NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5760-14T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JASON E. MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________
Submitted March 28, 2017 – Decided May 16, 2017
Before Judges Messano and Grall.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County,
Indictment No. 12-12-1139.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Rochelle Watson, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Kim L.
Barfield, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jason E. Moore (defendant or Moore) appeals the
denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained with two
search warrants. After the denial, defendant and the State
reached a plea agreement. In conformity with that agreement,
defendant pled guilty to two of the eight counts naming him in
an indictment returned by the grand jurors for Cumberland
County. Defendant was charged with crimes related to the
killing of Ervin M. Harper, the disposal of Harper's remains and
the production and distribution of marijuana. More
specifically, defendant pled guilty to count one, first-degree
aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) (amended from
murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(2)); and count four, second-
degree disturbing or desecrating human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-
1(a)(1).
As agreed, the remaining charges against defendant were
dismissed. The charges were: possessing a weapon with an
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count two); conspiring
with co-defendants, Lewis I. Moore and Amber M. Price, to
disturb and desecrate human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and
N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1 (count three); conspiring with the same co-
defendants to hinder and hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2
2 A-5760-14T1
and N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3 (counts five and eight)1; possessing a
controlled dangerous substance, marijuana in a quantity of more
than 50 grams, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3) (count nine);
manufacturing, distributing or dispensing marijuana, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(11) (count ten); and possessing a weapon
in the course of manufacturing, distributing or dispensing
marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a) (count eleven).
In conformity with the State's recommendation set forth in
the plea agreement, the judge sentenced defendant to a twenty-
year term of imprisonment for aggravated manslaughter, subject
to terms of parole ineligibility and parole supervision required
by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and to a
consecutive five-year term of imprisonment for disturbing human
remains. Both sentences are concurrent with a sentence
defendant was then serving for drug crimes charged in Indictment
10-04-1149. The judge also imposed the appropriate fines,
penalties and assessments, and at the State's request, dismissed
the charges against defendant in the remaining counts of the
indictment and eleven open cases.
1
Count four also charged Lewis I. Moore and Price with
desecration, 2C:22-1, and counts six and seven, respectively,
charged Price and Lewis I. Moore with hindering apprehension.
3 A-5760-14T1
At the time of his plea, defendant acknowledged shooting
Harper twice with a .357 handgun as Harper stood in the "side
driveway" of defendant's property. He further acknowledged
burying Harper in a wooded area of his property and later
unearthing and dismembering Harper's remains and placing them in
trash bags that he then buried in remote woods away from his
premises.
On appeal, defendant raises two issues for our consideration.
POINT I
BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON STALE INFORMATION,
PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE
OF THE FIRST SEARCH WARRANT. CONSEQUENTLY,
THE SECOND SEARCH WARRANT IS ALSO INVALID AS
THE FRUIT OF THE FIRST.
POINT II
BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE YARBOUGH GUIDELINES, A REMAND FOR
RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude the information
supporting the issuance of the search warrant was not stale and
adequately supported a finding of probable cause. Further, we
determine that the judge gave full consideration to the
guidelines for consecutive sentencing established in State v.
Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) (adopting criteria for trial
judges to consider in determining whether concurrent or
4 A-5760-14T1
consecutive sentences are warranted), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986).
I.
Two search warrants were issued — the first on February 5,
2011, and the second on March 11, 2011. Defendant submits that
the first warrant was improperly issued on stale reports of a
marijuana operation and inadequate information linking him or
his searched premises to Harper's disappearance and demise. His
only challenge to the second warrant is that it was supported by
evidence obtained with the first, and as such, the evidence
found in the second search must be suppressed as the fruit of an
illegal search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.
Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Barry, 86 N.J. 80, 87,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017, 102 S. Ct. 553, 70 L. Ed. 2d 415
(1981).
To prevail, defendant has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of validity extended to a search conducted with a
warrant; to do that, he must "prove 'that there was no probable
cause supporting the issuance'" of the first warrant. State v.
Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004) (quoting State v. Valencia, 93
N.J. 126, 133 (1983)). In considering whether defendant met the
burden, this court must give "substantial deference" to the
discretionary determination made by the issuing judge. Jones,
5 A-5760-14T1
supra, 179 N.J. at 388. Even if we were to find the supporting
information "marginal," we would resolve the doubt by sustaining
the search. State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 116 (1968) (citing
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S. Ct. 741,
746, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 689 (1965)). Thus, the question is
whether the judge was presented "with facts sufficient to permit
the inference of the existence of probable cause" necessary to
issue a warrant. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 128 (1987).
The issuing judge, was required "'to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and
'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime [would] be found in'" the place or places to be searched.
State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 93, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033,
119 S. Ct. 576, 142 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1998) (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d
527, 548 (1983)). The judge had to "consider the totality of
the circumstances, and . . . deal with probabilities."
Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 (2000) (citing Gates,
supra, 462 U.S. at 230-31, 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2328, 2332, 76 L.
Ed. 2d at 543-44), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146, 121 S. Ct. 1083,
148 L. Ed. 2d 959 (2001).
6 A-5760-14T1
The affidavit must have provided a "substantial basis" for
finding informant-accounts credible. State v. Sullivan, 169
N.J. 204, 212 (2001); accord Smith, supra, 155 N.J. at 92. In
making that assessment, an officer and a judge may assume the
veracity of concerned citizens, State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192,
216 (2002); recognize that detailed accounts of criminal
activity provide something more substantial than rumor,
Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 121; rely on corroborating
evidence investigating officers acquired, id. at 126; consider
evidence of defendant's criminal history included in the
affidavit, State v. Valentino, 134 N.J. 536, 550 (1994); and
assign value to inferences the affiant drew based on his
experience and training that "an untrained person could not"
draw, Smith, supra, 155 N.J. at 99; see also Novembrino, supra,
105 N.J. at 126.
Defendant's claim of "staleness" bears on whether the
totality of the information in the affidavit permitted the judge
to find "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime [would] be found" if defendant's premises were searched
during the time permitted in the warrant. Smith, supra, 155
N.J. at 93. In short, staleness is a question of whether the
probable cause still exists when the warrant is issued and at
the time of the search. State v. Blaurock, 143 N.J. Super. 476,
7 A-5760-14T1
479 (App. Div. 1976); see also Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S.
206, 53 S. Ct. 138, 77 L. Ed. 260 (1932).
"[T]imeliness and its converse, staleness, must be measured
by the [n]ature and regularity of the allegedly unlawful
activity." United States v. Nilsen, 482 F. Supp. 1335, 1339
(D.N.J. 1980). Thus, "'[w]here the affidavit recites a mere
isolated violation it would not be unreasonable to imply that
probable cause dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time.
However, where the affidavit properly recites facts indicating
activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a course of
conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant.'" United
States v. Harris, 482 F.2d 1115, 1119 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting
United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972));
accord Blaurock, supra, 143 N.J. Super. at 479-80 (relying on
Harris and Johnson).
With those standards as a guide, we turn to consider the
affidavit.
The affiant, Detective Ryan P. Breslin, applied for and
obtained the first warrant on February 5, 2011. At that time,
Breslin was serving as a detective in the Major Crime Unit of
the Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office (CCPO). CCPO hired
Breslin in November 2007, when Breslin had about one and one-
half years of service in a local police department and had
8 A-5760-14T1
graduated from the Vineland Police Academy. In his years with
CCPO, Breslin had investigated homicides, and had investigated
narcotics violations as a police officer. Breslin's training
included search warrant preparation, narcotics investigation,
and drug identification.
This investigation commenced in response to a missing
persons complaint filed by Kim Jenkins. Jenkins is the cousin
of Harper, the homicide victim. She reported that neither
family members nor friends had heard from or seen Harper since
January 20, 2011. She became concerned after a conversation
with Harper's girlfriend, Queen Lindsey, who said she had last
heard from Harper on January 13 via "Facebook," and he had said
he had been in an argument with someone named "Jason."
Jenkins had also spoken to Harper's nephew, Vernon Corbin,
also known as Vernon Blount. Vernon's mother, Ruby Blount, was
Harper's sister. Vernon told Jenkins that on January 28, "guys"
in a bar in Wildwood told him that "[t]hey got [Harper]."
Jenkins "believed Vernon was talking about members of the Blood
street gang because of a prior criminal investigation that
Harper was involved in."
The detectives had "several interviews" with Harper's
girlfriend, Lindsey. From her, they learned that she and Harper
had been dating for about four or five years and, like other
9 A-5760-14T1
couples, had problems that they worked out in a few days. She
had not heard from Harper since January 19, when he removed his
belongings from their apartment and went to live with Jason
Moore. She had repeatedly called Harper's cell phone number,
which she gave to Breslin. When Lindsey called, she was either
sent to voicemail or received no answer. She gave the
detectives two additional cell phone numbers for Harper.
Lindsey told Breslin it "was very unusual" that Harper had not
called her or family members since she last heard from him.
According to Lindsey, Harper did not have a car and always
used Jason Moore's car. Lindsey reported that, Harper and Moore
were friends and business partners and, in the past, Harper had
stayed with Moore after Harper and she had argued.
Lindsey further reported she had called Moore since January
23 to speak to Harper. When she had done that in the past,
Moore always had Harper get in touch with her. This time he did
not.
Lindsey told Breslin that she was
very suspicious of the stories that Moore was
providing concerning the whereabouts of
Harper. One of those stories was about Harper
stealing a quantity of marijuana from Moore
and Moore thr[owing] Harper out of the
residence. A second story was, on Friday,
January 21, 2011, Moore told Ms. Lindsey he
believed Harper had been smoking marijuana and
he was moving and talking very slowly. They
10 A-5760-14T1
(Moore and Harper) had gotten into an argument
over money or a cell phone bill and Harper
took a gun and left the residence. According
to Moore, that was the last time he saw Harper
(Friday, January 21, 2011).
When Ms. Lindsey asked about Harper's
clothing and pet dog, Moore told her Harper
left all of his clothing at the residence and
as a result of their argument he (Moore) shot
the dog. Lindsey then told [the detectives]
that he (Moore) later told her he didn't shoot
the dog, he just let it go.
Lindsey advised Breslin that Harper had a silver-colored
semi-automatic handgun. Although she had not seen Moore with a
handgun, she suspected he had one because of what he said about
shooting Harper's dog.
Lindsey knew about the Moore/Harper marijuana-distribution
partnership. She said Moore grows marijuana in a garage on his
property in Delmont, and Harper is one of his distributors.
They had been in that business together since April or May 2010.
During the week of January 1, 2011, she went to Moore's
house with Harper, and he showed her the indoor grow operation
in Moore's garage. She described the "grow operation" located
"in a hidden room in the garage with numerous lights on the
ceiling," about twenty-five marijuana plants were growing "in
what she described as five gallon buckets." And, there were
pipes leading to the plants and an area with smaller "starter"
11 A-5760-14T1
plants. The marijuana plants "were approximately three feet
tall and bushy."
Lindsey further advised Breslin that during a conversation
with Moore a week earlier, Moore asked if she planned to call
the police and to let him know if she did, "because he needed to
'clean up' a few things[,] and he really needed until the first
week or March to finish up." Breslin wrote, "[Lindsey] believes
he was referring to the marijuana grow and the growth of
plants."
Breslin explained why he believed the grow operation was
ongoing:
Based on training, education and
experience of this officer and the officers
involved . . . , we believe that information
provided by Ms. Lindsey is consistent with an
on going indoor marijuana grow. These facts,
coupled with Ms. Lindsey's recent
conversations with Moore about contacting the
police[,] leads this detective and the
detectives working on the investigation to
believe that the indoor grow is occurring at
this time. This information is consistent
with the growth cycle of a marijuana grow and
the maturity of the plants. The longer the
plants are allowed to grow the greater the
potency of the marijuana, and . . . the
economic value of the product.
Breslin acquired other information about Harper's
involvement in the marijuana business with Moore. According to
Lindsey, "Harper plays a big role in the distribution of
12 A-5760-14T1
marijuana from Moore," and she has personal knowledge of Harper
getting multiple pounds of marijuana at a time from Moore and
breaking them down into one ounce packages, which Harper would
distribute to various people. She further indicated, "Harper
was making a lot of money" and using it to take care of "her,
his son . . . and pay bills. Knowing all of this information
about the marijuana distribution also concerns Ms. Lindsey that
Moore is being evasive and inconsistent about Harper's
whereabouts."
Iesha Clark, the mother of Harper's son, spoke to Breslin
on February 4, 2011. She was "familiar with Harper selling
large quantities of marijuana with Moore, but could not go into
specific details because of the children being present." Clark
had last seen Harper on January 20 when he met her, took their
son for dinner and returned him to her as planned. Clark told
the detective that Harper was driving a gray Mazda that day and
said it belonged to Moore. Clark advised that was "very unusual
[for] Harper [to have] not contacted her since that date."
After receiving authorization, the detective checked all
the cell phone numbers he had been given for Harper. Because
the live global position of the phones showed no results, the
detective believed they were powered off. Call detail records
for the numbers "came back on [one] cell phone number . . . .
13 A-5760-14T1
The other numbers had no activity." The last of the calls
retrieved came during the late morning of January 22, and all
those calls were directed to voicemail. "There were no outgoing
phone calls made and there was no cell site tower information
provided."
The detective received approval from the County Prosecutor
to record a phone call from Lindsey to Moore, with Lindsey's
consent, however, Moore did not answer. While the police were
with Lindsey for the unsuccessful intercept, she received phone
calls from relatives of Vernon, reporting that he was calling
people and saying that Harper's body had been found.
Later, Ruby Blount called Breslin. She reported that she
had been speaking with Harper more frequently since her son
Vernon moved to New Jersey, and she said Harper had not been
returning her calls. She reported that the last time they
spoke, Harper was "stressed out" over his on-again off-again
relationship with Lindsey and with Jason Moore, who "sells
'weed' and . . . gave Vernon enough 'weed' to get him on his
feet." Ruby explained that Moore's involvement with Vernon
"bothered Harper and he was trying to keep Vernon away from that
activity." Harper had told her "he was living in Moore's
basement," "using Moore's cars to get around," and working as a
14 A-5760-14T1
partner of Moore's, who "had things in his house to grow and
sell marijuana."
Ruby also told Breslin that Vernon called her on January 29
and told her Harper was missing. Ruby called Moore, who told
her that he had let Harper stay in his house, but "put [him]
out" because things were missing. She also said she had been to
Moore's residence in 2008, which was in a "very rural" area.
Moore's criminal records disclosed a prior arrest in 2008
for an "indoor hydroponics marijuana grow in the garage" at a
residence in Delmont, New Jersey, which is the address of
defendant's premises identified in the search warrants at issue
here.
The detectives also tried but failed to find Harper by
contacting local medical facilities in Cumberland, Atlantic and
Cape May Counties, the State Medical Examiner, and county
correctional facilities throughout the State. None reported any
contact with Harper.
On the information summarized above, Breslin believed there
was probable cause for a warrant authorizing a search of the
premises, house and garage and the silver Mazda registered to
Moore for evidence of Harper's homicide, aggravated assault,
criminal restraint, or kidnapping, and for evidence of marijuana
possession, cultivation, and distribution.
15 A-5760-14T1
Mindful of our deferential standard of review, we conclude
that Breslin's affidavit contained ample evidence to support
issuance of a warrant authorizing the search of defendant's
home, garage and silver Mazda for evidence of marijuana
distribution and crimes related to Harper's unexplained
disappearance. The citizens who provided information were
persons concerned about Harper, because he had broken off
regular communications with them abruptly and without
explanation. Their consistent accounts of the approximate date
of their sudden loss of customary communication with Harper gave
Breslin sufficient reason to believe Harper was a victim of a
violent crime. Especially after an independent investigation
ruled out other probable and less sinister explanations, such as
hospitalization or incarceration.
In addition, these concerned individuals were repeating
Harper's disclosures of trouble between him and defendant
related to the marijuana business and defendant's involvement of
Vernon. Those details, repeated by Harper's confidants, gave
substantial reason to credit their information, and their
information pointed to defendant.
There was additional corroborated information of trouble
between Harper and defendant. Defendant gave the citizen-
informants, who contacted him to inquire about Harper,
16 A-5760-14T1
inconsistent explanations about the problems that led defendant
to put Harper out of his home and for Harper to leave without
his belongings. Defendant's accounts, albeit inconsistent,
suggested Harper was at fault. Defendant even told Lindsey he
had shot Harper's dog, which suggested defendant had a firearm,
and then said he had just let the dog go. Moreover, the
investigators obtained cell phone records that confirmed the
informants' accounts of when Harper went missing and stopped
answering his phone.
All of that provided ample support for "a practical,
common-sense decision" that the totality of the circumstances,
"including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons
supplying hearsay information," supported a determination that
there was "a fair probability" that "evidence of a crime"
against defendant would be found on his premises. Smith, supra,
155 N.J. at 93.
The information in the affidavit provided the same quality
and quantity of information establishing a fair probability that
evidence of marijuana distribution would be found on defendant's
premises and in the vehicle he allowed Harper to use. Lindsey's
detailed account of what she saw in defendant's garage during
the first week of January demonstrated the basis for her
knowledge about the "grow" facility. Similarly, her living with
17 A-5760-14T1
Harper for several years made her well-situated to observe and
report Harper's packaging and distribution of marijuana and his
access to sufficient funds to support her and Harper's son.
Again, her description of his business was corroborated by the
independent statements of the relatives and friends who, based
on conversations with Harper, were well-aware of the nature of
his partnership with defendant.
We agree with the judges who issued the warrant and denied
the motion to suppress that the affidavit contained information
establishing a fair probability that evidence of the marijuana
production and distribution would be found on defendant's
premises on February 5, when the warrant was issued. The
information was not stale.
Lindsey's detailed report of what she saw in the garage in
the first week of January, viewed with the other evidence,
indicated an ongoing marijuana operation at the time of Harper's
disappearance. That operation involved ceiling lights and
pipelines that defendant would not likely have been able to
dismantle and conceal by February 5. After all, defendant asked
Lindsey for notice of any call she made to the police so he
could clean up. Additionally, the inference Breslin drew about
the marijuana grow-cycle, which was based on his training and
experience, and inference available from defendant's prior
18 A-5760-14T1
arrest during the execution of a warrant authorizing a search of
the garage on this property in 2008 and its disclosure of a
hydroponic-marijuana grow operation further supported that
conclusion. The affidavit provided a substantial basis to
believe that evidence of the marijuana business Lindsey saw in
early January most likely would be there in early February.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
defendant failed to establish that the first warrant was
obtained with stale information of a crime related to marijuana.
Furthermore, there was sufficient information to establish
probable cause that evidence of a crime against Harper would
probably be found in the search of defendant's premises and the
vehicle he allowed Harper to use. Thus, the evidence obtained
during the search authorized by that warrant was lawfully
recovered, not tainted.
Because defendant's lone challenge to the second warrant
depends solely on the invalidity of the first, we have no reason
to address the second affidavit.
II.
Defendant argues that the judge imposed consecutive
sentences for aggravated manslaughter and desecration of human
remains without addressing the guidelines for exercise of that
discretion established in Yarbough. Contrary to defendant's
19 A-5760-14T1
claim, the judge provided a statement of reasons addressing
those guidelines. The Yarbough factors are:
(1) there can be no free crimes in a system
for which the punishment shall fit the crime;
(2) the reasons for imposing either a
consecutive or concurrent sentence should be
separately stated in the sentencing decision;
(3) some reasons to be considered by the
sentencing court should include facts relating
to the crimes, including whether or not:
(a) the crimes and their objectives were
predominantly independent of each other;
(b) the crimes involved separate acts of
violence or threats of violence;
(c) the crimes were committed at different
times or separate places, rather than being
committed so closely in time and place as to
indicate a single period of aberrant behavior;
(d) any of the crimes involved multiple
victims; [and]
(e) the convictions for which the sentences
are to be imposed are numerous . . . .
[State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 449 (2017)
(listing the Yarbough guidelines).]
At sentencing, the judge found that these two crimes
deserved more punishment than one and noted that there should be
no free crimes. He considered the separateness of aggravated
manslaughter and the disturbing of human remains and concluded
these separate crimes were "predominantly independent of each
20 A-5760-14T1
another." They clearly were. Defendant killed Harper by
shooting him twice. Subsequently, he buried Harper's body in a
wooded area of his property and covered that site with cement.
Later, he dug up the cement, dismembered the body and moved it
in trash bags to a remote site in the woods. In addition, the
judge found that defendant's disturbance of Harper's remains was
motivated by a purpose independent of the shooting — avoiding
detection and responsibility for killing Harper. The judge
further found these were separate acts of violence, committed
with different weapons, at different times and in different
places. All of those determinations were supported by the
record.
Although the judge did not address the factor on multiple
victims, Harper was the victim of the homicide and disturbing
human remains is a crime against public order and human
sensibilities. This Yarbough factor had no apparent relevance
here. Even if the judge erred by not saying that, the omission
is of no import on these facts, because there is no reasonable
interpretation of the multiple-victim factor that could
reasonably be viewed as favoring concurrent sentences here.
Similarly, the judge did not expressly address the factor
referencing the number of crimes for which defendant was being
sentenced. That is explained by the fact that the judge was
21 A-5760-14T1
sentencing defendant for only two crimes; the State's agreement
to dismiss the six counts charging other crimes made this factor
irrelevant.
Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the
judge's findings and statement of reasons, we have concluded
that they have insufficient merit to warrant any additional
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). The judge's
findings on and balancing of the aggravating and mitigating
factors are supported by adequate evidence in the record, and
the sentence is neither inconsistent with sentencing provisions
of the Code of Criminal Justice nor shocking to the judicial
conscience. See State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010);
State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180-81 (2009).
Affirmed.
22 A-5760-14T1