NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES MARK HINKLEY, No. 16-35393
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:14-cv-05117-TOR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KIRK JESSEE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Thomas O. Rice, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Former Washington state prisoner James Mark Hinkley appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging several
constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2011)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(summary judgment); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)
(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We may affirm on any basis supported by
the record. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hinkley’s
retaliation claims against defendants Shatto, Ansorge, and Allen because Hinkley
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants
acted with a retaliatory motive or acted in the absence of a legitimate correctional
goal. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (elements of a
retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905
(9th Cir. 2014) (“[M]ere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not
sufficient.”); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the absence of a legitimate correctional goal
and that courts “ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to prison
officials” when evaluating proffered legitimate goals (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hinkley’s
retaliation claim against defendant Jessee because Hinkley failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative
remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him.
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See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (the Prison Litigation Reform Act
requires “proper exhaustion,” which means “using all steps that the agency holds
out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)”
(emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); McBride v. Lopez, 807
F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2015) (to show that a threat rendered the prison
grievance system unavailable, a prisoner must show that he actually believed
prison officials would retaliate against him, and that his belief was objectively
reasonable).
Summary judgment was proper as to Hinkley’s claims against defendants
Knight and Shumate because Hinkley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact regarding whether these defendants personally participated in the alleged
constitutional violations. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth requirements for establishing supervisory liability under § 1983);
Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting
under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of
personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation . . . .”).
The district court properly dismissed Hinkley’s claims against defendant
Warner because Hinkley failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Warner
personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. See Starr, 652 F.3d
at 1207.
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The district court properly dismissed Hinkley’s Fourth Amendment and
Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Shatto, Ansorge, and Allen because
prisoners have no Fourth Amendment right of privacy in their cells, see Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984), and Hinkley did not allege facts sufficient to
show that these defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk
of serious harm, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
The district court properly dismissed Hinkley’s Eighth Amendment claim
against defendant Jessee because Hinkley did not allege facts sufficient to show
that Jessee acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
AFFIRMED.
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