NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 11 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAROLD D. HARDEN, No. 16-15328
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00560-JAD-NJK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SOBORO; BROWN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 8, 2017**
Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Harold D. Harden appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and
access-to-courts claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo the district court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir.
2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harden’s due
process claim arising from an alleged unlawful deprivation of property because
Harden failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he lacked an
adequate postdeprivation remedy under Nevada law. See Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§ 41.031, 41.0322, 209.243; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[A]n
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not
constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harden’s access-
to-courts claim because Harden failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether defendants caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous claim. See Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-49, 354-55 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-
to-courts claim and actual injury requirement).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in appellant’s opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2009).
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All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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