NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 19 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROD ESLAMI, No. 14-35677
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00837-HA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION, AKA Fannie Mae;
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ancer L. Haggerty, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 11, 2017
Portland, Oregon
Before: BYBEE and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and ZOUHARY,** District
Judge.
Rod Eslami obtained a home loan from World Savings Bank (“World
Savings”) and executed a deed of trust as security. After Eslami defaulted on the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
loan, the property was sold through non-judicial foreclosure. Sixteen months later,
Eslami sued Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the successor to World Savings, and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), the purchaser or assignee
of World Savings’ interest in the loan, seeking to quiet title to the property. He
alleged that there was no recorded assignment of the deed of trust to Fannie Mae,
and therefore the foreclosure sale and resulting deeds were invalid under Or. Rev.
Stat. § 86.735(1).1
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding
Eslami’s § 86.735(1) claim preempted by the federal Home Owners’ Loan Act
(“HOLA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470. It therefore did not address the defendants’
alternative argument—that Eslami’s post-sale claim is barred under Or. Rev. Stat. §
86.770(1). However, we can affirm the district court on any ground supported by
the record. Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th
Cir. 2001). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm on the basis
of § 86.770(1).
1. Eslami’s complaint seeks to invalidate the foreclosure based solely on the
failure to record an assignment of the deed of trust. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 86.735(1).
But, Eslami does not dispute that he was in default or that he received notice of the
1
All statutory references in this disposition are to the Oregon Revised Statutes
in effect in 2012; the relevant statutes were renumbered in 2013. See Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 86.752 (renumbering of § 86.735), 86.797 (renumbering of § 86.770).
2
foreclosure. Under § 86.770(1), “a post-sale challenge must be based on lack of
notice or on some other fundamental flaw in the foreclosure proceedings, such as the
sale being completed without the borrower actually being in default.” Woods v. U.S.
Bank N.A., 831 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Because Eslami
alleges only a “technical defect” under the Oregon Trust Deed Act, rather than any
“violations of subsections that grant substantive rights,” his post-sale claim is barred
by § 86.770(1). Id.; see also DiGregorio v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 381 P.3d
961, 965-67 (Or. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that Oregon law “does not mandate strict
compliance with every provision of the OTDA for a trustee’s sale to be valid” and
thus “where the fundamental premises of [§ 86.770(1)] are satisfied, its provisions
apply”).
2. Eslami argues that his request for equitable relief independently states a
claim. But, his quiet title claim fails because he cannot prove he retained an interest
in the land under § 86.770(1). See Rohner v. Neville, 365 P.2d 614, 618 (Or. 1961).
The complaint’s “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a quiet title action and its
assertion that his claim to title is superior to the defendants’ claim without “further
factual enhancement” do not state a plausible claim to relief. Woods, 831 F.3d at
1162.
3. Given our decision, we need not address whether Eslami’s claim is
preempted under HOLA.
3
AFFIRMED.
4