IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
EDWARD A. KOVACH,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D15-2335
HOLIDAY SPRINGS RV, LLC,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed May 12, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Hernando County,
Daniel B. Merritt, Sr., Judge.
Edward B. Cole, of Cole Law Firm,
P.A., Palm Harbor, for Appellant.
Paetra T. Brownlee and Charles M.
Greene, of Charles M. Greene, P.A.,
Orlando, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant challenges a summary judgment construing an easement contained
within a deed. Concluding that the trial court misconstrued the easement, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
The easement in question conveys “to the said grantee, and grantee's heirs and
assigns forever the following described land, situate, lying and being in Hernando County,
Florida, to-wit: An ingress/egress, utility, and drainage easement over the following
described property.” Appellant is named as “grantee.” The trial court concluded that this
easement may only be used by Appellant as named grantee and no other person,
including Appellant’s invitees. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court misconstrued
our decision in City of Orlando v. MSD-Mattie, L.L.C., 895 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA
2005). In that decision, we addressed an easement in gross where the grant was
expressly confined to a limited use. Nothing in that decision supports the proposition that
an easement that runs with the land may be used solely by the grantee. As a general
proposition, the holder of an easement is entitled to use the easement “in a manner that
is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude . . . [including]
normal development of the dominant estate.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes §
4.10 (2000).
Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), upon which Appellee
relies, is distinguishable. There, the easement stated that it was to be used “solely for the
benefit of the owner or owners.” After making the threshold determination that it was
ambiguous, our sister court then considered extrinsic evidence of what was originally
intended and concluded that access by campground patrons exceeded the contemplated
use as originally intended. Id. at 1143. Terrill v. Coe, 1 So. 3d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008),
also relied upon by Appellee, reversed the trial court’s summary judgment because issues
of fact precluded summary judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER, TORPY, and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
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