NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 11 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-30327
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:94-cr-00398-TSZ-1
v.
JOHNNY MADISON WILLIAMS, Jr., MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-30328
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:94-cr-00548-TSZ-1
v.
JOHNNY MADISON WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-30329
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:94-cr-00550-TSZ-1
v.
JOHNNY MADISON WILLIAMS, Jr.,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-30330
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:94-cr-00604-TSZ-1
v.
JOHNNY MADISON WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 9, 2017**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Johnny Madison Williams, Jr. appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion to discharge over $857,000 in criminal restitution. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo legal and constitutional challenges to
the application of restitution sentences. United States v. Berger, 574 F.3d 1202,
1204 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. DeSalvo, 41 F.3d 505, 511 (9th Cir. 1994).
We affirm.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2
Williams argues that extending the time period under which he is obligated
to pay restitution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. When Williams was
sentenced, his liability to pay restitution terminated “twenty years after the entry of
the judgment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1) (1992). However, under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), a defendant’s liability to pay
restitution terminates “the later of 20 years from the entry of judgment or 20 years
after the release from imprisonment of the [defendant].” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b). We
recently held that the MVRA’s termination-of-liability provision applies in
Williams’s situation. See United States v. Blackwell, 852 F.3d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir.
2017) (per curiam). We also concluded that applying the MVRA’s termination-of-
liability provision is procedural and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.;
see also United States v. Gianelli, 543 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Procedural changes, . . . which do not alter the definition of criminal conduct or
increase the penalty by which a crime is punishable, do not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.” (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
3
United States v. Michael Eckenrode
Combined Opinion