FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 24 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: MICHAEL KEITH SCHUGG, No. 15-15872
DBA Shuburg Holsteins and DEBRA
SCHUGG, D.C. No. 2:05-cv-02045-JAT
Debtors,
______________________________ ORDER*
G. GRANT LYON, Chapter 11 Trustee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 5, 2017
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: CLIFTON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,** District Judge.
The Gila River Indian Community appeals from the district court’s May
2012 order concluding that G. Grant Lyon had developed standing for his claim
regarding the scope of the easement over Murphy Road. The Community also
appeals from the district court’s May 2014 and March 2015 judgments determining
that the Murphy Road easement permitted Lyon to construct a 40-foot-wide paved
road, install underground utilities beneath the road, and use the road to
accommodate a 440-house development on the parcel of land known as Section 16.
Because we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Lyon’s claim
regarding the scope of the easement, we vacate the district court’s order and
judgments, and dismiss the case.
Article III of the Constitution “limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559
(1992) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “One essential aspect of this requirement
is that any person invoking the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing
to do so.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013). To satisfy the
requirements of Article III standing, a plaintiff must “prove that he has suffered a
**
The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct,
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. Under Article III,
“an ‘actual controversy’” must “persist throughout all stages of litigation.” Id.
(quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013)).
We concluded in 2010 that Lyon lacked standing to assert his claim
regarding the scope of the Murphy Road easement because there was no “live
controversy with regard to the scope of any easement,” and “no particularized or
imminent injury arising out of that disagreement.” Lyon v. Gila River Indian Cmty.,
626 F.3d 1059, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010). On remand for resolution of a distinct issue,
Lyon argued that an actual controversy had developed due to changed factual
circumstances that occurred after our 2010 decision, providing him with the
standing necessary to assert the relevant claim. The district court agreed.
As a general rule, however, “standing is determined as of the
commencement of the litigation.” Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1203 (9th Cir.
2015) (quoting Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2002)); see also Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 569 n.4 (quoting Newman-
Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 839 (1989) (“The existence of
federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the
complaint is filed.”)). We have held that, “[a]s with all questions of subject matter
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jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint,” and that “[t]he party invoking the jurisdiction of the court cannot
rely on events that unfolded after the filing of the complaint to establish its
standing.” Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) abrogated on
other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010).
Although this general rule is subject to a few exceptions, Righthaven LLC v.
Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2013), none apply here. Lyon relies on the
exception set forth in Northstar Financial Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments,
779 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2015). In Northstar, we held that a supplemental pleading
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), based on facts that occurred after the
filing of the original complaint, could cure standing deficiencies that existed at the
time of the original complaint. Id. at 1044. Yet, Lyon never filed, or attempted to
file, an amended or supplemental complaint.
Lyon urges that Northstar is nonetheless applicable to the present facts
because the district court’s September 2014 pre-trial order may function as an
amended complaint. This overextends Northstar’s reasoning. In Northstar, we
indicated the limited scope of our ruling, observing, “in order to decide this case, it
is enough to say that the rule as stated in Morongo,” requiring subject matter
jurisdiction to exist at the time the action commences, “does not extend to
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supplemental pleadings filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).” Id. (referencing
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. California State Board of Equalization, 858
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, we allowed the plaintiff in Northstar to cure a jurisdictional
defect with a supplemental pleading rather than requiring the filing of a new
lawsuit because, under the circumstances of that case, instituting a new action was
simply a “needless formality.” Id. at 1044 (citation omitted). That is not the case
here. The parties agree that requiring Lyon to initiate a new lawsuit would not have
“elevated form over substance,” but rather, could have had a real impact regarding
the Community’s opportunity to invoke tribal sovereign immunity. See id. at 1044.
Although Lyon had standing to assert other claims throughout this lawsuit,
“a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each
form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)). We held that Lyon lacked standing for his claim
regarding the scope of the Murphy Road easement. Lyon, 626 F.3d at 1074. In the
absence of an amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), see
Northstar, 779 F.3d 1036, or other exceptional circumstances, this standing defect
may not be cured by later factual developments. The district court therefore erred
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in determining that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate Lyon’s claim regarding the
scope of the Murphy Road easement.
Costs to be taxed against plaintiff in favor of defendant.
VACATED AND DISMISSED.
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