16‐2057‐cv
Advanced Access Content Sys. Licensing Adm’r, LLC v. Tao
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of May, two thousand seventeen.
4
5 PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI,
6 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
8 Circuit Judges.
9 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
10 ADVANCED ACCESS CONTENT SYSTEM LICENSING
11 ADMINISTRATOR, LLC,
12
13 Plaintiff‐Appellee,
14
15 v. No. 16‐2057‐cv
16
17 FENG TAO, DBA DVDFAB, DBA FENGTAO SOFTWARE
18 INC.,
19
20 Defendant‐Appellant.*
21 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
22
23 FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL CUKOR (Vincent E.
24 McGeary, on the brief), McGeary
25 Cukor LLC, Morristown, NJ.
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform to the caption above.
1 FOR APPELLEE: G. ROXANNE ELINGS (George P.
2 Wukoson, L. Danielle Toaltoan, on the
3 brief), Davis Wright Tremaine LLP,
4 New York, NY.
5
6
7 Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern
8 District of New York (Vernon S. Broderick, Judge).
9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
10 AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
11 Defendant‐appellant Feng Tao appeals from an order of the District Court
12 (Broderick, J.) granting in part a motion by Advanced Access Content System
13 Licensing Administrator, LLC (“AACS LA”) to amend a preliminary injunction
14 and denying Tao’s motions to amend the injunction and vacate the entry of
15 default. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior
16 proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
17 Tao principally challenges the amended preliminary injunction, arguing
18 first that AACS LA failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and second that the
19 injunction was unlawful insofar as it applied extraterritorially and enjoined
20 foreign third parties.
2
1 The District Court acted within its discretion in finding that AACS LA
2 would suffer irreparable harm absent the amended preliminary injunction.
3 Relying on sworn declarations, the District Court found that Tao’s software
4 allowed users to circumvent AACS LA’s encryption technology and thereby
5 undermined AACS LA’s business model. Further, Tao’s conduct indicated a
6 strong likelihood of future violations. We perceive no error in these findings,
7 which were sufficient to justify the amended injunction. See WPIX, Inc. v. ivi,
8 Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2012); Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 123 (2d Cir.
9 2005).
10 Nor does the amended injunction reach impermissibly beyond the United
11 States. The injunction does bind certain foreign third‐party registries and
12 payment processors who receive actual notice of the injunction. But the
13 injunction merely notifies these parties that they “could become liable through
14 Rule 65 if they assist [the defendant] in violating the district court’s orders.”
15 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 243 (2d Cir. 2013).
16 “[F]ederal courts can enjoin conduct that ‘has or is intended to have a substantial
17 effect within the United States.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d
18 1025, 1036 (2d Cir. 1985)). The District Court provided enough reasons why the
3
1 injunction must reach the “process” through which Tao distributes his software,
2 see id. at 244, as Tao continued to rely on foreign third parties to facilitate access
3 to the United States market even after the original injunction issued.
4 Tao also asks that we vacate the preliminary injunction and entry of default
5 on the ground that service was improper. Tao has arguably forfeited this
6 argument before the District Court. See Datskow v. Teledyne, Inc., Cont’l Prods.
7 Div., 899 F.2d 1298, 1303 (2d Cir. 1990). In any event, this fact‐intensive
8 challenge—which was never litigated, but still could be raised, below1—is not
9 properly before us and we decline to consider it on appeal in the first instance.
10 See Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 838 F.3d 86, 96 (2d Cir. 2016).
11 We have considered the remaining arguments and conclude that they are
12 without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court is
13 AFFIRMED.
14 FOR THE COURT:
15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
1 We express no opinion on the timeliness of any such challenge.
4