J. A03039/17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MICHAEL SCHRINER AND ROBIN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SCHRINER : PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants :
:
v. :
:
OTTO SCHAFFHAUSER, ET AL :
:
: No. 853 MDA 2016
:
Appeal from the Order Entered May 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Civil Division at No(s): 2004—CV-5200
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2017
Appellants, Michael Schriner and Robin Schriner, appeal from the May
19, 2016 Order1 vacating the March 29, 2010 Judgment entered in this
matter following a jury trial on damages. The court entered the May 19,
2016 Order in accordance with its April 22, 2016 Order granting summary
judgment in a separate case proceeding in the Dauphin County Court of
Common Pleas at docket number 2015-CV-2735.2 After careful review, we
1
Appellants also filed a Praecipe to Enter Judgment on May 19, 2016, in an
apparent effort to ensure the existence of a final order for purposes of
appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b).
2
Appellants’ appeal from the April 22, 2016 Order is pending before this
Court. See Schriner v. One Beacon Ins. Co., et al., No. 852 MDA 2016.
J. A03039/17
reverse the May 19, 2016 Order, and reinstate the March 29, 2010
Judgment.
A detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary for purposes of our
disposition. Briefly, on November 29, 2004, Appellants initiated a civil action
against Defendants Walter, Otto and Louis Schaffhauser (“Walter,” “Otto,”
and “Louis”) by Writ of Summons and, on December 1, 2005, filed their
Fourth Amended Complaint. Walter, represented by Kevin McKenna,
Esquire, filed Preliminary Objections, on December 22, 2005. Otto and
Louis, represented by Jordan Cunningham, Esquire, filed Preliminary
Objections, which were substantially similar to those filed by Walter, on
March 31, 2006.
On April 28, 2006, the trial court sustained Walter’s Preliminary
Objections and dismissed him from the action. However, the attorneys for
Otto and Louis did not praecipe the trial court to rule on their Preliminary
Objections and, thus, the trial court never disposed of them.
Although the trial court had dismissed Walter from the 2004 Lawsuit
when it sustained his Preliminary Objections, Appellants, Otto and Louis
executed a Joint Tortfeasor Release (“2009 Release”) on May 22, 2009.
Under the terms of the 2009 Release, Appellants released Otto and Louis
from liability in the 2004 Lawsuit in exchange for the assignment of the right
to seek contribution from Walter or assert a bad faith claim against his
insurance companies.
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On August 11, 2009, Appellants’ attorney, David Knauer, while still
representing Appellants, entered his appearance in the 2004 Lawsuit on
behalf Otto, and withdrew Otto’s Preliminary Objection. Then on November
10, 2009, after Jordan Cunningham, Esquire, Administrator of the Estate of
Louis Schaffhauser, withdrew pending Preliminary Objections on behalf of
Louis, Attorney Knauer entered his appearance on behalf of Defendant Louis,
and filed a Praecipe to Enter Judgment on the issue of liability in favor of
Appellants.
Notwithstanding that Appellants had released Otto and Louis from
liability in the 2004 Lawsuit by entering into the 2009 Release, the parties
proceeded to a jury trial on damages in March 2010. Since the proceeding
was not adversarial, not surprisingly the jury awarded Appellants
$5,100,000.3 On March 29, 2010, the court entered Judgment on the jury’s
verdict.4 Otto and Louis did not appeal from entry of that Judgment because
Appellants had released them from liability.
Appellants subsequently filed two separate cases, one in 2010 (“2010
Lawsuit”) seeking to enforce this judgment against Walter, and one in 2011
3
Attorney Knauer, representing both parties in this adversarial proceeding,
conceded Louis and Otto’s liability. We question how Attorney Knauer met
his responsibilities under the Rules of Professional Responsibility by
representing Appellants, as well as Otto and Louis, at trial.
4
Upon consideration of Appellants’ Motion for Delay Damages, on April 14,
2010, the court subsequently adjusted this amount to $6,690,275.
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(“2011 Lawsuit’) raising, inter alia, bad faith claims against Walter’s
insurers. The trial court resolved the 2010 Lawsuit in Walter’s favor when it
granted Walter’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The court resolved the
2011 Lawsuit on April 22, 2016, when it granted the insurers’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. Relevant to the instant matter, in the April 22, 2016
Order the trial court also sua sponte vacated the March 29, 2010 Judgment
in favor of Appellants.
Following entry of the April 22, 2016 Order in the 2011 Lawsuit, on
May 19, 2016, the trial court entered the order on appeal herein, which
vacated the March 29, 2010 Judgment.
On appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court sitting in the 2011
Lawsuit was without jurisdiction to vacate the March 29, 2010 Judgment
entered in the 2004 Lawsuit more than six years after its entry. We agree.
Section 5505 of the Judicial Code provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify
or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior
termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been
taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. Exceptions to the 30-day period
are permitted “to amend its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other
officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions
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in the record[.]”5 Commonwealth v. Klein, 781 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa.
2001) (citation omitted).
Our review of the record indicates that more than 30 days passed
between the time the court entered Judgment on the docket on March 29,
2010, and the court vacated the Judgment on May 19, 2016. Moreover, no
party appealed from the entry of Judgment in 2010. It is evident that the
trial court’s action in this case amounted to more than an effort to “amend
its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court,
inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions in the record.”
Klein, supra at 1135. Here, in vacating the Judgment, the trial court not
only exceeded its jurisdiction by reaching back six years in time, but also by
taking action in a separate case, presided over by a different jurist, with
different defendants, and raising different causes of action.
5
We acknowledge that “where there is a showing of fraud or another
circumstance so grave or compelling as to constitute extraordinary cause
justifying intervention by the court . . . then a court may open or vacate its
order after the 30-day period has expired.” First Union Mortgage Corp. v.
Frempong, 744 A.2d 327, 334 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation and quotation
omitted). Although the facts of this case, especially the fact that Mr. Knauer
represented all of the parties at the trial, could establish a showing of fraud
or other extraordinary cause, we cannot apply this principle for two
procedural reasons. First, we find no legal authority that authorizes the trial
court to strike a Judgment in a docket not before it. Second, the Superior
Court previously addressed the issue of the validity of the 2010 Judgment
when it refused to permit the Appellees’ to intervene in order to strike the
2010 Judgment. See Schriner, et ux. v. Shaffhauser, et al. v. Looker
Wolfe & Gephart Ins., et al., No. 1762 MDA 2012, unpublished
memorandum at 1 (Pa. Super. filed June 18, 2013) (concluding motion to
intervene was untimely filed; thus, intervenor status should not have been
granted and the judgment strike was, therefore, inappropriate).
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
vacate the March 29, 2010 Judgment. We, therefore, reverse the trial
court’s May 19, 2016 Order.
Order reversed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/26/2017
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