeatedly failed drug screens. The drug screens
indicate that Mother is still using benzodiazepines and cocaine. On other
-7-
J-S17002-17
occasions, Mother refused to provide drug screens which indicates that she
may also be using other drugs.
Mother asserts that she has been diagnosed with anxiety and major
depressive disorder, for which she is prescribed medication, and that she is
enrolled in mental health treatment. As the trial court noted, however,
Mother failed to provide the prescription for her medication. Furthermore,
Mother only attended three group mental health treatment sessions. She
did not receive treatment in the months prior to the evidentiary hearing and
refused to attend individual counseling sessions.
Mother also avers that she attended the medical appointments for
Child. Mother states that her visits with Child are always appropriate, and
that she never appeared at a visit in an intoxicated state. She argues that
she has attended the vast majority of her twice-weekly visitations, and only
recently missed some appointments because she had to care for her sick
mother. This explanation, however, does not excuse Mother from failing to
inform DHS that she was unable to attend the visits. This lack of
responsibility indicates that Mother is unwilling or unable to remedy the
incapacity which left Child without appropriate parental care.
After considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court
determined that DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother
caused Child to be without essential parental care necessary for her well-
being. Moreover, the trial court determined that DHS proved by clear and
-8-
J-S17002-17
convincing evidence that Mother cannot or will not remedy her incapacity
which led to Child being without essential parental care. For the reasons set
forth above, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in this determination.
Having determined that DHS satisfied subsection 2511(a)(2), we next
consider section 2511(b)’s requirements. The focus in terminating parental
rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but the focus under section
2511(b) is on the child. In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 850 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted).
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
analysis and the term bond is not defined in the Adoption Act.
Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,
if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or
her child is a major aspect of the []section 2511(b) best-interest
analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
considered by the court when determining what is in the best
interest of the child.
C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Mother argues that Child lived with her for the first months of Child’s
life. This argument, however, indicates why there is no bond between Child
and Mother. Child was so young at the time she lived with Mother that she
was unable to form a meaningful bond with Mother.
Mother avers that she continued visitation in order to maintain her
bond with Child. As noted above, although Mother has visited Child, none of
those visits were unsupervised. Furthermore, Mother frequently missed her
-9-
J-S17002-17
schedule visits and failed to inform DHS that she would not be attending the
missed visits.
Mother contends that Child knows that Mother is in fact her mother
and refers to her as “mom.” As such, Mother argues that DHS failed to
establish that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental
rights were terminated. Although Child recognizes Mother is her biological
mother, Child calls her foster parents “mom” and “dad” and has no problem
separating from Mother at the conclusion of those visits Mother attends.
Instead, Child is happy to reunite with her foster parents. Therefore, we
ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that there
was no meaningful bond between Mother and Child.
Furthermore, “[t]he psychological aspect of parenthood is more
important in terms of the development of the child and [his or her] mental
and emotional health than the coincidence of biological or natural
parenthood.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citation omitted). Thus, the trial court may emphasize the safety needs of
the child when evaluating section 2511(b). See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
763-764 (Pa. Super. 2008). As noted above, Mother is a drug addict who
continues to use cocaine and other drugs despite knowing that she is subject
to drug testing. She is unable to maintain consistent housing, even with the
financial support of outside agencies. Therefore, terminating Mother’s
parental rights is best for Child’s safety.
- 10 -
J-S17002-17
After considering the relevant factors, the trial court determined that
DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Mother’s
parental rights was in Child’s best interest. We ascertain no abuse of
discretion or error of law in this determination. As DHS satisfied section
2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s parental
rights as to Child.
In her final issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred in changing
Child’s permanency goal to adoption. This argument is waived. The
argument section of Mother’s brief does not contain any argument as to the
trial court’s order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption. Instead,
the argument portion of Mother’s brief only addresses the involuntary
termination of her parental rights. See Mother’s Brief at 10-16.
Accordingly, Mother waived any challenge to the order changing Child’s
permanency goal to adoption. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Decree and order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/20/2017
- 11 -
In the Interest of: V.M.C., a Minor
Combined Opinion