[Cite as State v. Peacock, 2017-Ohio-2592.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-16-26
v.
RENELL R. PEACOCK, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 15 CR 0173
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: May 1, 2017
APPEARANCES:
Jennifer L. Kahler for Appellant
Stephanie J. Reed for Appellee
Case No. 13-16-26
PRESTON, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Renell R. Peacock (“Peacock”), appeals the
November 1, 2016 judgment entry of sentence of the Seneca County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from incidents that occurred on November 29, 2014
and May 18, 2015. On November 29, 2014, Peacock, having been approached by
an officer from the Fostoria Police Department, led that officer on a foot pursuit
across a parking lot and through an alley in Fostoria, Ohio. During the chase,
Peacock discarded a small plastic bag from his pocket prior to being taken to the
ground by the officer. The officer then wrestled with Peacock because Peacock
continued to resist the officer’s attempts to control him, but a civilian aided the
officer in apprehending Peacock. A second civilian then arrived, found the item
Peacock discarded in the alley, and gave that item to another officer at the scene.
On May 18, 2015, Peacock was the target of a controlled-buy operation conducted
by law enforcement. During that operation, Peacock sold cocaine to a confidential
informant (“CI”).
{¶3} On August 5, 2015, Peacock was indicted on Count One of possession
of heroin, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),(C)(6)(a), a felony of the fifth degree,
Count Two of tampering with evidence, a violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1),(B), a
felony of the third degree, Count Three of resisting arrest, a violation of R.C.
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2921.33(A),(D), a misdemeanor of the second degree, and Count Four of trafficking
in cocaine, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1),(C)(4)(a), a felony of the fifth degree.
(Doc. No. 1). On August 25, 2015, Peacock pled not guilty to the charges in the
indictment. (Doc. No. 11).
{¶4} On September 11, 2015, Peacock appeared for a pretrial conference at
which the trial court, at Peacock’s request, relieved Peacock’s previously appointed
counsel and appointed new stand-by counsel to assist Peacock because Peacock
wished to represent himself. (Doc. No. 26).
{¶5} On November 24, 2015, a bench trial began, during which Peacock
requested that the trial court continue the trial and appoint him counsel, which the
trial court did. (Nov. 24, 2015 Tr. at 35, 43). The trial court released Peacock’s
stand-by counsel from his responsibilities and appointed new counsel for Peacock.1
(Doc. No. 60).
{¶6} The bench trial resumed on September 15, 2016. (Sept. 15, 2016 Tr. at
5). On September 20, 2016, the trial court found Peacock guilty of each count of
the indictment. (Sep. 20, 2016 Tr. at 3). The trial court then sentenced Peacock to
9 months in prison as to Count One, 30 months in prison as to Count Two, 60 days
in jail as to Count Three, and 9 months in prison as to Count Four, with the time for
1
Peacock did not specifically ask that his stand-by trial counsel be relieved. (Nov. 24, 2015 Tr. at 37-44).
However, by the hearing on a motion to continue the trial on August 2, 2016, Peacock’s new counsel had
appeared, and his previously appointed stand-by counsel was not present. (Aug. 2, 2016 Tr. at 2).
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all charges to be served concurrently for a total of 30 months of incarceration. (Oct.
27, 2016 Tr. at 13-14). The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on
November 1, 2016. (Doc. No. 101).
{¶7} On November 8, 2016, Peacock filed his notice of appeal. (Appeal Doc.
No. 1). He raises four assignments of error for our review. For ease of organization,
we will address Peacock’s first, second, and third assignments of error together,
followed by his fourth assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court Erred In Finding Appellant Guilty Of
Tampering With Evidence Where the State Failed to Introduce
Sufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction.
Assignment of Error No. III
The Trial Court Erred In Finding Appellant Guilty Of Resisting
Arrest Where The State Failed To Introduce Sufficient Evidence
To Support The Conviction.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court Erred In Finding Appellant Guilty Of Possession
Of Heroin When The Conviction Was Against The Manifest
Weight Of The Evidence.
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Peacock argues that his tampering-with-
evidence conviction is based on insufficient evidence. Specifically, he argues that
his tampering-with-evidence conviction is based on insufficient evidence because
the State failed to demonstrate that Peacock knew that an investigation was in
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progress or that one was about or was likely to begin. (Appellant’s Brief at 7).
Peacock further argues that his tampering-with-evidence conviction is based on
insufficient evidence because there was insufficient evidence presented to show that
he “altered destroyed, concealed, or removed any record, document, or thing with
purpose to impair its value or availability in a pending investigation.” (Id. at 8);
R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). That is, Peacock argues that there is insufficient evidence that
he discarded the bag of drugs. (Id.). He argues that, on a windy day such as the one
in question, any item of trash could have been blowing by, and he argues that the
officer could simply have been mistaken about what he saw because his vision had
blurred. (Id.).
{¶9} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly,
“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the
evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
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credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v.
Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33,
citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).
See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19
(“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight
of the evidence.”), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
{¶10} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v.
Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
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{¶11} R.C. 2921.12 sets forth the elements of the offense of tampering with
evidence and provides, in relevant part: “No person, knowing that an official
proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted
shall * * * [a]lter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with
purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or
investigation * * *.” R.C. 2921.12(A)(1).
{¶12} “Knowledge that a criminal investigation is under way or is imminent
is based upon a reasonable person standard.” State v. Hicks, 3d Dist. Union Nos.
14-07-26 and 14-07-31, 2008-Ohio-3600, ¶ 54, citing State v. Mann, 12th Dist.
Clermont No. CA2006-05-035, 2007-Ohio-1555, ¶ 11. In order to tamper with
evidence within the meaning of the statute, one must intend to impair the value or
availability of evidence that is related to an existing or likely investigation, with the
likelihood of the investigation measured at the time of the act of alleged tampering.
State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 19.
{¶13} R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) employs a “purposely” culpability standard. See
State v. Skorvanek, 182 Ohio App.3d 615, 2009-Ohio-1709, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.), citing
State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23234, 2006-Ohio-6963, ¶ 13-15. “A person
acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the
gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of
what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage
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in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). See Skorvanek at ¶ 21. A defendant’s
state of mind may be inferred from the totality of the surrounding circumstances
when determining whether the defendant acted purposely. Skorvanek at ¶ 21, citing
State v. Patel, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24030, 2008-Ohio-4693, ¶ 34.
{¶14} Therefore, the key inquiries in this case are whether the evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is such that any rational
trier of fact could have found that (1) a reasonable person in Peacock’s position
would have known that an official investigation was in progress or was about to be
or likely to be instituted, and (2) Peacock removed a bag of drugs from his person
with the intention of impairing its availability as evidence in the investigation. As
such, we will address whether a reasonable person in Peacock’s position would have
known an official investigation was in progress or was about or likely to be instituted
first, and whether he concealed or removed a bag of drugs from his person with
intention of impairing their availability in the investigation second.
{¶15} At trial, Fostoria Police Officer Nate Elliot (“Officer Elliot”) testified
that, on November 29, 2014, at approximately 4:22 p.m., he drove past Fort Ball
Pizza on West Center Street, having previously become aware that Peacock was
staying at an apartment in the area. (Nov. 24, 2015 Tr. at 22). Officer Elliot averred
that, at that location, he observed a vehicle registered to Aubrey Jones, a man whose
license was suspended and whose description matched that of the man who was
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operating that vehicle at that time. (Id. at 22-24). Officer Elliot then testified that,
after driving about and receiving information about the vehicle and the person to
whom it was registered, he then returned to the spot where the vehicle was parked
and saw that its driver exited the vehicle and was walking northbound through a
parking lot. (Id. at 23-24). Officer Elliot parked his patrol car, exited his vehicle,
and yelled to the driver of the other vehicle, asking whether that driver would come
and speak with him. (Id. at 24). Officer Elliot discerned that the driver of said
vehicle was not Aubrey Jones, but rather Peacock, whom he knew from prior
encounters. (Id. at 24-25).
{¶16} Officer Elliot testified that Peacock falsely identified himself as
Kewan Hayes. (Id. at 26-27). Officer Elliot testified that he then grabbed Peacock
by the arm and indicated that he knew Peacock was not Kewan Hayes, at which
point Peacock put his right hand in his coat pocket and fled on foot. (Id. at 27).
Officer Elliot testified that a chase then ensued. (Id. at 27). He testified that, during
that pursuit and while he was approximately five or six feet behind Peacock and
running through an alley, he observed Peacock remove his right hand from his
pocket and discard an item. (Id.). That item appeared to be a clear plastic bag with
lottery papers inside. (Id. at 28). Officer Elliot testified that he saw where Peacock
threw the item. (Id.).
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{¶17} Officer Elliot next testified that Jeremiah McDonald (“McDonald”), a
civilian who arrived on the scene, located the item that Peacock discarded. (Id. at
29). He said that he saw McDonald pick up the item from the spot to which Peacock
discarded it, that he followed McDonald as McDonald walked through the alley and
around a building, and that he saw McDonald hand the item to Officer Chad
Marchetto (“Marchetto”) of the Fostoria Police Department, who by then had
arrived on the scene. (Id. at 32).
{¶18} On cross examination, Officer Elliot testified that he worked
approximately ten hours on the day in question by the time he encountered Peacock.
(Nov. 24, 2015 Tr. at 8). He further admitted that he has a medical condition that
fatigues him quickly if his heart rate increases and also blurs his vision. (Id. at 23).
Officer Elliot conceded that a great deal of drug activity takes place in the alley
through which Peacock ran. (Id. at 30). Officer Elliot asserted that, at the time he
saw Peacock discard the bag of drugs in the alley, he was four or five yards behind
Peacock. (Id. at 32).2 Officer Elliot went on to explain that, once the chase was
concluded and Jeremiah McDonald arrived and searched the alley, Officer Elliot
yelled to McDonald from some distance away to stop McDonald from picking up
any potential evidence. (Sept. 15, 2016 Tr. at 35). Despite this, Officer Elliot said
McDonald picked up a bag of drugs and gave it to Officer Marchetto. (See id. at
2
Officer Elliot’s earlier testimony indicated that he was “five or six feet” from Peacock when the item was
thrown. (Nov. 24, 2015 Tr. at 27).
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35-36). Officer Elliot admitted to losing sight of McDonald “briefly” as McDonald
walked around a building after picking up the bag of drugs. (Id. at 36).
{¶19} This case presents a set of facts strikingly similar to those we
addressed in State v. Rock. State v. Rock, 3rd Dist. Seneca No. 13-13-38, 2014-
Ohio-1786. In Rock, a police officer approached three individuals while operating
his cruiser at approximately 2:45 a.m. Id. at ¶ 15. As he did so, the officer observed
one of the three individuals toss something from his pocket to the ground. Id. at ¶
15. After some questioning, Rock admitted to the officer that one of his companions
passed the drugs to him as the officer approached, and Rock discarded the drugs
under the belief that they were Vicodin. Id. at ¶ 17. When addressing whether the
evidence in Rock was sufficient to show that a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have known an investigation was about or was likely to be instituted,
we held that “passing illegal drugs in front of others in public would put a reasonable
person on notice that this illegal activity would be reported to law enforcement and
an investigation instituted.” Id. at ¶ 19. We further held that “a reasonable person
in Rock’s position would not have felt the need to toss the pills aside * * * if that
person did not believe an investigation was about or was likely to be instituted.” Id.
at ¶ 20.
{¶20} Here, Peacock did as Rock did—passed illegal drugs in view of the
public by removing the drugs from his person in the hope that the approaching
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officer would not find them. He would have had no reason to do so if he did not
believe that an investigation concerning those drugs was in progress or was likely
to be instituted. This case presents an even more favorable set of facts for the State
because Peacock discarded the bag of drugs during the light of the day with Officer
Elliot running a few feet behind him rather than in the darkness of the morning as
an officer approached him from some distance in a cruiser, making it all the more
likely that his action would be seen and would result in an investigation.
{¶21} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we conclude that a reasonable person in Peacock’s position would have known that
an official investigation was in progress or was about to be or likely to be instituted
at the time he discarded the item in question.
{¶22} Second, we will address whether the State presented sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that Peacock concealed or removed any record, document,
or thing to impair its value or availability in such proceeding or investigation. We
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that Peacock removed the
drugs from his person and concealed them by throwing them with the intention of
impairing their availability as evidence in an investigation. Officer Elliot saw
Peacock throw an item from his pocket during the chase, saw where the item landed,
and later was able to determine that said item was a bag of drugs.
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{¶23} Discarding a bag of drugs from one’s person during a chase is
precisely the sort of conduct the tampering statute contemplates, and the fact-finder
could reasonably infer that Peacock did so in order to prevent the item from being
used by placing it out of sight or otherwise getting rid of it. See State v. Colquitt,
2d Dist. Clark No. 98-CA-71, 1999 WL 812313, *5 (Sept. 24, 1999) (concluding
that testimony about the defendant’s throwing a bag of drugs over a fence as officers
approached was sufficient to establish concealment or removal of the evidence in
order to impair its availability in an investigation). The mere fact that Peacock did
what he did on a windy day on which various things could have been blowing about
while being chased by an officer in imperfect physical condition does not alter our
sufficiency analysis. The officer said what he said, and the finder of fact believed
him.
{¶24} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found it proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that a reasonable person in Peacock’s position knew that an official
investigation was about or likely to be instituted and that Peacock removed or
concealed a bag of drugs with the specific intention of impairing its availability as
evidence in the investigation.
{¶25} For the foregoing reasons, Peacock’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
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{¶26} In his third assignment of error, Peacock argues that his resisting-arrest
conviction is based on insufficient evidence. Specifically, he argues that, though
Officer Elliot pursued and attempted to restrain Peacock, Officer Elliot never told
Peacock that he was under arrest, and there was no evidence to suggest that Officer
Elliot believed that Peacock was involved in any illegal activity. (Appellant’s Brief
at 11). Though Peacock does not quite make his argument in these terms, it appears
from his brief that Peacock asserts that he did not act recklessly with respect to
resisting arrest because he had no reason to believe that Officer Elliot was
attempting to arrest him. (See id.).
{¶27} R.C. 2921.33 sets forth the elements of the offense of resisting arrest,
and it provides, in relevant part, “No person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or
interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” R.C. 2921.33(A). “A person
is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such
circumstances are likely to exist.” R.C. 2901.22(C).
{¶28} At trial, Officer Elliot testified that he told Peacock to stop during the
pursuit and that, when Officer Elliot eventually detained Peacock, Peacock did not
comply with his efforts to restrain him. (Nov. 24, 2015 Tr. at 29). According to
Officer Elliot, he had to wrestle with Peacock on the ground until a civilian—
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Stephen Schalk (“Schalk”)—arrived and helped place Peacock in restraints. (Id.; Id
at 32).
{¶29} Schalk also testified on the State’s behalf. (Sept. 15, 2016 Tr. at 79).
He testified that, on November 29, 2014, he observed Officer Elliot interacting with
Peacock in a parking lot on the corner of Wood Street and Tiffin Street. (Id.).
According to Schalk, he saw the police officer reach for Peacock, at which point
both took off running. (Id.). Schalk said that the two men than ran through an alley
and, the next time Schalk saw them, they were on the ground as Officer Elliot
struggled to control Peacock; Schalk approached and helped Officer Elliot place
Peacock in restraints. (Id. at 80).
{¶30} This case presents facts similar to those in State v. Dice, 3rd Dist.
Marion No. 9-04-41, 2005-Ohio-2505. In that case, Dice was the object of a police
investigation because he allegedly threatened his wife with a firearm. Id. at ¶ 5.
When the officers located Dice, he fled despite their instructions to stop, and they
pursued him. Id. at ¶ 8. One of the officers eventually tackled Dice, despite which
Dice continued to struggle so much that the officer could not complete the arrest
without help from another officer who assisted in subduing Dice. Id. at ¶ 27. When
Dice came before this Court arguing that there was insufficient evidence of resisting
arrest at trial, we concluded that, based on the facts above, sufficient evidence
existed to convict Dice of resisting arrest. Id.
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{¶31} Here, as in Dice, Officer Elliot was led on a chase prior to
apprehending Peacock. In each case, law enforcement told the defendant to stop to
no avail; and, in each case, the defendant was eventually captured, which
coincidentally required two people each time.
{¶32} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Peacock recklessly or forcefully resisted or interfered with a lawful arrest.
Therefore, Peacock’s resisting arrest conviction is based on sufficient evidence.
{¶33} For the foregoing reasons, Peacock’s third assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶34} In his second assignment of error, Peacock argues that his conviction
for possession of heroin is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically,
he argues that his conviction for possession of heroin is against the manifest weight
of the evidence because, though Officer Elliot believes he saw Peacock discard an
item while running through the alley, the officer was also suffering from a health
condition that impaired his vision. (Appellant’s Brief at 10). Further, he argues that
his possession-of-heroin conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence
because the alley in which the bag of heroin was found is one known for extensive
drug activity, meaning that there could very easily have been drugs in the alley
before Peacock came on the scene. (Id.). Peacock further argues that his conviction
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is against the manifest weight of the evidence because Schalk searched the alley at
Officer Elliot’s request and found nothing, while McDonald produced a bag of drugs
after ignoring the officer’s instructions to guard the alley, walking around the
building, and disappearing from sight. (Id.). Peacock also notes that, upon his
capture, he had no drugs or weapons on his person. (Id.).
{¶35} The offense of possession of heroin is set forth in R.C. 2925.11, which
provides, in relevant part:
{¶36} “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled
substance or a controlled substance analog. * * * If the drug involved in the
violation is heroin or a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing
heroin, whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of possession of
heroin.” R.C. 2925.11(A),(C)(6). “Possession” means having control over a thing
or substance, though it may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or
substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or
substance is found. R.C. 2925.01(K).
{¶37} Many of the facts weighing in favor of Peacock’s possession-of-heroin
conviction are summarized above in our discussion of his first assignment of error.
We find it unnecessary to review them in their entirety. We will simply note that
Officer Elliot testified that, while pursuing Peacock from a distance of five to six
feet behind him, he saw Peacock discard an item from his pocket, suspected the item
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might be contraband, and saw the location where the item landed. Officer Elliot
then averred that he saw civilian Jeremiah McDonald pick up the item from the spot
to which Peacock had thrown it and deliver that item to Officer Marchetto. That
item was tested and was found to contain heroin.
{¶38} McDonald testified on the State’s behalf. (Sept. 15, 2016 Tr. at 85).
McDonald was handed State’s Exhibit 2 and identified that item as the item he saw
discarded on the day in question and as the item that he picked up before handing it
to another officer. (Id. 87-88). That item was previously identified as the bag
containing heroin. (Nov. 24, 2015 Tr. at 34-36; State’s Ex. 3.). McDonald testified
that the officer on the scene had told him Peacock discarded something in the alley
and that McDonald should go look for it. (Id. at 96). McDonald then said he went
to the alley and picked up a bag that appeared to him to contain bubble gum. (Id. at
96-97). McDonald also said that he did not hear Officer Elliot call out to him as he
walked down the alley. (Id. at 98). He testified that he gave the bag containing the
drugs to the first officer he saw. (Id. at 100).
{¶39} Kelsey Degen (“Degen”), a forensic scientist with the Bureau of
Criminal Investigation (“BCI”), testified on behalf of the State. (Sept. 15, 2016 Tr.
at 116). She conducted an analysis on State’s Exhibit 2. (Id. at 123). According to
her findings, that exhibit contained heroin. (Id.; State’s Ex. 3).
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{¶40} As Peacock notes in his brief, Schalk’s testimony at trial indicates that
he did not see narcotics on Peacock or in the alley despite the fact that he searched
the alley for the item Peacock discarded. (Id. at 81-82).
{¶41} Weighing the evidence above, we conclude that the fact-finder did not
clearly lose its way in convicting Peacock of the offense of possession of heroin.
Officer Elliot saw Peacock discard a bag during the chase. McDonald retrieved a
bag from the alley, which Officer Elliot identified as the same bag he saw Peacock
throw, and that bag contained heroin. Mr. Peacock’s argument amounts to an
assertion that the fact-finder should not have believed the state’s witnesses because
Peacock’s version is more credible under the circumstances, but the mere fact that
the officer’s eyesight was less than perfect or that the heroin may have belonged to
someone else does not weigh heavily against Peacock’s conviction. State v.
McCary, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 16 (noting that a
conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the
fact-finder chose to believe one version of events over another). Nor does the fact
that McDonald did not follow Officer Elliot’s instructions to the letter in handling
the contraband he found; regardless of the route he took to give the evidence to the
police, McDonald testified that he picked up the item he saw Peacock discard, and
McDonald testified that he then gave that item to law enforcement. (Sept. 15, 2016
Tr. at 87-88). The fact-finder was permitted to believe McDonald. State v. Green,
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10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-526, 2012-Ohio-950, ¶ 11. Therefore, Peacock’s
possession-of-heroin conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶42} For the foregoing reasons, Peacock’s second assignment of error is
overruled.
Assignment of Error No. IV
Appellant Was Not Provided Effective Assistance Of Counsel
When Appellant’s Attorney Failed To Provide A Warning To
Appellant Prior to Making A Statement And To Advise Appellant
Regarding His Fifth Amendment Right to Remain Silent Prior To
The Attorney’s Release As Counsel of Record For Appellant.
{¶43} In his fourth assignment of error, Peacock argues that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he argues that his trial
counsel was ineffective because his trial counsel provided no warnings to Peacock
about his right to remain silent or that the statements he made at the pretrial
conference could be used against him at trial. (Appellant’s Brief at 13).
{¶44} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
establish: (1) the counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the
circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v.
Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Prejudice results when “‘there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.’” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142, quoting
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Strickland at 694. “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.
{¶45} We conclude that Peacock failed to demonstrate that prejudice resulted
from his trial counsel’s alleged failures. In light of our dispositions of Peacock’s
other three assignments of error, which pertained to Counts One, Two, and Three,
Peacock has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the results as to those
counts would have been different. We thus conclude that Peacock has not
demonstrated prejudice and that his trial counsel was not ineffective as to those
counts. State v. Six, No. 98CA9, 1999 WL 339233 (May 28, 1999) (concluding that
a trial counsel’s allowing certain statements into evidence did not demonstrate
prejudice where “a significant amount” of other evidence had been introduced to
prove the defendant’s guilt).
{¶46} We will now address whether Peacock has demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood that the outcome as to Count Four would have been different but for his
admission.
{¶47} At trial, Detective Gabriel Wedge of the Seneca County Drug Task
Force (“Detective Wedge”) testified that he was involved in a controlled-buy
operation that took place May 18, 2015. (Sept. 15, 2016 Tr. at 140). He said that,
prior to the operation, a CI contacted him and indicated that he intended to carry out
a drug transaction with someone identified as “Freak P.” (Id. at 143). “Freak P” is
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an alias that Peacock uses. (Id. at 139). According to Detective Wedge, he searched
the CI prior to the controlled-buy operation and found that the CI had no contraband
on his person. (Id.). The CI was then outfitted with audio-visual equipment and
provided money to purchase drugs. (Id.). Detective Wedge testified that he saw
Peacock meet with the CI in an alley and that, after that meeting, the CI told
Detective Wedge that Peacock accepted the money and went to procure drugs. (Id.
at 145). Next, Detective Wedge testified that he observed Peacock return to the area
and enter the CI’s home. (Id. at 146). Detective Wedge then identified State’s
Exhibit 6 as the audio-visual record of the transaction, which was subsequently
played for the trial court. (Id. at 152); (State’s Ex. 6).
{¶48} Detective Charles Boyer (“Detective Boyer”) of the Tiffin Police
Department testified that, at the conclusion of the operation, he picked up the CI,
and the CI provided to him a rock-like substance that Detective Boyer suspected
was cocaine, which Detective Boyer then provided to Detective Wedge. (Sept. 15,
2016 Tr. at 210). Detective Boyer identified State’s Exhibit 4 as the substance he
provided to Detective Wedge. (Id. at 210-211).
{¶49} Larry Rentz (“Rentz”), a forensic scientist with BCI, testified that he
analyzed State’s Exhibit 4. (Id. at 188). He further identified State’s Exhibit 5 as
the report indicating that State’s Exhibit 4 contained cocaine. (Id. at 189); (State’s
Ex. 5).
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{¶50} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Peacock did not
demonstrate prejudice, and his counsel was not ineffective. Even in the absence of
Peacock’s admissions during the pretrial proceeding, we find it highly unlikely that
the result as to Count Four would have been different in the absence of what Peacock
alleges were his trial counsel’s errors. State v. Inman, 9th Dist. Medina No.
03CA0122-M, 2004-Ohio-3424, ¶¶ 26-27 (concluding that a charge of trafficking
in cocaine was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence where authorities used a CI and a recording device, as well
as visual surveillance by officers to identify the defendant as a drug trafficker).
Because we conclude that Peacock’s trial counsel’s not advising him to remain
silent or that his statements could be used against him does not satisfy the second
element of the Strickland analysis, it is unnecessary for us to address whether the
first element of Strickland is met. State v. Anaya, 191 Ohio App.3d 602, 2010-
Ohio-6045, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.). Therefore, Peacock’s trial counsel was not ineffective.
{¶51} For the foregoing reasons, Peacock’s fourth assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶52} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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